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# *East versus West*

A. DENIAL OF CONTRAST





# *East versus West*

A DENIAL OF CONTRAST

by

P. KODANDA RAO

*(Servants of India Society)*

Foreword by

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

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WOKING

TO MY CHIEF  
THE RT. HON. V. S. SRINIVASA SASTRI,  
P.C., C.H., LL.D.



## Foreword

My friend, Mr. P. Kodanda Rao (of the Servants of India Society, Poona) has asked me to write a brief Foreword to his book on *East v. West*. I had the pleasure of reading it both in MS. and in proof. I feel that its learned and methodical analysis of the blanket terms East and West, and the many misleading ways in which this distinction is developed to the detriment of human unity and justice, is a serious and valuable contribution to this most interesting and urgent problem.

Till a few centuries ago there was nothing fundamental to distinguish the West from the East. The two have fertilized each other from the beginnings of history. Persia and Greece, India and Greece, Palestine and Europe remind us of cultural contacts. Differences there have been but they were by no means racial or geographical. They were not differences in essentials but only in the distribution of emphasis and so there has been no fundamental conflict between civilizations. Mysticism, unworldliness are frequently to be met with in the West while feverish energy, unscrupulousness and worldliness are not absent in China and India. Respect for human personality, mercy to the poor and the sick, law and justice for all men are spiritual values which flourish in the West, even though for the moment they might be obscured in central Europe, and it will not be fair to characterize the West as commercial and material. Unfortunately, it was in the East the West has seemed to be more selfish than spiritual, for it has come to us with assumptions of superiority which are backed by mechanized militarism and technological power.

My faith is that human nature is everywhere the same and it has developed in different ways, determined by the factors of geography and history. Now that the world has been drawn together by the forces of science and economics, there is need for understanding. I am not arguing for an eclectic synthesis but for an understanding

which will gradually furnish the spiritual basis for world unity. I am persuaded that the new civilization, which is neither Eastern nor Western but world-wide, will build human relationships by means of the great instruments of science and technology on the basic insights of the spiritual value and dignity of man.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

CALCUTTA

*August 8, 1939*

## *P r e f a c e*

THIS little study arose from the writer's participation in the Race Relations seminar under Dr. C. T. Loram in the Yale University in the academic year 1934-35. The subjects of discussion at the seminar were the Introduction of Western Civilization and Western Education to Non-Western Peoples, and the methods and results thereof.

The time spent at the Yale University gave the writer the welcome opportunity as well as the necessary stimulus to formulate the vague and nebulous doubts he had entertained for some years as to the validity and value of the dichotomous division of civilization into Western and Non-Western, or Occidental and Oriental, and to analyse, however inadequately and amateurishly, some of the concepts regarding the correlations and the spread of civilization, current among anthropologists, sociologists and students of civilization. In this study the words "civilization" and "culture" have been treated as synonyms and to comprehend human thought and action in all aspects.

The first part of the study is limited to the enumeration of some of the connotations of the terms Occident and Orient. It is more a survey of such connotations than a criticism thereof, and is intended to lead up to the formulation of the questions to be examined subsequently. The second part is devoted to the examination of the observations of certain writers on the subject of the Occident and the Orient. In order to understand the writers properly and to minimize the risk of doing injustice to their views, it has been found necessary and wise to make adequate extracts from their own writings rather than depend upon scrappy references or summaries. Also, if two writers attach two different meanings to the same word, the criticism of the one by the other becomes invalid. In order to minimize this risk, it is necessary, as far as possible, to take each author by himself.



The third part is devoted to a general review of the correlations of civilization. In it are examined the influence of race on culture, and the determinants of the development and spread of civilization. The last part sums up the tentative conclusions arising from this study. This method of treatment inevitably involves some amount of repetition, which may be minimized but not altogether eliminated.

Such a study must necessarily be inadequate and the results inconclusive. Yet the results, such as they are, tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, the doubts regarding the validity and value of the current concepts of Western and Non-Western Civilizations, and of the development of culture by one group and its diffusion to another. They reveal that several concepts current among students of anthropology, sociology and civilization are invalid. The study seeks to suggest what seems to be a truer interpretation of the nature of civilization, and of its origin and diffusion, particularly the differential diffusion of different culture elements.

The conclusions are, therefore, partly negative and partly positive. Even negative results need not be despised. For progress consists not only in the acquisition of new knowledge, but also in the elimination of old shackling superstitions. And those to whom it is not given to make constructive contributions to human knowledge and wisdom may find consolation in the words of John Milton:

"They also serve who only stand and wait."

P. K. R.

SERVANTS OF INDIA SOCIETY

POONA 4

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# PART I



## *Introduction*

SHOULD the East be Westernized? Is Western Civilization suited to the East? Is it possible to Westernize the East? If so, is it good to do so? Should Western education be imparted to the Oriental, or should he be educated along his own lines? Is the culture of one group suited to another group? Should the culture of one group be imitated by or imposed upon another group? Does not culture contact lead to culture conflict? Does not safety lie in each group evolving along its own lines, and being true to its own genius?

How very often does one come across such questions in current discussions. In order to answer such questions it is necessary, however, to define the terms, Eastern and Western, with reference to civilization. One must know as clearly as possible what is meant by Western Civilization before he can tell if it is good for the Oriental or not.

But to seek to define such terms seems like questioning the obvious. The concept of the division of civilization into Eastern and Western has been so long in use and has so often been used by so many different classes of peoples, from the popular journalist to the more serious student of history and even the student of science who is used to more accurate definition of terms, that it has become almost an axiom of modern thought and language, which it would be superfluous, if not pedantic, to seek to define.

And yet some definition, or approximation to it, is necessary if the questions mentioned above are to be answered intelligently. And the questions are not merely of academic interest, but of practical import. For policies of administration and governance, the relations, public and private, between groups of people, have



often been based and defended on the assumption of the validity and value of the division of civilization into Eastern and Western, and further subdivisions thereof. Anthropologists and sociologists have asked to be consulted in framing such policies, and administrators have increasingly allowed that claim.

While the concept of East and West in civilization—and this applies to several other anthropological and sociological concepts—has influenced public policies, there seems to be as yet no general agreement as to its definition. There are those who affirm that there are two civilizations, Eastern and Western, and that each has had an initial integrated pattern which governed its subsequent development through the ages and will continue to do so in future; others deny it. It has variously been held that Western Civilization was different from, complementary to, contradictory of, and conflicting with, Eastern Civilization. Differences between the two civilizations have variously been held to be correlated with differences in physical environment, in race, in social, economic or political institutions, in outlook, in character and in values. Some have held that Westernization was physically impossible without miscegenation or cross-breeding between races; others have held a contrary view. Some have held that Westernization led to regrettable and even disastrous results; others have denied it. There are still others who deny altogether the concept of a dichotomous division of civilization into Eastern and Western, and postulate only a time sequence: modern and ancient.

In the definition of terms, the social sciences have not yet attained that degree of precision which the physical sciences have attained. Nevertheless, as Mr. G. H. Lane-Fox Pitt-Rivers observed, "It is of the utmost importance that all terms used by anthropologists should be defined without ambiguity and with the greatest precision. This is a truism, of course, which applies equally to every department of science, though possibly the greatest number of offenders may be found in the ranks of social anthropologists and psychologists" (Pitt-Rivers: *The Clash of Cultures and Contact of Races*, p. 5). It may be that a high precision will never be reached. It may be that the very nature of the social sciences militates

against such precision, but there is no reason why efforts should not be made continuously to approximate to it as much as possible.

Though references to East and West are numerous and frequent in numberless books and periodicals and speeches, there has as yet been no comprehensive, concise and authoritative definition of the terms. Neither the *Encyclopædia Britannica* nor the *Encyclopædia of Social Sciences* defines or discusses these concepts. A comprehensive definition would require the exhaustive examination of all culture traits and culture complexes and their classification according as each of them is characteristic of the West or the East, on the general lines indicated in the Culture Scheme of Professor Clark Wissler, of the Yale University, or the more elaborate *questionnaire d'ethnographic* of the French scholar, M. L. Louis Marin. Such an elaborate examination is, however, beyond the limits of this little study.

The other alternative is to examine the views expressed by competent observers on the contrasts between the East and the West, and thereby piece together, as it were, a working definition. Even this is possible only to a limited extent in this study.

## *Geographical Delimitation of East and West*

ORIENT and Occident, East and West, have, primarily, reference to the cardinal points. Orient and East refer to the "rising sun," according to the *New English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, and Occident and West to the opposite, the setting sun. "That region of the heavens in which the sun and other heavenly bodies rise, or the corresponding region of the world or quarter of the compass" is the Orient, the East. Applied to civilization in this sense, it hardly makes any sense; Eastern Civilization is not directed towards the rising sun and Western towards the setting sun. Moreover the sun rises and sets on every point of the equator every day.

Starting from a directional significance, these words soon acquired geographical associations. The Orient is, according to the *New English Dictionary*, "that part of the earth's surface situated to the east of some recognized point of reference." East and West depend on the point of reference. Is there such a definite point of reference? For certain astronomical and geographical purposes the point of reference is the meridian of Greenwich in England. But that is not the same for all purposes. Every geographical area has an East and a West. The meridian of Greenwich does not distinguish the Eastern from the Western Hemisphere, nor Asia from Europe, nor Western Europe from Eastern Europe. In China, according to Dr. Hu Shih, India is sometimes referred to as the "Heaven of the West" (Hu Shih, *Chinese Renaissance*, p. 4). India is East and England is West. As applied to civilizations, East and West, Orient and Occident, have different geographical

associations. The *Dictionary* says that the Orient means "usually those countries immediately east of the Mediterranean or of South Europe, which to the Romans were 'the East'; countries of South-Western Asia or Asia generally." And the West or the Occident means "originally, the countries of Western Europe or of the Western Empire, or Europe as opposed to Asia and the Orient."

In passing, it may be noted that the terms East and West are very often used synonymously with Orient and Occident, though not always so. The former pair of opposites is, as it were, portable, while the latter is stationary. The United States, for instance, has a part called the East and a part called the West. But the former is not called the Orient and the latter the Occident. There is a Western Europe and an Eastern Europe; but no Occidental Europe and Oriental Europe. Orient and Occident have a more fixed geographical connotation.

With reference to Orient and Occident, Professor Clark Wissler says, "It is not always clear what is meant by those who use these terms, but in most cases, merely Asia and Western Europe are meant" (Wissler, *Man and Culture*, p. 232).

Sir Valentine Chirol speaks of the "great borderland of the Occident and Orient extending through Northern Africa and across Western and Central Asia, from the North-Western Atlantic to the shores of the Indian Ocean, even beyond" (Chirol, *The Occident and the Orient*, p. 213).

Professor Hans Kohn, a close student of the subject, includes in the East Turkey, Persia, Egypt, India and China. The Occident is either Europe only or both Europe and America. Russia "represented to a large extent the Orient for the Occident and the Occident for the Orient," and it "has been the meeting place of the East and the West by her history and by her nature" (Kohn, *Orient and Occident*, p. 76).

In his paper, "The Influence of the Culture of the West upon the Nations of Eastern Europe," presented to the International Congress of Anthropology and Ethnology in London in 1934, M. Gaster obviously distinguished the West from South-Eastern Europe, Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania, etc.

In *European Civilization* M. Charles F. Jean writes on "The East" and includes under it Mesopotamia, Egypt, Canaan, Phoenicia, Syria and Persia, while Professor J. L. Myres speaks of "Ancient History" as synonymous with "Oriental History," and the regions in which it flourished as the "Neater East" to "distinguish them from those other regions, in India, China and other sections of the margin of continental Asia" (Eyre, *European Civilization*, Vol. I, p. 89).

The *Cambridge Shorter History of India* suggests that "it may be that the Indus, as in later times under Achaemenids, marked the boundary between east and west and that the culture (of Mohanjodaro) should be linked with Mesopotamia and Iran rather than with India proper" (*Cambridge Shorter History of India*, p. 5).

Professor Harry Elmer Barnes restricts the "Orient" to what is now known as the "Near East" and includes the area between Egypt and Persia. India and China are not included. The West includes the "United States, Canada, England, and the western nations of the continent of Europe. It also includes some of the colonies of these nations, as parts of Australia, South Africa, etc." (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 546).

Mr. Maurice Parmelee says that Occidental culture "originated and has had its principal development in the Mediterranean area. It has spread over the whole of Europe and the Western hemisphere and has been carried wherever men of European origin have established colonies" (Parmelee, *Oriental and Occidental Culture*, p. 11). The Orient and the Occident are, however, not contiguous. For, he says that "between the Orient and the Occident lies an indeterminate zone including Asia Minor, Persia, the Arabian peninsula, Egypt, and the North African littoral . . . it is questionable whether it belongs to the East more than to the West" (*ibid.*, p. 12). After presenting certain facts and arguments, he comes to the conclusion that "the frontier between Oriental and Occidental civilization lies considerably to the east than is usually assumed. Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt and Persia belong to the culture series represented in its later stages by the Mediterranean culture," and hence form part of the West or the Occident.

Professor J. L. Myres speaks of "what has been called elsewhere the north-west quadrant of the Old World land-mass west of Ararat and the Median hills and north of Sahara, the cradle and nursery of the modern 'western world'" (Marvin, *Unity of Western Civilization*, p. 37).

It thus appears that from the geographical point of view the terms East and West, Orient and Occident, have no uniform and definite meaning: no such definiteness as, for instance, Asia and Europe.

## *Racial and Cultural Connotations*

HAVING noted that there is no unanimous agreement as to the geographical limits of either the East or the West, we may pass on to note some of the racial and cultural implications of the East and the West.

Apart from the astronomical and geographical connotations, the *New English Dictionary* gives two others. The Occident meant Christendom and Orient meant peoples to the east of Christendom, which means non-Christian or heathen. The contrast here is religious.

Orient also meant "brilliant, lustrous," and superior, while Occident stood for the opposite qualities.

These two connotations are not, however, exhaustive. For when Japan is said to be Westernized, it is not meant that she is Christianized or become inferior.

Professor Malcolm M. Willey gives a definition of Western Civilization without, however, instituting or implying a contrast with Eastern Civilization when he says: "We ourselves are living in a vast culture area that embraces the United States, Canada, England, and the Western *nations* of the continent of Europe. It also includes some of the colonies of these nations, as parts of Australia, South Africa, etc. This Euro-American culture area has centred within it a civilization that is as readily distinguished as were the Plains Indian, or the Eskimo civilizations. In fundamental complexes the peoples in this vast area are much alike: they are Christians; they are highly mechanized; they are nationalistic; democratic tendencies are common; their artistic and literary efforts conform to much the same plans—their social heritage constitutes an immense civilization. It is what we mean when we

say 'Western Civilization' " (Davis and Barne<sub>y</sub>, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 546). The racial implication is implicit. The people of the United States and South Africa included in this definition are the white people, and not the Plains Indians or the Bantu. Professor Willey makes it explicit when he later refers to Western Civilization as "white civilization" (ibid., p. 547).

Dr. Ruth Benedict, a distinguished anthropologist, in her recent book, *Patterns of Culture*, uses "Western Civilization," "white civilization," "European civilization" and "modern civilization" as synonymous and contrasts them with "primitive civilizations." Whatever Western may mean, white refers to race, European refers to geographical position and modern refers to time. Primitive is used not in the sense of being ancient in time but simpler in structure. Both Western and Primitive Civilizations may be contemporary, but the latter has fewer culture traits than the former, and is, therefore, less complicated.

Professor Harry E. Barnes refers to the Orient more as a period in the history of civilization than as a contrast with the Occident. He speaks of the "Oriental period" (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 73), of "Oriental times" (ibid., p. 77), and the "ancient orient" (ibid., p. 80). He arranges civilizations in this sequence: Primitive, Oriental, Classical, Modern and Contemporary. He does not contrast Oriental Civilization with Occidental right through history, but only in the Contemporary period. "It is this tendency (mechanical standardization) which has served very gradually, but very surely, to build up a remarkable contrast between Occidental and Oriental Civilizations in the last century and a half. We who dwell in the Occident have assumed it as self-evident, without argument, that the mechanical civilization of the West is superior to the more mystical, idealistic and individualistic culture of the Orient. But of late both Oriental writers and Occidental scholars, with any insight, have come to see that this judgment is not wholly valid, and many of the attitudes and influences of the Oriental culture are more profound and enduring than many contrasting phases of our highly artificial, machine-made, money-chasing civilization in the West" (ibid., pp. 172-73).



While thus Professor Barnes sees a contrast only in the Contemporary period, Professor Clark Wissler of Yale University contends that it was there even in Palaeolithic times. He says: "There is another line of cleavage that is usually considered fundamental, that between the Orient and the Occident. It is not always clear what is meant by those who use these terms, but in most cases merely Asia and Western Europe are meant. In historical discussions the peoples of these two areas are taken as antagonistic and it is certainly true that wherever the upholders of European cultures have met with serious trouble, the causes lay in the Orient. This seems to be true in Palaeolithic times. So from that day to this the leaders of both the West and the East have kept one hand on the sword. One may suspect such an old feud to be based upon something more than the commonplace; so culture incompatibility may be at the bottom of it. The cause and the locus of this fault line—to borrow a term from geology—is not well understood. We see it in the culture complexes, however" (Wissler, *Man and Culture*, pp. 232-33).

As illustrations of this fundamental culture incompatibility, Professor Wissler mentions only the differences between the Orient and the Occident in art, poetry, sports and festive gatherings. "In general, we say that Oriental art is highly conventionalized and does not strive to be realistic, while Occidental work approaches exactness in reproduction" (*ibid.*, p. 233). "Phonetic writing" which "set the pattern for the Occident" stood out "in contrast to Oriental methods" (*ibid.*, p. 234). "The boisterous gathering of men around the 'flowing bowl' is peculiarly Occidental" in contrast to the "lounging before a kind of ballet, with orchestra accompaniment and attending slaves; altogether a suave artistic procedure" of the Orient (*ibid.*, p. 234). The "Occidental pattern" of the conventionalization of play and athletics, "which we call sport, is another contrast to the Oriental world" (*ibid.*, p. 236). "The sport conception is truly Occidental, whether boxing, cricket, rowing, or any other of its well-known forms" (*ibid.*, p. 236).

If these be the only or the principal contrasts between the Occidental and the Oriental cultures, if the differences were only

of art, music, writing, poetry, sports, and such like, it is not very obvious how and why they should lead to so serious a conflict between the Orient and the Occident that each kept one hand on the sword and that, too, since Palaeolithic times.

It should be added in parenthesis that Professor Wissler finds the classification of civilization into Occidental and Oriental inadequate. He adds the "Middle American culture" of the "aboriginal America" as the "third great culture province" (ibid., p. 241). He prefers also to use "Euro-American" in the place of "Occidental," as Occidental culture extends beyond Europe to America.

The dominant characteristics of Euro-American culture, says Professor Wissler, are "*mechanical invention, mass education, and universal suffrage*" (ibid., p. 5). He does not affirm that these are characteristic of the West in contrast to the East. Whether they characterize both or only one, they do not seem to justify a conflict between the West and the East, much less from Palaeolithic times, if only for the reason that these characteristics are of recent origin even in the West.

The differences between the Occident and the Orient, which Professor Wissler postulates, are, according to him, conditioned by the different geographical environment of each at its genesis. "The schism, therefore, between Occidental culture and the Oriental is, as we have hinted, the old one between the *mesa* and the *tundra*. Occidental cultures were conditioned by the ways of the *tundra*" (ibid., p. 240-41). The *tundra* are the lowland region of "coniferous forests, fading out into the treeless tundra" in Northern Europe and Asia. The Oriental is conditioned by the *mesa*, the highland region which forms "the backbone of the world" from Gibraltar to Alaska, across central Asia and Tibet. "The old fundamental *mesa* culture is the same for the Neolithic highlands of Europe, Egypt, Sumeria, Babylonia, India and China" (ibid., p. 240). In so far as culture is conditioned by *mesa* and *tundra* and inasmuch as they both traverse both Asia and Europe from the Pacific to the Atlantic and as the *tundra* is to the north of the *mesa*, it would be more appropriate to speak of a Northern, *tundra*,

culture and a Southern, *mesa*, culture, instead of Western and Eastern.

The differences in the culture patterns of the Occident and the Orient at the dawn of these cultures have not, according to Professor Wissler, a mere historical significance as facts of ancient history, but they have a continuing significance, for he holds that "once these initial steps were taken, the patterns were set, and from that day until now have ruled with an iron hand" (*ibid.*, p. 237). We shall return at a later stage to the concept of pattern and its binding character.

Like Professor Wissler, Professor Arnold J. Toynbee considers the division of civilization into Occidental and Oriental inadequate. But while the former would add the Middle American, the latter would acknowledge five living civilizations or, as he calls them, "societies." They are the "Western, the Orthodox Christian, Islamic, Hindu and Far Eastern" (Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. I, p. 51). He recognizes two "societies" in the Occident and three in the Orient. He scoffs at the concept of an Oriental civilization. He says: "In Western minds the egocentric illusion . . . is fortified by the catchword of the 'Unchanging East' which compounds the three living civilizations of Islam, Hinduism and the Far East under the nondescript epithet 'Oriental,' and which carries the assumption that they all differ in equal measure from the civilization of the West and that they are indistinguishable from one another and from any of the extinct civilizations except the Hellenic and perhaps the Minoan. In reality, Islam has less in common with either the Hindu and the Far Eastern civilizations than it has with the orthodox Christian and the Western, while the gulfs that divide the Hindu and the Far Eastern Civilization from ours are possibly not so wide as the gulf which divides them from one another. . . . The catchword of the 'Unchanging East' collapses at a touch; and we are left wondering how this vulgar error can ever have obtained its hold" (*ibid.*, p. 164).

The geographical area of the Western "society" of Professor Toynbee is limited to "what the Romans had known as Gaul" together with "lateral extensions into the northern parts of Italy

beyond the Alps and into the southern parts of Britain beyond the Channel" (ibid., p. 32).

The dominant features of this Western Civilization at the "close of the age preceding our own," or approximately about the "third quarter of the nineteenth century," were the "industrial system of economy" and "Democracy," or "responsible parliamentary representative Government in a sovereign independent national State" (ibid., p. 1). There has been a shift since. "Industrialism and Democracy, rather, Industrialism and Nationalism, are the two forces which have exercised dominion *de facto* over our Western Society in our age" (ibid., p. 9).

While Professors Wissler and Toynbee assume culture areas with characteristic cultures, Mahatma Gandhi denies the concept of Western and Eastern Civilizations. Said the Mahatma:

"(1) There is no impassable barrier between East and West.

"(2) There is no such thing as Western or European Civilization, but there is a modern civilization which is purely material.

"(3) The people of Europe, before they were touched by modern civilization, had much in common with the people of the East, anyhow the people of India, and even to-day Europeans who are not touched by modern civilization are far better able to mix with Indians than the offspring of that civilization.

"(4) It is not the British people who are ruling India, but it is modern civilization, through its railways, telegraph, telephone, and almost every invention which has been claimed as a triumph of civilization" (Speer, *Race and Race Relations*, p. 126).

Sir Gilbert Murray does not take the same view as Mahatma Gandhi does. "All generalizations," he says, "about whole nations or groups of nations are superficial and inaccurate, even when made by scientific students without personal bias. And most of these actually current are made by prejudiced and utterly unscientific partisans. People talk loosely of the difference in character between 'Nordic' and 'Latin' nations, or, in still looser phrase, between 'East and West,' violently denouncing the one and praising the other. Even when there is no actual prejudice at work, the comparisons, though sometimes suggestive, are never exact. For one thing,

neither side of the comparison is uniform: every German is different from every other German, every Italian from every other Italian: nor can you make any single statement that will be true of all Indians or of all Englishmen. . . . I am always puzzled by the people who ask me 'Do I like Indians,' or it may be Americans, or Frenchmen: and can only answer, as I would about my own countrymen, that I like some and do not like others" (Murray-Tagore, *East and West*, pp. 12-14).

"Yet," he proceeds to say, "the differences are there and are felt, though they cannot be analysed" (*ibid.*, p. 14). "Yes," he repeats, "the differences are there: they are real and perhaps to a certain extent they are national and racial, though not as much as people imagine" (*ibid.*, p. 19).

Granting that there are fundamental differences, which might be felt but not analysed, there are those who hold that they do not necessarily involve a conflict. Mr. Robert E. Speer refers to the view of Lord Ronaldshay, a great student of Hindu civilization, that the unrest in India was due to "heat generated by the clash of two conflicting ideals, the offspring of two different outlooks upon the universe, those of the East and the West respectively" (Speer, *Race and Race Relations*, p. 157). On which he comments thus: "This view of the fundamental conflict between the Eastern and Western races is altogether too common. . . . But in the first place, there is no united East nor any united West. There is no united India. The clash of ideals of which the Earl of Ronaldshay spoke is a clash in India quite as truly as between India and the West. In the second place, as Professor Renisch argued, there is no irrepressible conflict between Oriental and Western Civilization. On the contrary, they are complementary to each other, not necessarily competitive" (*ibid.*, p. 157).

Dr. Rabindranath Tagore contests the view that the West is materialistic. He says: "Unfortunately for us, however, the one outstanding relationship of Europe with Asia to-day is one of exploitation; in other words, its origins are commercial and material" (Murray-Tagore, *East and West*, p. 43). "But this, as we realize, is only one side, however real and painful, of the Western

Civilization as it appears to us in the East. Western humanity, when not affected by its unnatural relationship with the East, preserves a singular strength of moral conduct in the domain of its social life, which has its great inspiration for all of us" (*ibid.*, p. 47).

While Professor Wissler thought that the differences between the Orient and the Occident lay in the spheres of art, literature and sports, Dr. George Sarton, the historian of science, holds that the "essential difference between East and West is that the latter overcame scholasticism, while the former did not. . . . It is not so much a matter of temperament, for there are men of Eastern temperament (for instance, the belated schoolmen) in the West and *vice versa*. It is a matter of fundamental method. . . . For example, Japan is becoming more and more a part of the West, so far as the intellectual mission of mankind is concerned. On the contrary, some European nations, which prefer argument to experiment, are orientalized, I mean, immobilized, to that extent. The great intellectual division of mankind is not along geographic or racial lines but between those who understand and practice the experimental method and those who do not understand and who do not practice it" (Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, Vol. I, p. 29). It will be noticed that Dr. Sarton gives two different meanings to East and West. The first is geographical: those that live in the West are Western. The second refers to intellectual method: the experimental method is Western. So that Orientals in location may be Occidentals in method and *vice versa*.

It is used in another sense still. "Mrs. Joachim Dege," reported the Berlin Correspondent of the *New York Times* on July 1, 1935, "goes so far as to call the National Socialist attitude toward women 'reactionary and Oriental' because it sought to 'orientalize' German women by running counter to the 'feminine emancipation movement.'" In this connection it is interesting to recall that at the International Congress of Women held at Istanbul in April 1935, Oriental women offered to help their Occidental sisters from being orientalized in the Occident!

Yet another connotation of orientalization is offered by Mr. A. Mervin Davis in his recent book, *Strange Destiny: A Biography of*

*Warren Hastings*, reviewed by Mr. P. W. Wilson in the *New York Times* of March 31, 1935. Mr. Davis had stated that Warren Hastings was "like a ruthless despot hewing his way to victory," that "he had been in India too long and adopted too many Indian ways of thought and action" and that his "nature had been thoroughly orientalized." Later in the review Mr. Wilson himself has the following: "If Nuncomar forged, what about Clive? When in India, he did not hesitate to do as India did." Taken at their face value, ruthless despotism would be the Oriental way and forgery the Indian way.

Dr. James R. Angell, the President of Yale University, in his Baccalaureate Address in June 1935, in expressing his severe condemnation of Russian Communism, said that "its cruelty is Oriental." Unlike the others referred to above, he did not consider it necessary to elucidate the significance of Oriental in this connection, perhaps because it was well understood by his audience.

Similarly, Mr. Arthur Mayhew does not pause to explain the significance of Oriental when he speaks of the "atmosphere of Oriental domesticity" and of a "wife, whose lovable charm is wholly Oriental" (Mayhew, *The Education of India*, p. 189).

Others are careful to explain what they mean by Oriental when they have occasion to use it. For instance, Mr. Hallet Abend, the special correspondent of the *New York Times* in Peiping, China, writing in that paper of June 9, 1935, says that "although Japan and China have not been technically at war since the summer of 1895, they have actually been at war since 1931. It has been a peculiar and typically Oriental kind of warfare." He anticipates that "by devious 'face-saving' and entirely Oriental devices Japan and China may accomplish for themselves what the League of Nations could not accomplish for them."

Mr. Hartley Withers thus refers to Oriental politeness: "In this very early and curious example of a bargain we find the seller continually expressing reluctance to sell and asking the buyer to accept as a gift the commodity he wants. It appears from the sequel that this is merely an example of Oriental politeness. At any rate,

the end of the bargain was that Abraham paid the "honey" (Marvin, *Unity of Western Civilization*, p. 201).

Mr. Hugh Byas, writing in the *New York Times Magazine* of February 10, 1935, on "Nervous Japan gripped by Spyphobia," says that "Japan, which had eradicated most of the Oriental epidemics of Asia, still harbours the Oriental mental disease, spyphobia. . . . It has been so in all Oriental systems of government." It is not quite clear if Mr. Byas suggests that spyphobia is peculiar to the Orient, and is absent or rare in the Occident, or whether there is an Oriental type of disease distinct from a corresponding type in the Occident. He could not have meant that spyphobia does not exist in the Occident.

On the other hand, Mr. George E. Sokolsky, in his article on "Equality: the Japanese Mirage" in the *New York Times Magazine* of December 9, 1934, speaks of the "Western mind" as opposed to that of the Japanese. "If, to the West, Japan's thinking on many questions seems muddled, it need only be realized that it really is muddled. Because her thinking is a complex formed by her search for equality, which is aggressive, and Confucian restraints, which are humble, the actual expression of the thought is too complicated and indirect for the Western mind. Often, in fact, an appearance of being deceitful is the result; for in view of the existence of such an intellectual complex the synchronization between thought and expression in word and action will be exceedingly poor." Mr. Mayhew also speaks of the Western attitude of mind. He asserts that "the fruitful assimilation of Western ideas involved a Western attitude of mind," which meant "a close connection between ideas and facts, and the repression, not encouragement, of emotion not likely to find an outlet in constructive action" (Mayhew, *The Education of India*, p. 59). And the Western ideas referred to were "English literature," "Western philosophy," and "the political and social ideas" of Europe, particularly, the "idea of liberty."

As against this, Mr. Herbert H. Gowen suggests that "we should consider whether the talk about an 'Oriental mind' is the outcome of fact or is a mere product of Occidental stupidity. We shall



certainly have to consider whether there is any hard and fast distinction between East and West" (Gowen, *Asia*, p. 13).

Passing reference may also be made to some other connotations of Oriental and Occidental. Lord Morley speaks of "Oriental evasion" (Lady Minto, *India: Minto and Morley*, p. 250). Mr. Lothrop Stoddard says that "one major factor in the Orient's present crisis is over-population. This is mainly due to Westernism" (Stoddard, *Clashing Tides of Colour*, p. 210). "In the East," he says, "luck and caprice are more prized than the 'security' cherished in the West. . . . And it is precisely this gambler's interest which westernization is eliminating" (ibid., p. 181). "The idea of comfort, imported from the West, has disrupted the East more profoundly than all our guns and missionaries put together" (ibid., p. 189). Referring to India, Mr. Mayhew speaks of the "development of the material resources of the country and of the training required for this essentially western work" (Mayhew, *The Education of India*, p. 14). Mr. Mayhew must have meant the development of material resources by *power-driven machinery*, for the development of material resources by manual labour had an earlier start and reached a higher stage of development in the East than in the West and motivated the voyages of discovery and commercial expansion of the West since the fifteenth century.

A writer in the *New York Times* says that "the modern house will be something like a box or something like an Oriental palace, severely cubical" (*New York Times*, July 13, 1935).

In support of the monetization of silver, Lord Hudson, Sir Henri Deterding and Sir Montagu de P. Webb urged that "a continued neglect to incorporate silver in the world's supply of legal tender may jeopardize and possibly wreck Western Civilization" (*The Leader*, Allahabad, India, October 4, 1934). Civilization, it may be recalled, includes not only financial matters, but languages, literatures, religions, superstitions, habits, and customs and ever so many other elements.

Even casual reading will bring up many more, and some startling, connotations of the terms Western and Eastern. But enough has been said to indicate their great variety.

## *Integrity of Civilizations, Acculturation, and Values*

IN the previous chapter the variety of implications of Occident and Orient has been noted. In the present chapter the variety of opinions regarding the integrity of civilizations, acculturation and values may be sketched.

Mr. Lothrop Stoddard anxiously enquires: "Can our distinctively Western Civilization be successfully transplanted and generalized?" (Stoddard, *Clashing Tides of Colour*, p. 407). He raises this question because he agrees with Mr. Lowes Dickinson when the latter held that "Civilization is a whole. Its arts, its religion, its way of life, all hang together with its economic and technical development. I doubt whether a nation can pick and choose" (*ibid.*, p. 195).

While maintaining that each civilization is an integral whole, Mr. Lowes Dickinson does not contend that it cannot be acquired by another civilization. Only it must be taken as a whole. "So, I expect," says Mr. Dickinson, "the East to follow us, whether it like it or no, into all these excesses, and to go right through, not round, all that we have been through on its way to a higher phase of civilization" (*ibid.*, p. 196).

Mr. Pitt-Rivers agrees with Mr. Dickinson with respect to the integrity of culture, but contends that acculturation is possible only with blood-mixture. He quotes with approval Professor Bronislaw Malinowski's thesis that "in every type of civilization, every custom, material object, idea and belief fulfils some vital function, has some task to accomplish, represents an indispensable part within a

working whole" (Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Cultures and Contact of Races*, p. 9). He goes so far as to hold that magic and sorcery, slavery and polygamy, are indispensable for the integrity of certain cultures. Even head-hunting may be an indispensable element of a culture (*ibid.*, p. 239).

Somewhat different is the view urged by Professor A. L. Kroeber of the University of California, and his associate, Mr. H. E. Driver. They say: "While we are not prepared to answer this question categorically, we believe that culture traits are in the main, if not in absolutely all cases, independent" (Driver and Kroeber, *Quantitative Expression of Cultural Relationships*, p. 212). They further contend that such is the opinion of nine-tenths of competent and authoritative anthropologists.

As regards acculturation, Mr. Pitt-Rivers holds that "the supposed ability to 'raise a people in cultural level' as also the phenomenon of a degradation of culture is, in either case, dependent upon a blood substitution in the population" (Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Cultures and Contact of Races*, p. 13). Professor Arnold J. Toynbee urges a different view. "The upshot of our enquiry is to discredit the hypothesis of a natural law in which the creation of civilization is supposedly revealed as a peculiar racial function of particular branches of the human family" (Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. I, p. 239).

Mr. Pitt-Rivers believes that acculturation is fraught with such disastrous consequences that he appeals to the "rising generation of our black-skinned subjects" that they may "learn to value whatever is sound or beautiful in their own culture, in which may be found the surest promise of their own racial achievement in place of blindly following the lead of people whose proffered cultural gifts they can never truly make their own" (Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Cultures and Contact of Races*, p. 241). On the other hand, Dr. Hans Kohn contends that a universal civilization is growing up all over the world.

In a letter, dated September 14, 1908, to Lord Minto, then Viceroy of India, Lord Morley, then Secretary of State for India, said: "You speak of our having 'too much respect for the doctrines

of the Western world, quite unsuited to the East.' Well, if I were in my famous suite of rooms at Government House, I would make bold to ask what doctrines? And what are we in India for? Surely to implant slowly, prudently, judiciously those ideas of justice, law and humanity, which are the foundations of our own civilization" (Lady Minto, *India: Minto and Morley*, p. 250). It is apparent that both Morley and Minto agreed that the doctrines of the West were different from those of the East, but while Minto held the former unsuited to the East, Morley thought that, given time and patience, they could be implanted in the East.

Granting that acculturation is possible even without blood-mixture or miscegenation, what of its results? Mr. Stoddard anxiously asks, "Will the outcome be for good or for ill? Is the leaven of Westernism a vital tonic or is it a baneful toxin infecting the East with death and decay? An old adage states that 'one man's meat is another man's poison'" (Stoddard, *Clashing Tides of Colour*, p. 206).

Mr. Arminius Vámbéry has no doubt that it was all to the good. "When fanatics and enthusiasts profess that our culture in Asia has only engendered poverty and misery, and that the coming of the Westerners has been a curse to mankind in the East, these expressions are merely the outcome of a morbid fancy, or of total ignorance of the real situation. . . . Only arrant malevolence or wilful blindness can persist in seeing a disadvantage in the activity displayed by Western lands in favour of the Asiatic world" (Speer, *Race and Race Relations*, pp. 297-98).

Mr. Herbert A. Gowen is not so sure of it. "What of the influence of the West upon the East?" he asks, and wonders: "Will it merely brutalize and materialize the spirit of the Orient, or will it help to lift up vast populations of the over-worked and under-fed to better standards of living and the enjoyment of life?" (Gowen, *Asia*, p. 404).

General J. C. Smuts, the scientist, statesman, and philosopher of South Africa, said in his speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, on November 13, 1934, that "the past record of the West in the East is not one to be proud of or to be

further copied. While mindful of our duty and responsibility as trustees for the greatest civilization that this earth has ever known, we should avoid the assumption of superiority. Not the mailed fist, but the friendly helping hand, should be in future the symbol of our association with Asia."

## *The Problem Stated*

AFTER thus surveying in the previous chapters the variety of connotations and opinions regarding Western and Eastern Civilizations, we may now proceed to frame the issues, as it were, with a view to examining them in the light of evidence.

One view is well expressed by Professor Toynbee when he said that "Our Western Civilization happens to have emerged and developed among peoples in Western Europe who belong, in their physique, to certain varieties of the 'White Race' which ethnologists have labelled 'Caucasian' " (Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. I, p. 209). It is a mere coincidence and not a correlation. Another view links up, tacitly or expressly, the three factors of race, geographical situation and culture, and divides civilization into two patterns, the Occidental and the Oriental. Each of these is conceived as an integral whole, but the two are mutually opposed. Some authorities go so far as to contend that these two patterns were formed at the dawn of civilization and were conditioned by two different geographical environments. Once they were set, they have conditioned and will continue to condition with an "iron hand" all subsequent evolution of each pattern. All developments must, in consequence, conform to the particular pattern and each civilization can and must develop along its own lines. Any attempt to blend cultures will only result, on account of incompatibility, in failure and frustration, if not worse.

Yet another view holds that acculturation is possible, but inasmuch as each civilization is an integrated unit, it must be accepted as a whole. It is not possible for one culture to pick and choose from another.

There are those who hold that culture is a function of race, and

hence no acculturation is possible without race-mixture. Others take the opposite view.

Some go so far as to contend that Eastern and Western Civilizations are fundamentally conflicting. Others hold that, while they are different, they are not conflicting but complementary. Yet others grant that they are different but confess that the differences are felt but elude definition. Still others deny the concept of the spacial division of civilization into Eastern and Western and affirm that there is only a modern civilization as opposed to ancient civilization.

Among those who admit the possibility and the actuality of the westernization of the East, some contend that it was beneficial; others contend that it was unfavourable, while yet others are still in doubt. Some wonder if what is good for the West will be good for the East.

It is of some practical importance to know which of these conflicting views is correct. If Western culture is linked with race, acculturation will be possible only by miscegenation. If it is correlated with a geographical environment, acculturation will be possible only by migrations or by the artificial modification of the geographical environment. If it is an integrated pattern, an organic whole as it were, acculturation will involve the taking over of the whole as a unit; if it is an aggregate of traits which at any moment are found together by accident but which are capable of independent diffusion, acculturation may be partial and selective.

If, on the other hand, Western Civilization means modernization, it will only mean that the West is ahead of the East, and there is a lag in time, but no difference in kind and quality. The East may catch up by putting forth extra effort and speed. If, however, Oriental means an historic period some centuries ago, the question of westernizing the Orient does not arise at all. For it is the twentieth century now for both the Occident and the Orient.

If Western Civilization connotes certain desirable qualities, mental and moral, such as devotion to truth, science, and progress, loyalty to principles, kindness and mercy, justice, humanity, etc., and if Eastern Civilization connotes the contrary qualities, the two

are certainly in conflict with each other; they have been in the past and will be in the future. They are incompatible with each other, even as light and darkness. And there can be no doubt as to which is the better. Nothing can be more desirable than that westernization must become universal. It cannot be meat for the West and poison for the East.

If these good qualities are correlated with race, they can be acquired only by miscegenation, if even so. If, however, they are correlated with some mutable factor, like habitation, religion, education, economic and political environment, they may be acquired without miscegenation.





## PART II



## *Dr. Hu Shih on East and West*

HAVING finished the preliminary investigation of the problem, and having framed the issues, we may now proceed to call in witnesses, as it were, and examine their evidence. The first witness is Dr. Hu Shih, who is perhaps the greatest living Chinese savant and who, in the magnitude of his influence on his fellow beings, is often compared with Mahatma Gandhi and Lenin. In his Haskell Lectures delivered as recently as 1933, he dwells primarily upon the influence of Western Civilization on China. And in doing so, he takes up the larger question of East and West.

He starts his study in contrast by the statement that the difference between Western and Eastern Civilizations was a new thing, that "before 1600, before the rise of the new science and the Industrial Revolution, there was no real difference between the East and the West" (Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance*, p. 63). He had himself stated earlier elsewhere that "The difference between the Eastern and Western Civilizations is primarily a difference in the tools used. The West has, during the last two hundred years, moved far ahead of the East merely because certain Western nations have been able to devise new tools for the conquest of nature and for the multiplication of the power to do work. The East, whence have come a number of epoch-making tools of ancient civilization, has failed to carry on that great tradition and is left behind in the stage of manual labour while the Western world has long entered the age of steam and electricity" (*ibid.*, p. 63). Since taking this view he has moved further, and in the Haskell Lectures he raises the question, "Whether or not there was some fundamental difference between the intellectual tradition of the East and that of the West which may account for the vast differences in the later stages of their respective

cultural development." He came to the conclusion that there was a fundamental difference and that it was "so great and basic that one is almost justified in saying that all the vast differences in the most recent times which so sharply mark off the Western Civilization from the Eastern have been determined or predetermined by this early difference in intellectual pursuit and endeavour" (ibid., p. 64). He goes further still when he says "that the difference is not of degree of emphasis but it is a difference in degree, which, in the course of time, becomes a difference in kind" (ibid., p. 65). As an illustration of this fundamental difference in kind and not merely in degree, Mr. Hu Shih states that "the ancient leaders of India were developing great religious systems, the Chinese were working out their moral and political philosophies, and the Greeks, who could rival their Chinese contemporaries in their philosophizing about morals and government, were remarkably different in their predominant interest in the objects of nature, in mathematics, in geometry, and in mechanics" (ibid., p. 65).

After saying all this, he refers, with legitimate pride, to the achievements of the Chinese in the sphere of science during the last twenty years! If the cultures of the West and China were fundamentally different, and different in *kind*, and if from a very early age the "intellectual developments of the Chinese and the Greeks were already taking radically divergent directions" (ibid., p. 66), the recent application to science by the Chinese would have been impossible; there could be no convergence of the Chinese and the Greek traditions. Nor would Western Civilization ever extend to all the peoples of the world as Mr. Hu Shih implies when he says: "The modern conflict of these diverse civilizations, viewed in the light of history, is only one of the latest scenes of the great drama of world-conquest by the new civilization which began in Western Europe and spread both east and west with ever-increasing force and vigour until both its eastward and westward movements finally met in the great arena of East Asia" (ibid., p. 2). It should be added here that by conquest Mr. Hu Shih does not mean that Western Civilization was imposed on China by a foreign nation by force or conquest; nor even by the indigenous ruling class, as

was the case in Japan. In China, Western Civilization spread by what he calls "diffused assimilation" without the intervention of a "powerful ruling class" or "centralized leadership in culture control" (ibid., p. 24).

In which case there does not seem to be a fundamental difference in kind between Chinese and Western Civilization, as Mr. Hu Shih has affirmed. He quotes Mr. Wang T'ao as among those who held the "civilization of the West" in unreserved admiration, and Mr. Wang T'ao had said: "My observation is that the political life of England embodies the best ideals of our classical antiquity" (ibid., p. 33). Even in the more limited field of science, Mr. Hu Shih asserts that the Chinese philosophers had the "scientific spirit" (ibid., p. 67), but they had "no method" (ibid., p. 67). Subsequently, however, he says that the "philosophy of scientific investigation of the twelfth century had at last found a workable method in the seventeenth. This scientific spirit and methodology placed the new scholarship on a solid basis and produced the age of scientific research in the humanistic and historical studies during the last three hundred years" (ibid., pp. 69-70). Later on, Mr. Hu Shih says that a recent revolution in sinological studies has made the Chinese youth to understand that the "so-called procedure of science is, after all, not so alien and strange to the Chinese intellectual tradition" (ibid., p. 77).

The real difference that Mr. Hu Shih has in view is the *subject matter* of the studies of the Greeks and of the Chinese philosophers: while the former studied both the humanistic and the scientific subjects, the latter confined themselves to the humanistic and the historical. Granting that this is historically true, notwithstanding the pursuit of astronomy by the Chinese (ibid., p. 28), what is the significance of it? It is often stated that Vienna and Edinburgh Universities are famous for the study of medicine, and Oxford excels in the classics, while Cambridge is pre-eminent in mathematics. Taking this to be true, does it follow that there is a wider and deeper significance in these resemblances and differences? Even in the same university all professors and scholars do not study the same subject; they take different subjects. Dr. Hu Shih contrasts the

subject matter of the learning of the West and the East during the last three hundred years and concludes that while Galileo, Kepler, Boyle, Harvey, and Newton worked with the objects of nature, with stars, balls, inclining planes, telescopes, microscopes, prisms, chemicals and numbers and astronomical tables, "their Chinese contemporaries worked with books, words and documentary evidences" (*ibid.*, pp. 70-71), and he says that this contrast makes "the fundamental difference between their fields of work all the more conspicuous." But it does not explain why Galileo and Kepler did not study chemistry and the science of war, and Boyle and Harvey did not study marine engineering and the science of the navy, aspects of Western Civilization which, according to Mr. Hu Shih, most impressed the non-European peoples.

But granting that Chinese Civilization is fundamentally different in kind from Western Civilization, it does not seem to extend to the whole of the East: it is not a contrast between the West and the East. For, Japan, if no other country, has rapidly adopted Western Civilization, not excluding "the mastery of the martial phase of Western Civilization, which is the most difficult for an Oriental race to learn" (*ibid.*, p. 13). Mr. Hu Shih says that "in the brief course of little more than half a century Japan not only has become undoubtedly a past-master of all the arts and weapons with which the West once threatened to overpower her, but is now actually threatening to out-Herod the Herods of the Western world in industrial and commercial expansion as well as in military and naval rivalry" (*ibid.*, p. 3). Mr. Hu Shih contrasts the rapid and centrally-directed westernization of Japan with the slow, voluntary and evolutionary westernization of China. The fact that both the peoples are of the East has not produced similar reactions in them towards Western Civilization, but each reacted differently. Apparently the distinction is not between East and West but between the West and China and Japan.

Perhaps Mr. Hu Shih's own earlier diagnosis is more accurate. The difference between Eastern and Western Civilization was one of tools. Till A.D. 1600 there was no difference between the two; if anything, the East had better tools; but since then the West has

forged better tools and has gone ahead of the East. And now the culture of the West is diffusing to the East. Both Japan and China are being "westernized"; only the speed of the diffusion has been, for reasons given by Mr. Hu Shih, more rapid in Japan than in China. And even China is now catching up. *There has been a lag in time but no difference in kind.*

*But even this difference in time is not as between East and West. The development of any tool or idea was not synchronistic all over the West. Every development started with one individual and gradually, fast or slow, diffused to others.* And the diffusion did not stop with the boundaries of the West. Mr. Hu Shih quotes with approval Professor R. H. Tawney when he said that "the phenomena which disturbed the balance was the rise of the great industry, first in England, and then, a generation later, on the continent of Europe and in the United States" (ibid., p. 63). The reasons for the differential diffusion, the more rapid diffusion to Europe and the United States and a much later diffusion to Japan and China, is perhaps due partly to the distances and the means of communications. In the earlier days, communications, whether in the East or the West, were comparatively slow; to-day they are more rapid wherever, either in the East or in the West, rapid means of communications have been adopted. With the result that tools and ideas travel much faster to-day than ever before. Mr. Hu Shih himself thus refers to it. "And the rapidity of it all! Within my own life, I read all the beloved novels by lamps of vegetable oil; I saw the Standard Oil invading my own village, I saw gas lamps in Chinese shops in Shanghai; and I saw their elimination by electric lights. . . . And my people travelled with me from the vegetable oil lamp to electricity, from the wheelbarrow to the Ford car, if not to the aeroplane, and this in less than forty years' time" (ibid., p. 96). Perhaps the West took longer than forty years to change over from the oil lamp to electricity, and perhaps oil lamps still survive in some rural and backward parts of the West as in similar parts of the East.

Apart from the speed, the character of the change in civilization has been graphically pictured by Mr. Hu Shih. "Throughout the nineteenth century, various kinds of manufactured goods gradually



came in and became first the luxuries of the *élite*, then the necessities of the cities, and finally articles of every-day use by the people. Slowly and imperceptibly, but irresistibly, the imported goods found their way into villages and farms, and replaced all their rivals of native make. Thus matches replaced the old-fashioned tinder-box of iron and flint; the kerosene lamp the vegetable oil; the cigarette the old water-pipe and the long bamboo pipe; and the piece-goods of Lancashire the home-spun cloth. Even paper of Western manufacture is completing its conquest of the country of its invention. And the story is true of practically every article of modern invention and mass production.

"Old handicrafts are driven out of existence; gigantic factories and monstrous trading companies are arising in cities; sales agents are penetrating into every corner of the country; peasants are flocking to the manufacturing and trading centres to find new employments. New ways of transportation and communication—the steamship, the railway, the new roads, the telegraph, the post service—are assisting the spread of the goods, the migration of the peoples, and the transmission of new manners and ideas. And with them have come the new technique and processes of commercial and financial transaction and organization. The mill dollar has replaced the uncoined silver; and the copper coin has killed the old cash. The banks, the paper notes, the joint stock company, and lastly, the stock exchange—all these are bringing about an economic and industrial revolution in an old country" (*ibid.*, p. 95).

Are these changes in the civilization of China any different from the evolution of civilization in the West? And if these changes in China or the East generally constitute "westernization" of the East, would it not follow that the West itself has been, no doubt earlier, "westernized"? And what was the civilization of the West before such westernization? Was it Eastern? Mr. Hu Shih has already said that before 1600 there was no difference between the civilizations of both the East and the West. Apparently both the West and the East had "Eastern Civilization" then; subsequently, "westernization" commenced, first in the West and since in the East, so that in future the civilizations of both the East and the West will be

just "Western." In simple common sense, it only means that the civilizations both of the East and the West have passed from the stage represented by the vegetable oil lamp and the tinder-box to the stage of electricity, though the process has not been simultaneous in origin, nor uniform in speed, nor yet completed.

But if the word "westernization" must be used, if only as a convenience, to describe a group of cultural traits that characterize a civilization, if electricity, banks, factories and aeroplanes constitute "westernization," there is no denying the fact that the West itself was but recently "westernized," and if the only alternative was to be "Eastern," the West was Eastern until recently!

And yet the "westernization of the West" sounds odd and impossible; a contradiction in terms. The "westernization of the East" has become current coin and is almost an axiom in modern language, hardly calling for examination. Perhaps the explanation for this is that Western Civilization was *born* in the West. It is not so much the character of the culture, but its origin in the West, that makes it Western. Hence the "resistance to a foreign civilization" and the "problem of cultural conflict" (*ibid.*, p. 5). If the origin of a cultural trait in the West makes it Western, the universally acknowledged facts that printing, paper, gunpowder, to mention only a few instances, had their origin in the East, and in particular, in China, would make them "Eastern" and their adoption by the West would mean the "easternization" of the West. As a matter of fact, porcelain alone among the Chinese products is called "China," but even the extensive, almost universal, use of "china" in the West has not been claimed as the "Chineization" of the West.

If origin is the criterion, it may be recalled that the civilization of the West has not all had a Western origin; that if the cultural traits are traced back, their origins will not all be located in the West. Also, even before the Christian era, not to speak of 1600 A.D., there has been an exchange of cultural traits between the East and the West, though the cultural commerce may have varied in quantity from time to time. To-day the whole world is laid under contribution for much that bears the stamp of Western Civilization. There is a continuous exchange of raw products and manufactured goods

between the West and the East. If, however, it is contended that the production of *manufactured* goods is "Western" and of *raw* products "Eastern," the West, in so far as it still produces agricultural and forest produce, is still partly "Eastern"; and the East, in so far as it has taken to manufactures, particularly Japan, which is now competing with the West even in Western markets, is "Western." The proportion of industry to agriculture has varied in time and space, but not as between the West and the East. Before steam and power-driven machinery was invented, there was no large-scale industry at all either in the West or in the East. It was invented in England, and from there it spread to the other parts of the West even as it subsequently spread to the East, by a process of diffusion. To-day not even the most industrialized country in the West, not to speak of the West as a unit, is either wholly or uniformly industrialized. Taking the West as a whole, more than half the population is still agricultural, and the tendency has been, since the Great War, to make even the most industrialized countries agriculturally self-sufficient.

It may be that it is not so much the origin as the *development* and *use* of a cultural trait in the West that makes it Western. The textile industry, for instance, may have originated in China and India, earlier than in England, but it was developed in England, and so it is a Western trait. But that is no longer so valid. India, China, and even more, Japan, have developed and used textile machinery. Japan has gone ahead of the West and has become a serious threat to the West. Neither in origin nor development does the textile industry seem to have any special correlation with the West.

Mr. Hu Shih has spoken of the "advance of the Western Civilization on the Asiatic continent" (*ibid.*, p. 8), of the East's "natural resistance to foreign culture" and the consequent "cultural conflict" (*ibid.*, p. 5). *It is apparently meant that the civilization of the West is foreign and alien to the East, and that the contact brings about a conflict. In so far as there is a conflict and resistance, it is not so much between the civilizations of the East and the West as between certain culture traits, whether in the West or in the East.* Both in the East and the West, there has been a conflict, great or small, between the

vegetable oil, kerosene oil, gas and electricity for lighting purposes; between manual labour and machine power; between the animal-drawn vehicle, the railway train and the motor bus; between religion and science; between tradition and innovation. As a matter of fact, all change upsets the existing equilibrium and brings about a conflict, major or minor, and evokes resistance from the *status quo*. The whole social and political history of the West itself is but the story of how every change and innovation brought about a conflict with the *status quo*, which offered resistance to the change. This process of change and conflict and resistance, successful in some cases and unsuccessful in others, is paralleled in the East, for no civilization has been quite static. Perhaps cultural conflicts have been more common in the West than in the East and more difficult to resolve than in the East.

*Every change is foreign and alien.* To the handloom weaver in China textiles manufactured in power mills are equally foreign and alien, whether the mills are located in China or Japan or Manchester, or run by Chinese or British capital and labour. Vegetable oil gives place to kerosene in China, whether the latter gushed out in Manchukuo or the United States or Chaco. It may be that for purposes of customs taxation, textiles from Japan as well as Manchester are "foreign" to China, and the textiles produced in China are native and indigenous, but to the handloom weaver, both are foreign and alien. Though in this discussion Western Civilization has been treated as a unit in contrast to the Eastern, yet, French goods are foreign to England and liable to customs duties, and the French language is foreign to the English.

But is Western Civilization a unit, an integrated pattern, to call forth a uniform reaction towards it from the East? Is it a conflict between the two civilizations, each being a unit? Mr. Hu Shih recounts how in the sixteenth century European Jesuit missionaries from Europe who were sent to China and had to win the confidence and respect of intellectual China for their religion, were carefully picked for their knowledge, among other things, of astronomy, in view of the controversy then raging in China for over two hundred and fifty years regarding the reform of the calendar; how they were

allowed by the Chinese Government to compete with three local schools of astronomers in contests which were to test the accuracy of their methods of calculation of astronomical data; and how they won in the contest and how, as a result, the Chinese Government promulgated the calendar as devised by the Jesuits (*ibid.*, p. 29). He records that the Jesuit influence died out in about a hundred years, and later China came once again in contact with "Western Civilization." This time the "Europeans were no longer remembered as the heralds of a wonderful science and a religion of love; they were only recognized as pirate-traders and most conspicuously as traders of opium" (*ibid.*, pp. 30-31). The Opium Wars created "suspicion and resentment" among the Chinese and it took them a long time to form a "better opinion of the Western nations and of their civilization" (*ibid.*, p. 31). This welcome change was due to the work of the missionaries, who came along with the traders, and who started schools and hospitals, agitated against opium-smoking in China and in Europe, and befriended the Chinese.

The significance of these incidents and trends may be noted. The earlier Jesuit missionaries, the opium traders and pirates and the later Protestant missionaries are all bracketed under "Western Civilization," but the reaction of the Chinese has been different to each of them. The reasons are obvious. In the case of the calendar reform and the acceptance of the system advocated by the Jesuits, it was the case of the *objective* testing of different systems and the acceptance of the best; the problem lent itself to such an objective test. There was undoubtedly a conflict between the four schools of astronomers, but that did not affect the Government, who accepted the best, which happened to be the one of the Jesuits. But it was not the best because it was Western, or because it was sponsored by the Jesuits. It was not a conflict between the West and the East, between Western accuracy and Eastern inaccuracy, nor between Christianity and the religions of China. As a matter of fact, the Jesuits were not primarily interested in astronomy or the reform of the Chinese calendar; they sought only a method of approach to the intelligentsia of China in order to proselytize them. But evidently in this latter respect the Jesuits did not march from success to

greater success; their influence died out in a hundred years. No fundamental differences in kind between the West and the East made it impossible for the Chinese Government to adopt the Western Jesuit calendar. It was welcomed and accepted.

But Western Civilization, in the form of pirate traders, and traders of opium in particular, was not acceptable to the Chinese. They submitted to it only after defeat in two wars. And Western Civilization in the form of schools and hospitals and anti-opium propaganda by the Protestant missionaries, who came at the same time as the traders, was welcomed. Under the circumstances, China or the East could not possibly have a single attitude towards Western Civilization, since the latter was not a single integrated and consistent whole, but a bundle of independent, and in some respects, contradictory traits. Jesuit Christianity, astronomy, opium and schools were not all linked together. China was not obliged to accept all or none.

*The conflict is not between the civilizations of the East and the West, but between certain culture traits in certain circumstances. Culture traits may be complementary, neutral or conflicting.* While there is a conflict between competing and replaceable culture traits, such as vegetable oil, kerosene, gas and electricity, between horse-coaches, automobiles, and railways, between Christianity, Islam, Confucianism and Buddhism, between free trade and protection, between autocracy and democracy, and between science and religion, there is no conflict between the production of electrical energy and the manufacture of electric bulbs; between automobiles and the steel and rubber industries, between Christianity and social service, protection and home manufacture, between democracy and the electoral system, between science and industry; in fact, they are complementary and co-operative; they are linked together. On the other hand, the relations between Christianity and the electric lamp, between chemistry and music, between democracy and vegetarianism, are neither complementary nor conflicting, but neutral. And this whether in the East or the West.

It is also noteworthy that Mr. Hu Shih uses westernization as synonymous with *modernization*. Thus: "As far as I can see, there

were three factors which contributed most substantially to the success of Japan's westernization. First, the existence of a powerful ruling class from which have come all great leaders of the movements for reform and modernization" (ibid., p. 5). Again and again he refers to the westernization of Japan during the last seventy years as modernization (ibid., p. 23). Used in this sense, the question whether the East should be westernized amounts to enquiring if the East should be modernized. The same question will apply equally well to the West. Should, for instance, modern advances in surgery, sanitation and education be adopted, or should the surgery of the days before the discovery of antiseptics and anaesthetics, the medicine of Galen and Hippocrates, be still practised in the West? Whether westernization in the sense of modernization is good or evil is another matter. Modernization is taking place in the West as well as in the East and it knows no difference between East and West.

Mr. Hu Shih uses Western Civilization in yet another sense: *certain character traits*. They include "military and naval strength that is behind the scientific, technological and industrial civilization of the West" (ibid., pp. 5-6), "the military side of Western culture, which does not consist of mere up-to-date equipment, not mere efficient organization, nor mere resourcefulness in men and money power, but which must presuppose the existence of what may be vaguely termed 'the martial spirit', under which term may be included the love of adventure, the almost primitive delight in competitive combat, the instinctive love and worship of the warrior, the painstaking cultivation of bodily strength, the habits of obedience and the readiness to fight and die for an impersonal cause" (ibid., p. 14), Western "social and political life which had come to be regarded as more important and more fundamental than rifles and cannons, the steamship and the railroad, the commercial and industrial enterprises" (ibid., p. 33), "popular election of men to office, the majority rule, and the judiciary" and "government by law" (ibid., p. 33).

Dr. Sun Yat Sen had crystallized the "four fundamental principles of Western Civilization" as follows: "To enable man to exert his

utmost capability; to utilize land to its utmost fertility; to use nature to her utmost utility; and to circulate goods with the utmost fluidity" (ibid., p. 36). Mr. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, one of the great leaders of the reformation in China, listed certain qualities of character which had made "Western nations great and progressive," and which the Chinese should acquire. "Of the new virtues he has attributed to the peoples of the West, we may mention: civic morality (as distinct from the private morality of the Eastern peoples); nationalism; the jealous regard for one's rights and liberties; the sense of duty; the love of freedom; self-discipline; self-respect; the love of adventure; the martial spirit; perseverance; progressiveness; the ability to unite and organize; respect for economic independence" (ibid., p. 37).

More recent intellectual leaders of the Chinese and themselves great admirers of Western Civilization, Messrs. Ch'en Tu-shiu and Wu Chih-hui, thought that science and democracy and science and technology were responsible for Western Civilization (ibid., p. 39).

Mr. Hu Shih remarks that the "virtues so eloquently and vehemently preached by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao are almost without exception the individualistic virtues most admired in the Victorian age. . . . He was totally blind to the new movements and tendencies which had already arisen in the midst of that age of individualism and liberalism, and which was already loudly challenging the economic and social structures created by those individualistic virtues most admired by the Chinese convert" (ibid., p. 38). And he records that "Mr. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who twenty years ago had been the most eloquent champion of westernization, came out in 1919 as the standard-bearer to sound the warning of 'the imminent bankruptcy of the scientific civilization.' Thus great has been the trans-valuation of the values of Western Civilization even in the West itself, particularly since the World War and the revolution in Russia, both of which have 'seriously challenged' Western Civilization and many of its 'basic institutions.' . . . Its scientific achievements were attacked by theologians and defenders of spiritual values as being too materialistic and leading man to the brutal ways of the machine. Its economic and industrial system which had been



the most important force to utilize the new discoveries of science and to help to bring them from the laboratory to the market-place and the home, was most ruthlessly condemned as capitalistic, as the exploiter of the sweat and the blood and the brain of the many for the exclusive benefit of the few. Even its political ideal of democracy and parliamentary government, which has been accepted as the highest embodiment of the political genius and inspiration of the race, was severely criticized as the historical accompaniment of the capitalistic system, as the instrumentality of the rich and the strong for the government and oppression of the poor and the weak, and as a wasteful and inefficient system better suited for the division of spoils than for the effective ordering of society and the State" (ibid., p. 41).

Mr. Hu Shih notes how "all the values have been turned upside down" (ibid., p. 42). But the change is not complete nor uniform. Monarchies and republics, parliamentary and presidential democracies, personal and proletarian dictatorships exist together within the West itself. And so do capitalism and communism; religion and science; nationalism and internationalism; industry and agriculture. All are apparently equally entitled to be called integral parts of "Western Civilization." When, for instance, the question is asked, should the East be Westernized, which of these contradictory alternatives is meant? Western Civilization has not been an integrated pattern to be accepted or rejected as a whole. Not even a single people during the last few centuries, nor all the peoples of the West at any one time, much less all the people all the time, have had a uniform pattern of civilization which could be easily identified as Western Civilization. It has been more like a mechanical mixture of the most varied and even contradictory ingredients, rather than a chemical compound with definite ingredients combined in definite proportions and having definite properties. The elements that go to form Western Civilization are not all linked together. In the process of diffusion, they do not all stick together. Under the circumstances, it would be feasible to discuss the origin, the diffusion and the evaluation of *each culture trait and culture complex* but not of *Western or Eastern civilization*.

## *Sir Valentine Chirol on Occident and Orient*

IF Dr. Hu Shih finds the difference between the East and the West in the intellectual tradition, Sir Valentine Chirol, one of the most competent students of the Orient and the Occident, finds it fundamentally in race, or rather colour. In his book, *The Occident and the Orient*, he says: "The discords and conflicts within the Occident are many and grievous, but the nations that they divide all belong, broadly speaking, to the same type of civilization; and in the fact that they are all partners in that civilization I see sure ground for hoping and believing that those discords and conflicts will be assuaged and will finally disappear under the healing influence of time and by the development of new processes of international agreement. Between the Occident and the Orient, on the other hand, there is no such bond of a common civilization. On the contrary, the discords and conflicts which divide them arise out of a clash of different and in many respects mutually antagonistic civilizations, and the phase upon which they are now entering may be roughly described as a general movement of revolt throughout the Orient against the ascendancy of the Occident on the plea either that it has learned all that the Occident can teach it or that the lessons of the Occident are a snare and a delusion. The real significance, I think, of this revolt is that behind it there is the stirring of the ancient world forces long dormant in the Orient, but reawakening once more under the masterful impact of our modern Western civilization. That awakening assumes many different and sometimes conflicting shapes, for though we may regard the Orient as a whole and the Occident as a whole in so far as they stand for distinct types

of civilization, the Orient is not one nor is the Occident" (Chirol, *The Occident and the Orient*, p. 5).

For the limited purpose he had in view, namely, the political changes in the relations between the Occident and the Orient, Sir Valentine did not deem it necessary to discuss at length, much less in a categorical manner, what were the characteristics of the Occidental and the Oriental civilizations, how they were not only different but mutually antagonistic, and how and why the conflicts and discords within the Occident were different from those between the Occidental and Oriental civilizations. A perusal of his book makes it fairly clear, however, that the general character of the discords and conflicts, whether within the Occident or between the Occident and the Orient, or, it may be added, in the Orient itself, is about the same: the desire for the acquisition or maintenance of political, economic or religious domination of one group over another and the resistance thereto. France resists the hegemony of Germany as much as China resists that of Japan, and India that of England, or Abyssinia of Italy; the Jew resists the domination of the Christian as much as the Protestant resists that of the Catholic, the Christian of the Moslem, the Moslem of the Hindu, and so on. Nationalism and imperialism recognize no boundaries between the Orient and the Occident; every group seeks autonomy for itself and dominion over other groups, whether the group be a political nation or a class—political, economic or social—within a nation.

Civilization includes more than the political, economic and religious traits; it includes language, literature, music and other fine arts, social habits and customs, ceremonies connected with birth, marriage and death, dress, amusement, and a host of other traits. These traits do not lead to discords and conflicts as much as the others; but in so far as they sometimes do, the alignment is not between the Occident and the Orient. The Taj Mahal and the Ajanta Caves may enthral an Occidental who is shocked by the sculpture of Epstein.

There is, however, one broad distinction between the Occident and the Orient and that is colour. "All the manifold discontents of the Orient are bound up together in the clash of colour" (*ibid.*, p.

210). He adds: "Nature herself is responsible for it, since she gave a generally white complexion to all the peoples of the Occident and, in varying degrees, a darker complexion to all those of the Orient" (ibid., p. 210). But why did this difference lead to a conflict? Explains Sir Valentine: "But it has acquired a dangerous significance with the white man's assumption of superior and indefeasible rights based on the superiority of his race" (ibid., p. 210). "But rightly or wrongly, the Oriental, who for a time admitted and acquiesced with almost fatalistic resignation in the white man's superiority, denies it to-day—denies it sometimes passionately—for all atavistic instincts, reacting against the aggressive impact of Occidental civilization, rebels as never before against it; sometimes contemptuously because increasing intercourse has made him too familiar with the seamy side of our civilization; sometimes though, alas! more rarely, because he has assimilated enough of its finer spirit to claim the rights of equal partnership in all that is best of it" (ibid., pp. 210-11).

It is thus a conflict due to the claims of a particular race to superiority over other races. It can be a clash of *civilizations* only in so far as a *civilization is linked with a race and a colour*. Race and colour are biological characters, which are inherited and which can be acquired only by miscegenation by subsequent generations, and even so, only up to a point. In so far as Occidental Civilization is based on colour and race, there can be no "westernization of the Orient"; no assimilation of Occidental Civilization by the Oriental, which Sir Valentine postulates is possible!

Looked at another way, "clash of colour" and "superiority of the white race" has no significance. It is meaningless to speak of the superiority of one colour over another, say, in the colours of a spectrum. Values attach to thoughts and deeds and tools only in so far as they give power, comfort and happiness to individuals and groups of people. The gun is superior to the bow and arrow in warfare; success in a venture gives pleasure; the automobile is faster than a horse-wagon; religion may be a comfort and a solace to some; heroism may win the applause of the people. A group can be superior because its members can think and do better than those

of another group and because they have tools with which to subdue another. Culture traits can have values, but not races or colours.

Of the characteristics and values of Occidental and Oriental Civilizations, Sir Valentine speaks as follows: "It is not merely or mainly the political ascendancy of any one European power over these or those peoples of the Orient that is at stake. It is not merely or mainly whether President Wilson's formula of 'self-determination' is, or was intended to be, applicable to the nations of the Orient whose independence might very well mean a reversion to oriental forms of society and government entirely incompatible with any fruitful relations with the Occident. The fundamental issue is whether the Orient can be brought to adapt itself to that democratic type of human society which the most progressive nations of the Occident have gradually evolved as affording the largest opportunities for individual and collective freedom combined with the restraining sense of individual and collective responsibility" (*ibid.*, p. 207). He sums up the contrast thus: "If one seeks to define what the Orient chiefly lacks, and has always lacked, it is the practice of freedom with the sense of responsibility, or in other words, character" (*ibid.*, p. 207). Sir Valentine does not explain in so many words whether theocracy, autocracy and the lack of character of the Oriental is linked with his colour or whether it will ever be possible for the Oriental to acquire character and work democracy. It is clear, however, from what he says that the Occident was not born with democracy but only "gradually evolved" it. Before the dawn of democracy, the Occident, too, knew no other than theocracy and autocracy, though it was still the Occident. To-day, democracy is not universally practised or even acclaimed in the Occident; and many of the nations of the Orient are seeking democracy, while their Occidental overlords are hindering it. India is a case in point. Oriental civilization is no more theocratic and autocratic than Occidental civilization is secular and democratic.

Sir Valentine is not hopeful of Orientals acquiring character. He says that it is much easier for "Orientals to contract the vices than the virtues of the Occident" (*ibid.*, p. 74). For instance, in Khedive Ismail of Egypt, "profligate indulgence in the worst foibles

of the West was combined with the worst methods of Eastern despotism. If he filched away from his subjects fully a quarter of the best lands in the valley of the Nile, that was merely straining an Oriental practice" (*ibid.*, p. 75). Apparently, there is something like Western despotism; the Occident is not all "character" and "democracy." Perhaps it is not necessary to enquire at any great length whether Khedive Ismail's conduct was the normal Oriental pattern or whether and in what respects the acquisition of vast colonial possessions, particularly in Africa, by Occidental commercial companies and States, differed from that of the Khedive.

## *Mr. Pitt-Rivers on Race and Civilization*

MR. GEORGE HENRY LANE-FOX PITT-RIVERS, in his scholarly book, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*, makes an unequivocal case for the thesis that differences in culture are due to differences in race. The substance of his theme is that race is correlated with mental characteristics and, therefore, with culture. Acculturation is possible only with race-mixture. Attempts to westernize non-Westerners, whether they be Polynesians or Negroes or the brown races in Asia, without race mixture, will only lead to the disintegration of their civilization, and in some cases to the extinction of these races.

"Culture, the fruit and expression of man's mental activity," says Mr. Pitt-Rivers, "accumulated and transmitted through the generations, is in its origin determined by, and in its evolution both limited by, and modified by, man's capacity—and is variable too in its expression as that capacity is variable" (Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*, p. 3). In so far as the unit is the individual man or humanity as a whole, this proposition is self-evident. Achievement is limited by capacity. Man is incapable either to grow wings on his body or control the movements of the stars.

The unit which Mr. Pitt-Rivers adopts for purposes of civilizations, however, is neither the individual man nor humanity as a whole, nor, as others do, geographical area or nationality or religion, but race. "The evolution of culture-forms must be correlated to the history of and evolution of race, for only in this way—by tracing the history of culture-potential, in the mixing, blending and substitution of racial stocks—can we hope to explain the rise and fall of

civilizations, the degradation no less than the development of culture" (ibid., p. 4). "Culture-forms" he defines as "traditions, art-forms, beliefs, customs, and social organizations," and "culture-potential" as the "innate constructive ability, the capacity to develop, under suitable conditions, artistic, scientific, or technical skill; temperamental dispositions" (ibid., p. 3). He also speaks of "culture-accessories," which are "implements, weapons, the products of art, and mechanical discoveries" (ibid., p. 3). In other words, culture-potential is the biological heritage, while the others are social heritages, the non-material and the material.

He seeks to "correlate mental and physical characteristics in man in such a way as to establish the psychological counterpart to a racial type" (ibid., p. 5). And "race" he defines as "a biological group based on common possessions of an indefinite number of physical characteristics" (ibid., p. 4), and implying "an identity or measurable distinction and a constant degree of relative homogeneity" (ibid., p. 6). Thus, if a race remains pure, its culture-potential remains unchanged and so its culture. Culture change is correlated with change in culture-potential. Mr. Pitt-Rivers contends that "the supposed ability to 'raise a people in cultural level' as also the phenomenon of a degradation of culture is, in either case, dependent upon a blood substitution in the population" (ibid., p. 13), and that "we cannot 'raise people to our own high cultural level' by changing their culture forms," for "facts prove that culture-potential cannot be modified without first modifying blood, though that of course follows when races are in contact" (ibid., pp. 239-40).

He illustrates his thesis by quoting the examples of Liberia, Haiti, and Dominica. "Although culture-form is conditioned by culture-potential, the inheritance of the two may come from very different sources. For instance, contrast the culture level of the mixed negro populations of the Haiti and Dominican Republics with the general culture-level of their white neighbours of the United States of America. Their heritage of culture-forms and culture accessories has been practically identical, but their heritage of culture-potential, which must be correlated with *racial*, not



*national*, history, has been very different" (ibid., pp. 3-4). With regard to Liberia he says: "When Liberia was established on the west coast of Africa as an independent republic, her citizens, the freed negroes from America, had for a century been trained in the ways of European culture and the Christian belief; they were then fully equipped with all the culture-forms and culture-accessories of their white foster-parents: with all the paraphernalia of President, Senate, Officers of State, electoral system, Courts of Law, Church and moral code, and last but not least, with large monetary subsidies. Culture-potential, however (inalienable from germ-plasm), the champions of democracy, liberty and equality were powerless to transfer. The result is what any biologist should have foretold: Liberia has developed along lines of her own, handicapped, it is true, by the tawdry trappings of a culture to which her people never had and never could have become adapted, and now, even Liberia's best friends have to admit, made ludicrous in its incongruous setting" (ibid., p. 235).

Thus, according to Mr. Pitt-Rivers, the differences in the cultural achievements of the Whites in the United States and of the Negroes in Liberia were due to racial and biological differences in culture-potentials, notwithstanding homogeneity of social environment. He would have it that the culture-potential of the Negroes was apparently high enough to permit of their acquiring culture-forms like Christianity, and forms of democratic government, but it was not high enough to permit of their acquiring "democracy, liberty and equality." These characteristics are also, apparently, inherited through the germ-plasm, and the Negro germ-plasm does not carry these traits. For, according to him, definite ways of thinking, though not definite ideas, are inheritable. "Though it may be true that it is absurd to suppose that a tendency to think certain definite ideas can be inheritable, it is quite a different thing and equally absurd to suppose that a tendency to think—not certain things but in a certain way—may not be inheritable" (ibid., pp. 10-11). Thus, neither the Whites nor the Negroes inherit the definite ideas of democracy, equality and liberty, yet the Whites inherit the tendency to think in that way, while the Negroes inherit,

through their germ-plasm, the tendency to think in a different way, a way that makes even the best friends of Liberia feel sorry for them!

And this is not merely history; it is something which Mr. Pitt-Rivers is confident any biologist could have foretold. It is one of those correlations, one of "the immutable laws of nature, however unwelcome or even deplorable the facts may seem" (ibid. p. 14).

Mr. Pitt-Rivers does not, however, tell how culture-potential can be measured. That achievement cannot exceed capacity may be readily granted, but how is capacity to be measured? It is measured only by achievement, by past history. *Instead of capacity measuring achievement, achievement measures capacity*; instead of causes accounting for effects, effects account for causes; *instead of the biologist anticipating history in the light of immutable law, the historian seeks post-facto biological explanation for the accidents of history!*

If the Negroes in America are a "race," as Mr. Pitt-Rivers would have it, their cultural status during the last two centuries and more has not been stationary. They arrived as slaves; to-day they are freemen. To-day they own lands, are engaged in the professions, run banks and universities, contribute to art, literature and science. Mr. Edwin R. Embree, no small authority on the Negro question in America, reviews the history and achievements of the Negro in America and comes to the deliberate conclusion that "In the enslavement and forced degradation of the Negro there is enough to account for his present lowly place in the industrial West. In the Negro's phenomenal progress during his two generations of freedom there is enough to give high hope for his successful adaptation to the conditions of the New World and his continued advance in arts and industry" (Embree, *Brown America*, p. 284). And he adds: "My fear is not that the Negro will not be absorbed into American life, but that he may be so completely 'Americanized' that, ceasing to have any characteristic individuality, he will simply swell the ranks of standardized mediocrity" (ibid., pp. 285-86).

The progress made by the Negroes in America will not be denied. If, "race" being constant, all this phenomenal progress was possible in the past, is there any biological reason to presume that no more progress is possible or that the maximum possible progress

has been reached? Could a biologist have foretold that the culture-potential of the Negro race was such that a Negro could be President of a bank or a university, that he could contribute to literature or science, but that he could not be successful with "democracy, liberty and equality"? At any rate, earlier ethnologists like J. C. Nott and George Robins Gliddon, who pronounced on the racial capacity of Negroes when they were slaves in America, do not seem to have made the distinction. They simply said that "it cannot be denied that the dark races are in respect to intellect and virtue greatly inferior to the whites of fairer complexion" (*ibid.*, p. 17).

If the friends of Liberia have reason to be ashamed of her administration, is it because her rulers are Negroes, and has it anything to do with their culture-potential? Is misgovernment, mal-administration or whatever it be that disfigures the government of Liberia, peculiar to governments controlled by Negroes with their racial culture-potential, or is it found elsewhere? Mr. Embree gives a few instances of regrettable practices among the Whites in the United States and concludes: "In view of the recent revelations in Chicago and New York City and Pennsylvania and Tennessee and Mississippi, not to mention the spectacular vulgarities and corruptions of the Harding administration in Washington, white politicians are in a poor position to throw stones at the Negroes of the Reconstruction period" (*ibid.*, p. 182). Or, for that matter, one may add, Liberia. Observes Mr. Embree: "Lovers of good government do well to point out these evils and hold them up to scorn. The only mistake is to assume that corruption and tomfoolishness are traits peculiar in American history to the Reconstruction bodies; that Negroes and carpetbag legislators differ either in degree or kind from their fellow politicians of other times and other places in this great democracy. What newspaper does one pick up, over the length and breadth of the land, which does not daily report equally purple tales of fraud and stupidity?" (*ibid.*, p. 180). From the point of view of culture and the culture-potential of races, it is worthwhile to note that the misgovernment of the Reconstruction period was not the work solely of the Negroes but of the "carpet-baggers" as well, and the latter were white people.

It may be urged in defence of Mr. Pitt-Rivers' theory that the Negroes in America are not a "pure" race but a mixed race, and that the race-mixture accounts for the progress made by them; and that the change in the culture-forms is correlated with change in culture-potential due to blood-mixture. Says Mr. Pitt-Rivers: "Into the originally very mixed stock of the Negro the infusion of white blood has been so extensive that the 'original type of the African has almost completely disappeared'" (Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*, p. 152). Of the quality of such process, Mr. Embree says: "These blood mixtures of the slave days were often what the scientists to-day would call eugenic. Often the best white blood, represented by the white planters and their sons, joined with that of Negro girls chosen for their comeliness, intelligence, and attractive personalities" (Embree, *Brown America*, p. 7). The white blood represented not only the Anglo-Saxon, but also the Latin, French, and Spanish. There was the admixture of Red Indian blood as well. In this sense, the Negroes in America are not a "race"; they are the result of a mixture of a number of races.

One of the laws formulated by Mr. Pitt-Rivers is that "miscegenation and outbreeding tend to produce a stock more generalized and therefore more variable in its adaptability than the specialized type it replaces when the latter's cultural or physical equilibrium is disturbed" (Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*, p. 109). The miscegenation of the Whites and the Blacks must, according to his theory, have brought about a type more generalized, and capable of wider adaptability than of either of the more specialized types, Whites or Blacks. It has the culture-potential of both the Whites and the Blacks. There is nothing that the mixed Negro people could not do which either the Whites or the Negroes can do. If the culture-potential of the Whites permits and sustains democracy, and that of the pure Negroes does not, that of the mixed Negroes ought to.

Unless it be that, far from generalizing the culture-potential, miscegenation inhibits certain of the traits derived from Whites, and among these the capacity for democracy.

In this connection it is interesting to note that the Reverend W.

Groves, of Calabar Province, South Nigeria, says: "Among Anang and Ibibio people there is no 'kingship' nor office of 'paramount' chief, a term introduced by Government from the northern provinces when inaugurating 'indirect rule.' There is no more democratic government anywhere than on the West Coast. Heads of families in a village or of a clan or tribe, elect one of their number to be their chief, and his position is not hereditary" (*Congrès International Des Sciences Anthropologiques et Ethnologiques*, 1934, p. 210). This reference is relevant only if Mr. Pitt-Rivers and Reverend Groves meant the same thing by democracy.

Mr. Pitt-Rivers has correlated race, culture-potential, and civilization. Race he has defined as identity or homogeneity of physical characteristics. A race may conceivably be homogeneous with respect to culture-forms, such as religion and nationality, and culture-accessories such as automobiles. But is a race homogeneous with respect to culture-potential? He himself says: "It is often forgotten, or the facts ignored, that culture-potential often varies enormously within a single society that is supposed to exhibit a uniform culture. In the great nations of modern Europe, with their heterogeneous populations and mixed ancestry, the diversity of culture and culture-potential between different classes and groups, and even between different individuals of the same class, may well exceed the differences between many centuries of growth in more homogeneous societies" (Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*, p. 13). The assumption that the Whites of the United States as a unit and the Negroes of Liberia as another single unit have each a culture-potential seems, therefore, unwarranted. The culture-potential of an Edison or a John Dewey is not general among the Whites. Graded according to culture-potential, if the latter can be measured, the groups will be many and will cut across White and Black and not run parallel to them. And if culture-potentials condition culture, cultural differences will not coincide with racial differences.

"When we come to consider," says Mr. Pitt-Rivers, "whether groups distinguishable in an ethnic sense, or in their cultural trends, can be said to be predisposed to the one or the other type of psycho-

logical function we face the very difficult question of how far any group is homogeneous in its psychic tendencies, or how far it can be assumed to be dominated by individuals of the one type or the other. We shall probably find, though the question is no doubt arguable, that some degree of characteristic uniformity in tendency is often apparent among fairly homogeneous ethnic groups or groups dominated by distinguishable cultural trends" (*ibid.*, p. 157.) Reserving for subsequent consideration the "arguable" question of race and culture, it may be pointed out here that neither the Whites in America nor the Negroes in Liberia are homogeneous ethnic groups, as defined by Mr. Pitt-Rivers himself.

The second important point urged by Mr. Pitt-Rivers is the incompatibility of cultures of different races. He speaks of "the impossibility of infusing a foreign culture upon people who are not adapted to it" (*ibid.*, p. 235); he refers to Liberia, the "most Europeanized of African states," which, however, "developed along lines of her own," and was only "handicapped" by the civilization of her "white foster-parents," to which she "never had and never could have become adapted" (*ibid.*, p. 235). And the best advice he gives to "our dark-skinned subjects" is that they may "learn to value whatever is sound or beautiful in their own culture, in which may be found the surest promise of their own racial achievement in place of blindly following the lead of people whose proffered cultural gifts they can never truly make their own" (*ibid.*, p. 241).

Among the categories of incompatible culture traits are "religious proselytism, and introduced European systems of education or of government" (p. 239), as well as clothing, food, and sex-relations. With reference to clothing he says: "The evil consequences of the adoption of European clothing by native races is generally admitted" (*ibid.*, p. 58). The Reverend W. J. Durrand thought that "of all the evil customs introduced by civilization, the wearing of clothes is probably the greatest" (*ibid.*, p. 58). Bishop Patterson had said that "European clothes for natives" were "abhorrent" to his mind (*ibid.*, p. 59). As to why European clothing is an evil, Mr. Pitt-Rivers says: "European clothes are the most effective promoters of skin disease and of influenza, colds, coughs, and the

pulmonary ailments that afflict races first brought into contact with civilization" (*ibid.*, p. 58). But why so? Mr. Pitt-Rivers explains that "when cotton clothing, singlets and trousers, is adopted in place of the simple native loincloth of bark cloth, or fibre or grass of native manufacture, or in place of no clothing at all, these badges of 'civilization' are habitually worn day in and day out, until they rot to pieces" (*ibid.*, p. 58). Will the race and culture-potential of the "Native" inhibit his changing and washing his clothes? Mr. Pitt-Rivers analyses the agencies that introduced clothing among the Natives and their motives in great detail. The European Christian missionaries, the European traders, and the European Governments were the agencies, and the missionaries were the worst offenders in this respect. If white missionaries could persuade the black Natives to accept Christianity and European clothing, would the factor of race stand in the way of the White missionaries persuading their Native converts to wash, dry, and change their clothes? The trader, who, next to the missionary, was "the greatest factor in encouraging the use of clothing amongst natives," and whose "first object" in his dealings with the Native races was "to teach them new tastes and wants which he alone can supply," might find it profitable to sell laundry machinery as well as clothes.

Nudism and clothes are certainly incompatible with each other, but is there a racial correlation between Natives and nudism and between Whites and dress? Or, is it possible for Whites to be nude and Natives to be dressed? Nudism is not unknown among the Whites and Christians at that, notwithstanding the tradition of "flesh-consciousness and the virtue of concealment, the two signposts of Christian culture" (*ibid.*, p. 59).

As regards values, nudism, clothes, the nature of clothes and their style depend on different criteria; but none of them has any reference to race and culture-potential. If nudism is incompatible with Christianity, all Christians must clothe themselves, irrespective of race. If clothes are meant as an adjustment to climate, they will differ with the climate, the seasons, and the weather. In summer, particularly in the tropics, the rational need is a minimum of

clothing; in winter, and particularly in the temperate and arctic regions, heavy clothing is indicated, irrespective of race. Style of dress is a matter of tradition and individual taste. The White man wearing heavy European clothes in summer in the tropics is as absurd as the Negro going nude in winter in the arctic regions, or even for the same White or Negro to wear the same dress in summer and winter, in sunshine and in rain.

It may be urged, however, that in so far as climate influences not only clothes but human pigmentation, which is a racial character, race influences clothes. Mr. Pitt-Rivers points out that black and white skins react differently to light, and quotes with approval Dr. E. P. Taylor's generalization that "Races, though capable of gradual acclimatizations, must not change too suddenly the climate they are adapted to. With this adaptation to particular climates the complexion has much to do, fitting the negro for the tropics and the fair white for the temperate zone" (*ibid.*, p. 108). Mr. Taylor immediately qualified this statement by adding "though, indeed, colour does not always vary with climate as where in America the brown race extends through hot and cold regions alike" (*ibid.*, p. 108). Mr. Pitt-Rivers observes that, "Speaking generally, it may be conceded that many coloured races have shown their capacity to become gradually acclimatized to cold latitudes, while fair races have not proved so adaptable when they move to the tropics" (*ibid.*, p. 109).

Whatever be the final verdict of science on what Mr. Pitt-Rivers calls a "thorny question," it is evident that neither of the races is so well adapted to its climate as to do without clothes. The Negro wants some clothing to keep him warm in the winter even in the tropics; some blankets (or at least a fire in lieu thereof). At any event it can hardly be doubted that clothing, to be sensible, must be conditioned more by climate, season and weather, than by any other consideration, least of all, race. The question is not whether "European" clothes are good for Natives, but whether "European" clothes are good for tropical summers, whether for Natives or for Europeans. If "Native" dress is good for the tropics, it must be good for the European as well as the Native.



The changes in the dress of Whites in all parts of the world during the last few years proves that dress reform has to take account of tradition, a culture-form, rather than race, a culture-potential. The tendency is growing of wearing light and little dress in summer, more "native" than "European," though tradition is still interposing obstacles in the way.

Then with regard to food, Mr. Pitt-Rivers says: "Whichever view is taken of the effect of European foodstuffs, it is difficult to believe that anyone can suppose that the preserved and tinned fish and meats that are increasingly bought by the South Sea natives or are issued out to them by plantation owners in accordance with Government regulations, could be anything but injurious and infinitely worse than any fresh food that natives happen to be used to, which may be deficient, but not in the least likely to be unwholesome" (*ibid.*, p. 61). Can it be that European food in the sense of preserved and canned food is good for Europeans and bad for Natives; that Native fresh foods are good for Natives and bad for Europeans? Or can it be that fresh foods are good for both, and tinned foods bad for both, irrespective of race?

Mr. Pitt-Rivers has an elaborate discussion of polygamy among the Natives, and has much to say in favour of it on hygienic and eugenic considerations. "Psychologically, they (polygynous institutions) satisfy the polygamous propensities of man, while, at the same time, ameliorating the condition of the monandrous woman by obtaining for her complete sexual segregation during pregnancy and suckling, the conditions which natives in polygynous communities generally consider important" (*ibid.*, p. 128). "In innumerable ways evidence shows that the most favourable breeding conditions are obtainable for the mother only under polygynous conditions, which not only secure for her a monandrous existence during the whole mating cycle, but protect her from the too frequent and continuous attentions of even one man, especially during gestation and lactation. That longer intervals between pregnancies mean more favourable intra-uterine conditions is, indeed, generally recognized" (*ibid.*, p. 131). From the eugenic point of view polygamy not only gave the best men "a wider choice of the finest

women, but enabled the finest men to leave a greater number of descendants" (*ibid.*, p. 134).

It is unnecessary here to go into the merits of the above propositions. The relevant question is whether they apply only to Natives or particular races, or are of general application, inclusive of the Whites. That monogamy is incompatible with polygamy is clear, but is there a correlation between Natives and polygamy, and between Whites and monogamy? Or is it racially possible for the White to be polygamous and the Natives to be monogamous? Is it only a historical finding that Natives are polygamous and the Whites are monogamous, or is there a biological inevitability about it, which any biologist could have foretold? Is monogamy an alien and foreign culture-form which the Natives can never make their own, and polygamy an alien and foreign culture-form which the Whites can never make their own? The Mormons are white people, yet they were once polygamous, even if they are not so to-day.

Reserving for later consideration the question of "European education" for Natives, it may be noted that Mr. Pitt-Rivers says that "the adoption of Christianity has never made a people more civilized nor more intelligent" (*ibid.*, p. 235). Does this apply to Whites as well as to Natives?

In this connection it is instructive to note what the Reverend W. Groves describes as the "effect of contact with Western civilization" on the marriage customs of the Anang and Ibibio tribes in Southern Nigeria. "The marriage bond has been weakened. The war-years gave palm produce a high standard of value. The people grew to know the value of money. It produced a spirit of independence and individualism among men and women. This weakened the authority of tribal and family life." "The introduction of taxation, small as it is, has affected the marriage problem. The young men cannot afford to marry. This has led to increased prostitution." "With the decline of values in palm produce there has come a relaxation of the marriage laws. Instead of the complete head-money being paid prior to marriage, the purchase is now made on the instalment system." The Reverend Groves ends by avowing his belief that "the Christian Gospel will bring individual stability to the Africans

in the welter of things that perplex them now" (*Congrès International Des Sciences Anthropologiques et Ethnologiques*, 1934, pp. 220-21). Is this picture any different from what has been the case in the West? The racial factor does not seem to have prevented the "westernization" of the Negroes referred to. The cause for the changes are, according to Mr. Groves, economic. Similar economic causes have brought about similar social situations, whether the people concerned be Whites or Negroes, Christians or pagans. Neither race nor religion nor previous cultural status has determined the course of cultural evolution as economic innovations have. And these economic innovations have no restricted culture area but have the whole world as one such area.

The foregoing examination of the evidence that Mr. Pitt-Rivers himself advances lends no support to his theory of the correlation of race and culture. As a matter of fact, he was really contending that certain culture-forms of certain Natives were better intrinsically than the substitutes offered by the Whites to them, and that, therefore, they should not be suppressed by the White overlords. For instance, the "absence of bodily self-consciousness" and "openness and joyful acceptance in sexual matters" was better than the Christian sense of the "sinfulness of the flesh" and of "flesh-consciousness"; nudity or minimum clothing was better in the tropical summer than heavy clothes; fresh food was better than tinned and preserved food. Polygamy was better than monogamy: "We may not unreasonably find an indication of this in the patent fact that sex antagonism is most acute in monogamous and least in polygamous communities" (*ibid.*, p. 129). Under a polygamous system "the finest types were thus constantly recruited from their own finer stock, while the whole community was constantly being recruited from its best elements or from above rather than from below, after the stupid and dysgenic method of our own civilized society which rewards the ability to rise in the social scale with sterility" (*ibid.*, p. 134). As regards property, "this healthy association of ownership and function, so sadly absent from the commercial and mercenary structure of modern European society, is, in most primitive societies, accompanied by the communal use

of property nominally owned by headmen and chiefs" (*ibid.*, p. 209).

These good traits or culture-forms are happily found in certain groups of people. Far from copying them, other communities who have obtained political and spiritual power over them have used that power to suppress these culture-forms, for lack of understanding. With reference to the uncompromisingly hostile attitude of European missionaries towards polygamy, "the psycho-biological and sociological aspects of which they seem to understand so little and to have so little concern for," Mr. Pitt-Rivers complains that "invariably and inevitably moral rather than biological considerations are of prime importance from the missionary point of view. From this point of view native customs must be judged by the standard of the missionary's own Christian code by which alone can be determined whether any conduct or any custom constitutes a sin, irrespective of the biological consequences of the 'sinful' or 'virtuous' conduct, or even whether it leads to the survival or extinction of the race" (*ibid.*, p. 135).

More than all, Mr. Pitt-Rivers vehemently protests against the use of compulsion in acculturation. He protests against the "patent injustice of forcing an alien code upon a people whose social organization and whose every idea conflicts with it, involving, as it does, a degree of interference with the private life and of persecution that even the people of Europe, who profess to accept that code and that morality, have never, since they were freed from the Inquisition, for a moment tolerated" (*ibid.*, p. 141).

While thus opposed to compulsion, Mr. Pitt-Rivers is not opposed to voluntary acceptance. "The diffusion of cultural elements between races in contact by borrowing is quite a different process, which involves the selection of some elements only, their modification or adaptation to the needs of the borrower and the complete rejection of incompatible elements" (*ibid.*, p. 240). This is really a plea for self-determination in acculturation.

## *Mr. Arthur Mayhew on Culture Conflict*

UNLIKE Sir Valentine Chirol and Mr. Pitt-Rivers, Mr. Arthur Mayhew, who is now the Educational Adviser to the Colonial Office, London, urges that race has little to do with conflict between the East and West. He admits that a conflict exists, but its cause is cultural, not racial. Mr. Mayhew spent the best part of his life in the Educational Service in India and acquired exceptional qualifications to write the book, *The Education of India*, in which he discusses not only purely educational questions but also the larger problem of the interaction of Eastern and Western Civilizations. As a matter of fact, his book teems with references to the East and the West. It will take too long to examine all the various connotations which he gives to these terms. Attention must here be restricted to his basic view of Eastern and Western Civilizations.

At the outset it should be noted that, in using the terms East and West, Oriental and Occidental, Mr. Mayhew has in view almost exclusively India and England. He does not refer to China or the Islamic countries to the west of India when he speaks of the East, nor does he refer to France, Germany, or the United States when he speaks of the West. It is just India and England.

East and West, he says, stand for "two types of culture" which, "though they have reacted on one another, have not yet fused; their interaction has been so far responsible for antagonism rather than co-operation" (Mayhew, *The Education of India*, p. 177). In proof of this he says: "Lord Milner's view that, owing to cultural differences, India as a Dominion of the British Empire must remain 'an embarrassment and weakness, not satisfying India, and not

contributing to the solidarity of the other members', will be shared by those who know most intimately the products of our Indian schools or colleges" (ibid., p. 177). Since the famous Minute of Lord Macaulay and the decision of Lord William Bentinck (to which further reference will be made later), and for a century now, the schools and colleges referred to have been giving "Western education" which was "based essentially on western culture" (ibid., p. 30). To the extent to which Indians have come under the influence of "Western" education, they are not undiluted Orientals; they have approximated more closely to Western Civilization than those other Indians who never came under that influence. If conflict between the West and the East is due to cultural differences, it should be greatest between the pure Western and the pure Eastern types and less between the pure Western and the Western-educated Indians. The more the Indian educated in these institutions approximates to Western culture, the less should be the gulf that divides him from the Occidental and, therefore, the less the conflict between the two. The facts seem to be otherwise. Mr. Mayhew says: "We must set the admitted facts that the direct influence of western ideas and methods is felt within a very small, though perhaps important, section of a vast population, that it is within this small section that friendship between Englishman and Indian is becoming increasingly difficult every year, that western culture, far from driving out its eastern rival has indirectly fostered a belief in that rival's merits and a determination to make good its claims before the world, and that the moral superiority of Europe is widely questioned and by many denied, while those who urge complete liberation from its 'satanic' influence receive respectful attention" (ibid., p. 22). According to Mr. Mayhew, then, the conflict is not so much between the Occidental and the Oriental, who are culturally farthest apart, as it is between the Occidental and the westernized Oriental who have culturally more in common.

Mr. Mayhew does not think that race and colour are the cause of the conflict between the two types of culture. Nor is it nationalism, or language. He says: "It was perhaps unnecessary for Lord Milner to emphasize diversity of race and language. The

history of the Roman Empire reminds us that such diversity is no necessary bar. It is true that the Roman Empire was untroubled by 'nationalism' and that intermarriage within the races of their empire was not only physiologically acceptable but a general practice. But 'nationalism' is not necessarily responsible for cultural differences, though it is often a political result. And though intermarriage between East and West is deprecated physiologically, and shows no signs of becoming habitual, its absence does not necessarily involve cultural antipathy. The Parsees in India are racially as distinct from us as the Punjabee Brahmin and have never intermarried with us. But their civilization is not alien in the sense that the Brahmin's is. As for language, though English will perhaps never become the cultural language of India, as it is most surely becoming the political and economic language, its prevalence among the intelligentsia will ensure, linguistically, a mutual understanding between East and West, if other conditions are favourable" (ibid., pp. 179-80).

Mr. Mayhew goes so far as to contend that the "attitude of our Colonies towards Indian immigration is not fundamentally based on dislike of men of another race or colour, or fear of political and economic supremacy passing from men of British extraction. It is due essentially, though to some extent subconsciously, to a feeling that the Indian's scheme of values is not that of the Colonial, and that political or economic supremacy will be used for the establishment of a social and spiritual world, in which what is to the Colonial of vital importance will count for nothing" (ibid., pp. 176-77).

"It is mainly points of difference in the moral and spiritual plane," postulates Mr. Mayhew, "that are responsible for such antagonism as disturbs the political and economic relations of India to the empire" (ibid., p. 176). As illustrations of the differences in "absolute values," Mr. Mayhew has the following: "When we think of what, through our instruction, the Indian can do and must do to gain a livelihood, we imagine him in his government or mercantile office, pleading in the law courts, practising in the hospitals, and even doing in executive councils or ministries the work that, for a century, has been reserved to the 'Heaven-born'

of the Civil Service. He is western and one with us. . . . If we follow the clerk home from his office, or the agricultural labourer, who has achieved literacy in the village school, home from the plough and watch his employment of his leisure, his search after happiness in his family or communal life, we shall find the Oriental, not the Occidental. . . . Practically everything is shed that has been acquired at such cost from school and college and contact with the West. . . . The western train is used for reaching the place of sacred pilgrimage, and the electric fan for cooling the performer of domestic rites and ceremonies. But when the Maratha lecturer devotes his holiday to the cult of Shivaji, as the incarnation of militant Hinduism, or when the Bengalee clerk sacrifices a goat to Kali, who is identified with his beloved motherland, they are not, as some would have us believe, expressing in Oriental ways devotion to great ideas of nationalism or freedom that western culture has made sacred to them. They are rather giving expression, in accordance with Hindu tradition and ideas, to the Hindu conviction that God is everywhere, and to the spiritual yearning for God that is exemplified in the crudest as well as the most subtle and refined form of Hindu social and religious life. . . . The professor of English literature will not talk about his personal and intimate debt to that literature. For it does not intrude into his personal and domestic life. Reproductions of famous pictures of the West convey nothing to him. His true self is absorbed in a world of values that he feels, and perhaps rightly, would be meaningless to the European" (*ibid.*, p. 181).

The solution of the conflict, Mr. Mayhew thinks, lies in India's acceptance of Christ and the spiritual and ethical atmosphere of the New Testament. "What one feels in one's inmost heart most hopefully is that the spirit of Christ, and His spirit only, will eventually remove the cultural antagonism on which all spiritual monopolies are based" (*ibid.*, p. 185). But is Christ and the New Testament "Western"? Mr. Mayhew says: "We are not claiming, of course, a western origin for the New Testament or for the spirit that inspires it"; though he notes that there is "an effort to claim it entirely for the East." None the less, "it represents, though many Englishmen



and most Indians are unconscious of the fact, the spiritual foundations of our western institutions and civilization."

Thus, in the view of Mr. Mayhew, the conflict between the two types of civilization, the Western and the Westernized Eastern—for he is really comparing these two and not the Western with the pure Eastern—is not due to colour, race, language, politics, economics, or nationalism. It is due to the difference in the schemes of real values, the methods of enjoying happiness, such as literature, art and religion. He does not, however, plead for the obliteration of the differences between cultures. "There is room within the British Empire for the Celtic characteristics of the Irish Free States, the French ideas and associations of Quebec, and the scheme of values that determines Boer life in the Transvaal. There will be room within a politically united India for seekers after happiness, along very diverse paths, when mosque and temple are illuminated by the torch of learning" (*ibid.*, p. 207). And that torch is Christianity. "The writer's personal view is," says Mr. Mayhew, "that moral progress in India depends on the gradual transformation of education by explicit recognition of the spirit of Christ" (*ibid.*, p. 210).

It may not be obvious to others, what is so obvious to Mr. Mayhew, that the conflict between the East and the West, in the sense he has used them, is due to differences in the schemes of values; it may not be obvious to them, for instance, how an Indian enjoying his Kalidasa should come into conflict with an Englishman enjoying his Shakespeare, any more than the latter should come into conflict with a German enjoying his Goethe or a Frenchman his Voltaire. Again, in what sense was the Indian who attended office, pleaded in courts, etc., "Western"? Were there no offices and mercantile firms in India before the introduction of "Western" education? Were there no ministers and other officers of State? Were there no lawyers before? The term "Vakil," used even now for lawyers, is not an English word but a Persian one. Is the cult of Shivaji in Maharashtra different from the cult of Napoleon and Joan of Arc in France, of Washington and Lincoln in the United States, or of Lenin in Russia? In what sense is the cult of hero-worship Eastern? Is sacramental worship specially Eastern? Or

superstition? Can the Catholic worship be characterized as sacramental, and do Protestants call much of what the Catholics do superstition? Do the agnostics, atheists, and the rationalists, as Western as any other, call all religion superstition?

Is the conflict between the Whites and the Coloured in the United States due to differences in the values of life? There are conflicts within the West itself. Are they also due to differences of values? Or is it only between the East and the West that the conflict is cultural, but within the West itself racial, political, linguistic, economic, and so on? And has Christianity resolved the conflicts in the West which is blessed with it? Has Christianity saved the Christians from Inquisitions, slavery, and wars and exploitation?

Among the "admitted facts" mentioned by Mr. Mayhew and referred to in a previous paragraph, was the growing unfriendliness between the Englishman and the Western-educated Indian. There is no such unfriendliness between the Indian and the American, the Canadian, the Frenchman, the German, the Spaniard, nor between the Indian and all Englishmen. There is the greatest friendliness between an Englishman like the Reverend C. F. Andrews and Indians. It is not a case of the unfriendliness between the East and the West on account of differences in the absolute values of life, but it is only between *some* Indians and *some* Englishmen. The former, rightly or wrongly, believe that the latter are humiliating India politically and exploiting her economically. The conflict is neither racial nor cultural but political and economic.

Another of the "admitted facts" is that Oriental culture, far from being driven out by Western culture, has acquired a belief in its own merits and is determined to make its claims good before the world. Is it to be supposed that the Orient has rejected the recent material inventions, science and applied science of the West? Are the peoples of the East, from Turkey to Japan, rejecting *all* the culture of the West? Dr. Hu Shih has borne testimony to the rapid Westernization of China. The Westernization of Turkey and other Islamic countries is admitted. And also of India, as Mr. Mayhew himself testifies.

An Indian who has mastered both the English language and his

own mother-tongue reads and appreciates the literatures in both languages. Is it necessary that the Englishman who learns French should thereafter not read English literature? Should French drive out English?

As for the moral superiority of the West, is it the East alone that is questioning it? Perhaps it is the Westerners themselves who are more incisive in questioning it.

It is as well to distinguish what are the features of Western Civilization which the East seeks complete liberation from. Christianity has not been imposed on the East, and there is, therefore, no occasion to seek liberation from it, even if such were desired. The liberation is from political subjection and economic exploitation where they exist. In this respect the West has done just the same. Since there is now no Western people politically subject to the East, the question of political liberation does not arise. But it was there about a hundred years ago. In the early years of the nineteenth century Greece and the other Balkan countries successfully liberated themselves from political subjection to Turkey. To-day the West is resisting the threatened economic exploitation of the West by Japan, and seeking liberation from it where it is already established.

## *Mr. Maurice Parmelee on East and West*

IN his very interesting book, *Oriental and Occidental Culture: An Interpretation*, Mr. Maurice Parmelee institutes an almost categorical comparison, or rather contrast, between the Orient and the Occident.

It is important to note that, as has already been pointed out, Mr. Parmelee, unlike some others, includes Islamic Asia, from Asia Minor to the frontiers of India, in the West, or at any rate, he does not include it in the Orient.

Taking religion first for examination, Mr. Parmelee finds that within the "Western cultural sphere" were evolved "two great Semitic religions, Christianity and Islam. The one dominates the West. The other dominated the borderland between the West and the East" (Parmelee, *Oriental and Occidental Culture*, p. 48). Judaism and Zoroastrianism may also be mentioned, at any rate, the former, which Mr. Parmelee includes among the eight "leading religions" (*ibid.*, p. 229). In the Orient are to be found Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism and Shintoism. If the people of Asia Minor and the countries to its east are included in the Orient, as several authorities do, all the leading religions will have originated in the Orient. In which case, with respect to the *origin* of the leading religions, the West is homogeneous only in the sense that it gave birth to no great religion. If Islamic Asia be included in the West, the Occident is not homogeneous, inasmuch as it will have given birth to three great religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

With reference to the spread of each of these religions, it varied

in time. There was a time when none of these religions existed. Every one was born sometime and somewhere. And it spread. The spread of each religion differs with the time when a survey is made. To-day the doctrines of all the leading religions are known both in the Orient and the Occident. The number of people formally professing each is different in either. Neither the Orient nor the Occident is homogeneous in this respect. The Occident has for some centuries been predominantly Christian.

The East, says Mr. Parmelee, is polytheistic, while the West, which is predominated by Christianity and Islam, is "belligerently monotheistic" (ibid., p. 48). But this contrast is "not absolute." "For example, I have said that Western religion is monotheistic. And yet, Christianity, for all its boasted monotheism, has an inexplicable doctrine of a divine trinity in which, by means of a mysterious mathematics, three are one and one god becomes three" (ibid., p. 52). Whatever be the merits of the contrast, the relevant point is that *polytheism and monotheism are not characteristic of the East and the West, as they are of certain religions*. For instance, Islam and Christianity are monotheistic, whether in the Orient or the Occident; they are not monotheistic in the Occident and polytheistic in the Orient. Hinduism is monistic, monotheistic, pantheistic, polytheistic and atheistic, while Buddhism is atheistic, notwithstanding that they are both Oriental.

"Religion," says Mr. Parmelee, "is much more institutionalized in the West than in the East" (ibid., p. 50). And he arranges the different religions in their order of institutionalization. At one end is Roman Catholicism, and at the other Confucianism. But here again, institutionalization is correlated with particular religions and not with the East or the West. Catholicism is highly institutionalized whether in the East or in the West.

"All these facts suggest," says Mr. Parmelee, "that the East is more religious than the West" (ibid., p. 53). The "facts" are: "Mysticism is prevalent in the East. Astrology, geomancy, necromancy, and other forms of magical belief and practice, which are closely allied and mingled with religion, are widespread in the East, whereas science has checked them to a large extent in the West.

Science has also secularized many phases of Western life" (ibid., p. 53). This statement describes the situation at a particular time, the time when Mr. Parmelee made his survey. It also means that it was not so in the past. As the discoveries of science increased and diffused, they increasingly checked magic and secularized the phases of life in the West. And so they are doing in the East as well. *As science waxes, superstition wanes*. The contrast is not between a "more religious East" and a less religious or materialistic West, but between stages in the development of science and its secularizing influence in both the West and the East.

Speaking of India, Mr. Parmelee says that "While belief in astrology is by no means dead in the West, it does not manifest itself in this widespread fashion" (ibid., p. 77). Not long ago it was very widespread in the West as well. According to the writer in the *Encyclopædia of Social Sciences*, "From Mesopotamia astrology passed to the Greeks. . . . The final summator of the Greek astronomical system, Ptolemy of Alexandria, who flourished in the second half of the second century of the Christian era, was himself no mean astrologer. . . . By the sixteenth century, after theology and law, astrology was the main intellectual interest of the learned class. Its conclusions were accepted by every class. . . . Nor was it until the general acceptance by the educated class, late in the seventeenth century, of the views of Galileo and Kepler as to the structure of the universe that astrology began to lose hold. . . . Forsaken by the more enlightened, it was and is still held by the most ignorant in the West and by almost all classes in the East." Dr. George Sarton says: "Now astrology spread East and West and was popular everywhere. But in Islam it was balanced to a certain extent by a vigorous development of astronomy and the persistence of a few sound scientific traditions, while in the West, where the contact with such traditions was completely lost, it was entirely unmitigated" (Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, Vol. I, p. 19).

Secularization spreads with science. It is spreading in the East. Professor William E. Hocking of Harvard and his colleagues of the Laymen's Enquiry Commission say: "At the beginning of our century of Protestant missions, Christianity found itself addressing

men attached to other religions: its argument was with other religions. At present, it confronts a growing number of persons, especially among the thoughtful, critical of or hostile to all religion. Its further argument, we judge, is to be less with Islam or Hinduism or Buddhism than with materialism, secularism, naturalism" (Hocking, *Re-Thinking Missions*, p. 29).

Mr. Parmelee proceeds to distinguish "the differences between Eastern and Western modes of thought and ideals." "The West emphasizes action, work and accomplishments; the East, meditation and contemplation. The West is intensely interested in the present mundane existence. The East yearns after a nirvana of non-existence. The West is principally concerned with the relative. The East is preoccupied with the idea of the absolute. The West deals with the particular; the East with the ultimate and the universal. The West is turning more and more to science for guidance. The East still clings close to religion and metaphysics. The West is endeavouring to control nature. The East resigns itself to natural forces. Western control of nature dissipates fear of natural forces through science, invention and industry, which are rapidly supplanting magic and religion. The East deadens this fear by means of resignation, inaction, and anticipated personal extinction through mergence with the infinite. The West recognizes no past existence and pays less attention to the future one in which it professes to believe. The East believes in a past existence and anticipates a series of future ones.

"The East tends to regard the world of phenomena as illusory, and confuses the natural and supernatural, even though it usually recognizes the distinction between them. The West distinguishes sharply between the two, when it recognizes the supernatural at all, and considers this world as very real. The East is still swayed by a static philosophy of changelessness and fixity. The West is dominated by a dynamic, pragmatic, instrumental philosophy of change. The East believes in a periodic law of cyclism, of eternal rhythm, which makes it fatalistic. The West is enamoured with the idea of evolution and progress toward some goal, whatever it may be, which makes it self-confident and hopeful.

"The Easterners are said to be less individualized, because they look forward to ultimate extinction. The West lays emphasis on individuality and the development of personality. The Eastern doctrine of reincarnation is said to encourage inaction, and perhaps indolence, because its believers think they have many existences to live through automatically. Christianity and Islam teach that there is only one life, the future life being of an entirely different order, so that Westerners live the present life more intensely, endeavouring to get all they can out of it, and leave it reluctantly. The East preaches a gospel of renunciation; the West one of fulfilment. The East is prepossessed with the divine; the West with the human" (Parmelee, *Oriental and Occidental Culture*, pp. 62-63).

A detailed examination of these categorical contrasts is rendered hardly necessary because of the qualifications that Mr. Parmelee makes. "Each generalization is subject to many exceptions and qualifications. All of the characteristics to be mentioned apply to a certain extent to both East and West. Moreover, they apply in a varying degree to the different parts of the East, which is much less unified than the West, and more to India than elsewhere. They indicate norms set up by the thinkers and leaders who influence the common people in a measure. But the life of the masses the world over is much the same in that they are primarily concerned with satisfying the fundamental human wants" (*ibid.*, p. 62). He goes further when he says: "in fact, with reference to these matters, almost as sharp a distinction must be drawn between India and the eastern Asiatic peoples as between India and the West. It may be true that the mystery of the universe presents itself more forcibly to the Asiatic than to the Western mind. But neither China nor Japan is as deeply interested in metaphysics, theology and religion as is India" (*ibid.*, p. 68).

It must be remembered that Mr. Parmelee includes Islamic Asia in the West. There are those who would consider that there is as sharp a distinction between the culture of Islamic Asia and the Christian Europe as between either India or China. It is doubtful if even Mr. Parmelee would postulate for the Islamic area those characteristics which he postulated for the



West, the Christian West, as, for instance, science, invention and industry.

But apart from this, what is the significance of the contrasts that Mr. Parmelee has drawn between the East and the West? If his characterization of the East applies mostly to India and not to other parts of the East, and if even in India it does not apply to all or most of the people, if it does not apply to the masses who form the bulk of the population, but only to the thinkers and leaders who, in any country, form a small minority, and if, even so, it applies to a certain extent both to the East and the West, what is its significance? It can only mean that if the characteristics of the thinkers and leaders all over the East and the West are examined, it will be found that all of them occur both in the East and the West, but that their *relative proportions* will vary. In the East will be found more of the Eastern characteristics and less of the Western, while in the West more of the Western and less of the Eastern.

There is all the difference in the world between saying that something *occurs* among a people and something is *characteristic* of them. Gangsterism, sky-scrapers, vegetarianism, lynching, study of archaeology, mysticism, and nudism, for instance, occur in the United States of America, but they are not characteristic of Americans, as are, for instance, American citizenship, political franchise, use of the toothbrush, and perhaps to a lesser extent the reading of newspapers, the use of the automobile, Christianity, and the use of the English language. The extent of the spread of a culture trait is relevant to the question at issue.

A statistical measurement of the characteristics attributed to the East and the West by Mr. Parmelee is, it must be granted, difficult in all cases. Census statistics can reveal the number of professed or formal Christians, Hindus, Moslems and Buddhists, but they do not tell how many of these really believe and follow the tenets of their religions, how many emphasized action, work and accomplishment and how many meditation and contemplation, how many are scientific and how many superstitious, how many are fatalistic and how many self-confident and hopeful.

Not all the peoples in the West, nor even a majority of them, are

scientific. Nor, it seems, is a scientific Westerner scientific in all respects. Mr. Pitt-Rivers has the following: "Sir James Fraser wrote to Mr. Heape: 'I suppose that Newton was the greatest scientific genius who ever lived; but he wrote drivelling nonsense about prophecy and the book of Revelation. Faraday, another scientific genius of the first order, was a Sandemanian. A. R. Wallace, Crookes and Lodge dabble in the nonsense of spiritualism. Mankind from top to bottom is riddled with such inconsistencies'" (Pitt-Rivers, *Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*, p. 161).

In the absence of objective scientific measurement, only a subjective appreciation is open. It has, however, all the weaknesses of generalization from insufficient data, which Mr. Parmelee himself deplored when he said: "It is unfortunately true of both Eastern and Western writers that they often make wild and inaccurate generalizations when trying to compare Eastern and Western thought" (Parmelee, *Oriental and Occidental Culture*, p. 56, note).

But whatever be the basis for estimating the proportion of the Eastern and the Western characteristics in the East and the West, the *proportion* itself has not, according to Mr. Parmelee, remained constant in time. He says, for instance, that "the West is turning more and more to science for guidance. The East still clings to religion and metaphysics" (*ibid.*, p. 62). "During the past three centuries science has made greater strides in the West than during all preceding time the world over. It has transformed Occidental Culture not only materially but mentally as well" (*ibid.*, p. 73). "Every visitor to Venice has seen at the entrance to the Grand Canal the large church of Santa Maria della Salute. It was constructed several centuries ago in an effort to check a great epidemic which was raging. The West has travelled a long way since that time" (*ibid.*, p. 78). "It must not be forgotten that science is a comparatively recent factor in the Western world, and might very easily have failed to develop at all" (*ibid.*, p. 84). It is clear from such statements that the West has not always been as scientific as it is to-day.

It is not only the West that has changed under the influence of science but also the Orient. "Occidental science," says Mr. Parmelee,

"has already improved the material welfare of the Orient so greatly as to put it heavily in debt to the West" (ibid., p. 79). So, what has happened in the West is happening in the East; science is spreading. The contrast is not, as Mr. Parmelee would have it when he says that "The outstanding intellectual difference between the East and the West is with respect to the scientific point of view and attitude of mind," but between a less scientific past and a more scientific present, both in the West and the East. Mr. Parmelee says of the scholars of the Orient that "many of their prepossessions must be swept away before they can begin to acquire a scientific point of view." It was and still is just the same with the Occidental scholars; the process is not completed yet. The writer on "Magic" in the *Encyclopædia of Social Sciences* says that "Magical ideas and procedure are plentiful in contemporary civilization. The secularization of modern life has proceeded at the expense of religion and its gods more than of magic."

From what has been said, it may be concluded that Mr. Parmelee is not of those who would speak of the incompatibility of Western and Eastern cultures. The characteristics of either exist in both, though in different proportions; the proportions, however, have not remained constant in time. The West and the East are on the same road, the latter following the former. This can only mean a lag in time, but not a fundamental difference of kind, as it were.

But a fundamental difference is implied when he enquires "why the Orient failed to reach the scientific stage of its own accord," and avers that "there is no reason to believe that without the leadership of the Occident the East would not have attained this stage for a very long time, if ever" (ibid., p. 76). In this he has the support of Professor A. N. Whitehead, whom he quotes. "There is no reason to doubt the intrinsic capacity of individual Chinamen for the pursuit of science. And yet Chinese science is practically negligible. There is no reason to believe that China, if left to itself, would have ever produced any progress in science. The same may be said of India" (ibid., p. 81). Here Messrs. Parmelee and Whitehead pass from the recording of past history to the enunciation of a sociological law: unassisted by the West, the East cannot develop science.

The history of science as described by Mr. Parmelee himself does not seem to support this view. "It must not be forgotten that science is a comparatively recent factor in the Western world, and might not very easily have developed at all." There was no sociological law of the inevitability of science in the West. "The Greeks in Asia Minor and the Hellenic peninsula, influenced from India, Mesopotamian and Egyptian sources, made small beginning, and then came a long interlude." India, if not Mesopotamia and Egypt, is of the East, according to Mr. Parmelee. It may well be said, then, that the West, unaided by the East, could not have developed science! "The Roman Empire, somewhat like its great contemporary the Chinese Empire, spread a political and military order throughout the West. Its authority was highly centralized, so that it did not foster a spirit of free research and investigation." This might be held to justify the statement that neither in China nor in the West was the development of science possible. "It was succeeded by the Roman Church, which was and is the most centralized and institutionalized religion in the world. Under its hierarchical rule there was little freedom for independent thinking. It was largely responsible for the gloomy centuries of the Dark and Middle Ages. Monastic ideals and a static philosophy prevailed, and the universities existed largely for the training of monks. The sort of contemplation and meditation encouraged was hardly more fruitful than that of the Indian yoga systems. For nearly two thousand years science was nearly at a standstill, almost the only exceptions being a few contributions from Arabic culture, which were the by-products, so to speak, of the sudden and rapid spread of Islam. But no more than Christianity did Islam contain the possibility of stimulating science to develop to its full fruition" (*ibid.*, p. 84-85). If, in spite of this, science was possible in the West, is there any *a priori* reason to suppose that a similar development was impossible in the East?

Or, is there some other explanation? Mr. Parmelee recognizes the difficulty in answering the question. "It is difficult enough to explain why events take place in cultural evolution. It is often even more difficult to explain why they did not happen. A complete and conclusive explanation as to why science did not develop in the

East is out of the question" (*ibid.*, p. 84). He suggests the explanation, however, that the ardent interest of India in religion and metaphysics and of China in ancestor worship prevented the development of science. As stated in the passages quoted above, the situation was no different in the West. Thus, till a few centuries ago, the prospects of science were equally gloomy both in the West and in the East.

"Then came a concatenation of events," says Mr. Parmelee, "which played their part in preparing the way for the coming of science, such as exploration leading to the discovery of America and the routes to the East, the invention of printing, the renaissance of learning, the discovery of the ancient classics, the revolt against the church, the increase of wealth and leisure. These and many other factors aroused men's minds and broadened their outlook" (*ibid.*, p. 85). Are these historical accidents or have they any correlation with the West? The discovery of America was an accident; it was not a characteristic of the West. Printing and paper, Mr. Parmelee admits, were of Chinese origin, and "these inventions slowly made their way westward across Asia and eventually reached Europe. First came paper, which was the essential preliminary to printing. Then came the various forms of printing. So that Gutenberg's discovery may not have been wholly or even a large part original, since it may have been inspired by these products of the Far East" (*ibid.*, p. 80).

The reasons given by Mr. Parmelee are simply historical events, none of which was correlated with the West and none of which had had to happen in virtue of any sociological law of Western Civilization as opposed to that of Eastern Civilization.

It is noteworthy that Mr. Parmelee and Dr. Whitehead do not hold that the East cannot acquire science from the West, though it could not develop it unaided by the West. The East can copy, but it cannot originate. Mr. Parmelee has borne testimony to the introduction of science in the Orient from the Occident. He quotes Dr. Whitehead as saying that "More and more it is becoming evident that what the West can most readily give to the East is its science and its scientific outlook. This is transferable from country to

country and from race to race, wherever there is a rational society" (*ibid.*, p. 74).

Reserving for later consideration the question of the original contributions to science made by India, it is interesting to note that Mr. Parmelee says that "So far as science is concerned, evolution is merely a name for a process of change. Its first great exponent, Herbert Spencer, recognized this and indicated clearly that evolution is correlated with and balanced by involution. This fact was dimly perceived by Indian sages two or three thousand years ago, though they failed to describe this process of change accurately and in detail, as has been accomplished to a considerable extent by Western scientists. But these sages of old and scientists of to-day are at one in realizing that there can be no purpose or end in this infinite and universal process of change" (*ibid.*, p. 88). Two or three thousand years ago there were perhaps no Western scientists at all; much less even a dim perception of the principle of evolution by the West.

Mr. Parmelee has said that "Occidental science has already improved the material welfare of the Orient so greatly as to put it heavily in debt to the West" (*ibid.*, p. 79). Does this mean that the people of the East are indebted to the people of the West? Are all the people who live in the West to-day or who have lived in the West in the past responsible for Occidental science? In what sense is science Occidental? Is it characteristic of all or the bulk of the people of the West, now or ever before? Did the whole or the bulk of the population of the West in the past encourage and stand by the scientific men of the West? Does not the history of science in the West show that in the old days scientists were persecuted and discouraged, that even as late as the middle of the last century the Darwinian theory was fiercely assailed by no insignificant sections of the West? Science has had slowly and painfully to win its way to public favour. Is there any justification in holding that the achievements of men of science in the West belong to the whole of the West, are native to the whole of the people of the West, but foreign to the people of the East; and that they are a gift of the West to the East for which the East has to be grateful to the West?

Or is it really the case that the people of the West as well as of the East have reason to be grateful to the men and women of science, whether of the West or the East? These, in their turn, have to be grateful to their predecessors in science who, by their earlier and pioneering work, facilitated their own achievements. The fact that scientists *occur*, as it were, in the West does not make science the *characteristic* of the West, even as the occurrence of lynching and mysticism in the West do not make them characteristic of the West. *The man of science creates and gives, and the rest of the world receive. It is not a case of the West creating science and the East receiving it from the West.*

## *The Individual and the Family in the East and the West*

MR. PARMELEE next proceeds to contrast the social organization of the East with that of the West. "It is often said that the individual is the unit of society in the West, the family in the East. While this is too categorical a statement to be entirely true, it raises several interesting questions. Is individuality suppressed, causing greater uniformity of personality in the Orient? Is there greater differentiation of personality and more genius in the Occident? Is morality more socialized in the East? Is there more democracy in the West? Is there more formal courtesy in the Orient? What effects do these partly contrasted systems have upon human relations, such as between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant, employer and employee? Does Eastern family life stand in the way of a broader social life?" (ibid., p. 91).

After reviewing the situation, he concludes that "the preceding discussion indicates that it is well-nigh impossible to give a categorical answer to most of the questions which have been raised, so imponderable are many of the factors involved" (ibid., p. 102). He continues: "The family is much more powerful in the Orient. It hampers the career of the individual by limiting the choice of occupation and of spouse, by restricting freedom of movement and by accentuating paternal authority. It also stands in the way of a broader social life. In the West the individual usually belongs to several social and cultural circles, and the women share this life with the man. The seclusion in the home of Oriental woman cuts her off almost entirely from the broader social life. The predominant position of the family as the central unit of society narrows the



outlook of the man, so that he is less likely to be interested in political, national and world affairs" (*ibid.*, p. 102-3).

In examining these partial contrasts, it is necessary to analyse the standards of judgment: whether a character just *occurs* in a given unit of civilization or it is *characteristic* of it in the sense that it is shared by a great majority of the people; whether it is a *recent development* or has been a *constant factor* during the historical period; and whether it is *correlated* with the East or the West or with some factor which is independent of this category and is perhaps universal.

Taking first the question of the influence of the family on the individual, Sir William Beveridge speaks of three stages formulated by Dr. Muller-Lyer. The first is kinship or tribal. "The second stage is the full family stage. Here under the dominance of one male, the family forms a close-knit group for all purposes, social, political, and economic. In republican Rome the father was the absolute owner of his wife and children and slaves alike, of all they made and all they earned; they had no relations with the world outside. The family was the indivisible atom of which society was made. For another people this stage is summed up by the statements that an Englishman's house is his castle, and that every woman's place is in a castle of this kind. Most races that have progressed and made civilization have also at one time or another taken this strong patriarchal view, have based the family on the undisputed dominance of the father.

"The third stage is described by this writer as the personal stage, not yet wholly achieved anywhere, but gradually coming upon us. The development of manufacturing and trade deprives the household of many of its former functions. The State undertakes duties that were formerly those of the family, such as education or provision for old age. The personalities of wife and children claim and get independent recognition from the State. The family becomes less close-knit, less dominated by one member, perhaps less permanent. The atom seems to be breaking up" (Beveridge, *Changes in Family Life*, pp. 22-23<sup>1</sup>). "The patriarchal organization of the

<sup>1</sup> Published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

tribe became the pattern for the individual family, and with slight changes persisted from ancient days until after the Industrial Revolution" (Groves, Skinner and Swenson, *The Family and Its Relationships*, p. 31). It is apparent, then, that the relation between the individual and the family before the Industrial Revolution in the West was similar to that in the East, and that a similar change accompanies the spread of the Industrial Revolution in the East. Dr. Jerome Davis says that "The home used to be a self-sufficing centre. . . . To-day in some isolated rural communities in northern Maine and New Hampshire, far from the railroad, one can still find examples of the old home. In these places the dwelling itself was built by the father, the clothing made by the mother, the food is raised on the farm and prepared in the home. Even religion and education used to be provided very largely within the four walls of the homestead. Now everything is changed. . . . Probably nine-tenths of the productive tasks carried on in the American home of the early nineteenth century are being done by outside agencies" (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 716-17).

## *Women in the East and the West*

ON the question of the status of women, Mr. Parmelee says: "The seclusion of women in the home has existed in varying degrees at many times and places, in the Occident as well as in the Orient. It is far more characteristic of the East than of the West. It must, however, be remembered that at all times and places where it has existed it has been primarily and mainly true of the women of the upper classes. The women of the lower classes usually have to work with the men in the fields and elsewhere. . . . Like polygamy wherever it has existed, the complete seclusion of women is largely a luxury of the men of the upper classes" (Parmelee, *Oriental and Occidental Culture*, p. 131). He notes how women were not secluded in Japan prior to Chinese influence and how to-day they are free again due to the spread of industrialism. Of "purdah," or the seclusion of women in India, he says that "even in northern and central India the majority of the Hindu women, at any rate the lower class women, are free from the 'purdah' so far as appearing in public with faces uncovered is concerned. In southern India there has never been any trace whatsoever of the 'purdah.' The women move about freely and with no attempt at concealment" (ibid., p. 140). Burma knows no 'purdah.' In Malaya peninsula and in Java even Moslem women are not secluded.

In connection with the status of women it is instructive to note the evolution it has gone through in the West, from the days of ancient Greece, the fountain-head of Western civilization, to modern times, and to note parallels with the East. Writing on the "Evolution of Women" in *Woman's Coming of Age*, Mr. Robert

Briffault says: "The laws of the Ancient Aryans of India lay down that 'No act is to be done by a young girl or a young woman, even though she be in her own house, according to her will. In her childhood she should be under the will of her father; in her youth under that of her husband; if her husband die, under the will of her sons. A woman should never enjoy her own will. She must worship her husband—even though he be of bad conduct, debauched, devoid of every quality—as though he were a god.' A Chinese literary lady whose writings have become classic expresses as follows the social tradition of her country on the subject: 'We women,' she says, 'occupy the last place in the human species, we are the weaker part of humanity. The basest functions are, and should be, our portion. There is a truth which we should ever bear in mind, and which should influence the whole of our conduct, and it will be our happiness if we act in accordance with it. A woman should be as a shadow and an echo in the house. Let her never oppose others, let her suffer patiently others to oppose her.' In ancient Greece the ideal woman was described by Pericles as one whose name should never be heard either for good or ill. 'Silence, modesty, and to stay at home quietly are the most becoming virtues of a wife,' says Menander. 'A woman who goes out of the house,' said Hyperides, 'should be at that time of life when men ask not, Whose wife is she? but, Whose mother is she?' She should, says Xenophon, 'not be allowed to see, hear, or ask anything more than is absolutely necessary.' Roman social tradition was, as is well known, founded upon principles identical with those laid down by the Hindus. A woman was regarded as the ward of her father, of her brother, of her husband, and when widowed, of her sons. 'Our fathers,' says the elder Cato, 'have willed that women should be in the power of their fathers, of their brothers, of their husbands. Our fathers have bound down women by law, and bent them to their power.' Christianity reiterated and reinforced the Roman social tradition. 'Wives,' it enjoined, 'submit yourselves unto your husbands as unto the Lord. Let the wives be subject to their husbands in everything. Let them be discreet, chaste; let them stay at home and obey their husbands.' Ecclesiastical law authorized a man to enforce obedience from his wife by beating her

'with whips and cudgels'—*flagellis et fustibus*. These principles have not only been laid down by men for the guidance of women, but have been adopted by the latter as the foundations of feminine virtue and be seemingness. Writing at the beginning of the last century, a lady remarks: 'Women are something like children—the more they show their need of support, the more engaging they are; in everything that women attempt they should show their consciousness of dependence.' In accordance with these principles women have in most civilized societies been completely excluded from all social and intellectual activities, from government, political, religious, professional, industrial, commercial pursuits, and from the administration of property" (Schmalhausen and Calverton, *Woman's Coming of Age*, pp. 5-6).

Women were treated as property even as late as 1797 in England. "Wife-sale and wife-purchase" were "part of the life of the day" (*ibid.*, p. 13). "In the matter of wife-sales and wife-purchases, the women were usually led by their husbands, with a rope about their necks, to the market place where they were sold along with cattle, and with proper witnesses to sanction the bargain. . . . Women thus led about the market place by a rope became a common sight. Smithfield Market became famous for such sales." *The Times* of London of July 22, 1797, had a commendatory reference to it (*ibid.*, p. 13). "Even the church was not at all immune from such traffic. In February 1790, for instance, a wife who had been deserted by her husband and had become a burden upon the parish, which had been supporting her, was sold at the market place by the parishioners for two shillings" (*ibid.*, pp. 13-14).

A description of the status of women in the United States as late as 1858 is quoted in *Women's Coming of Age* from Mrs. A. J. Graves' "Women in America," which purported to be "an examination into the moral and intellectual condition of American female society." She wrote: "The supremacy of the husband as the head of the family institution is similar to the supremacy of the governing power of the State, and there is the like obligation to obedience to both. She is required, therefore, not only to submit to man as her head in the marriage relation but she must not assume to herself

any rights of participation with him in the management or control of civil or political affairs. She (a good woman) has no desire to rule where she feels it her duty to obey, as it is her highest pleasure to 'love, honour and obey'; and she submitted with cheerful acquiescence to that order of conjugal relation which God and nature have established. Woman feels she is not made to command, and finds her truest happiness in submitting to those who wield a rightful sceptre in justice, mercy and love" (ibid., p. 15).

It is interesting to note the influence of the Church, Catholic and Protestant, on the status of women in the West. According to Mr. Joseph McCabe, "Roman lawyers of the first and second centuries had removed all the disabilities and harshness of the older Roman law" through a "liberal use of equity and by the sanction of less tyrannical forms of marriage." But "in the later Middle Ages the laws of every country in Europe, directly inspired by the Canon Law, threw women back into the state of dependence on their husbands from which the Roman had rescued them" (ibid., p. 51). "To the Fathers it seemed that woman was the diabolical source of all the unpleasantness of sex and for this and her supposed guilt for the curse of the race, they used bitter language" (ibid., p. 52). The Church put a premium on celibacy, chastity and asceticism, and discouraged divorce and widow remarriage. "From the thirteenth century, when the Church completed a despotic power over European life, the position of women steadily worsened" (ibid., p. 59). "In the completed Christian civilization she held a far lower position than she had had in the Egyptian, Babylonian, Hittite, and in its later stages, the Greco-Roman civilization" (ibid., p. 61). It may be noted that the first three are Eastern. "Whenever Popes or prelates of strict faith came to power, they acted on this estimate (inferiority) of women, and it was they who made the Canon Law, insisting on the subjection of women, which from the thirteenth century had a profound influence on civil law. By the time of the Reformation women were treated in law with all the insulting disabilities and inequalities which Protestants were no more willing to relieve than Catholics. It was the sceptics of the second part of the eighteenth century who began to revolt, and apart from a few

Quakers, for nearly a century the fight was left almost entirely to sceptics" (*ibid.*, p. 60).

Even in the Age of Chivalry, women did not always receive chivalrous treatment from gallant knights. The *New York Times* (November 1, 1934) recalls that "A verray parfit, gentil knyght" was permitted to knock his wife down and kick her in the face. The champions of widows and orphans, he could and did sell his wards and daughters in marriage, often when they were mere children."

One of the results of the Christian Church's inferior view of woman—she was the "devil's gateway," according to Tertullian—was the "notion of alliance between demons and women," the superstition of witchcraft, which "became for centuries the convictions of intelligent people" (*ibid.*, p. 176). "The judicial murder of helpless women became an institution." In the words of Professor William Graham Sumner, of Yale University, "After the refined torture of the body and the nameless mental sufferings, women were executed in the most cruel manner. These facts are so monstrous that all other aberrations of the human race are small in comparison" (*ibid.*, p. 176). It was estimated that during the Christian period some nine million persons, mostly women, were burned as witches (*ibid.*, p. 176).

Against such degradations and injustice there were protests. "At the time of one of the great crises in that evolution (of human justice), known as the French Revolution, women, who had up to that time unquestionably accepted patriarchal principles, began to dispute their validity and justice. That protest has ultimately led in our own day to what is known as the emancipation of women" (p. 18). It was the Industrial Revolution and the World War that ushered in the modern woman. Even yet all the discriminations against women have not been removed. Even as recently as February 1935 there was a debate in the London Press whether women could reason, whether they were born with a handicap, and whether they could excel men in business. It was only in June 1935 that the Oxford University removed the last of the discriminations against women students at Oxford and permitted them to take degrees in Divinity.

Even the United States, which may be said to have gone farthest in the emancipation of women, is not, according to Miss Rose C. Field, a land of equal opportunity for women. There are only thirty out of 534 occupations in which women are not represented, but there are many in which their representation is only nominal. "One robin does not make a spring." "There is a superstition in mining camps and fishing villages that to let a woman go down a shaft or to take one on a fishing trip is to invite disaster. The taboo is frank and superstitious. But the superstition, in vaguer form, floats like an impenetrable veil over other occupations" (*New York Times Magazine*, June 9, 1935).

The important point to be noticed is the great contrast between the status of the Western woman now as compared with that of a few centuries ago. It is also noteworthy that improvement began only recently, and that it has progressed with accelerated speed and momentum. It was due primarily to the Industrial Revolution. The distinction, therefore, is not that women had a better status in the West than in the East, but that both in the West and in the East they had an inferior status, and they are moving towards equality. The pace is unequal and uneven. While the French women have yet no vote, women of India and Turkey have it. On the first of March, 1935, when seventeen women took seats in the Turkish Parliament in Istanbul, the French Chamber of Deputies in Paris passed a measure to give the French women the vote; but it has since been turned down by the French Senate. In the meanwhile, women in Germany and Italy are being "Orientalized" by their Governments—sent "back to the kitchen."

"In the East," says Mr. Parmelee, "there is little of the so-called romantic love which bulks large in the West. As a consequence, woman figures much less in Eastern than in Western literature, and there is much less gallantry and chivalry towards women in the East" (Parmelee, *Oriental and Occidental Culture*, p. 167). Here again the difference between the East and the West is, according to him, quantitative rather than qualitative. Is that quantitative difference a permanent distinction or a transitory one, being correlated with factors which are becoming universal? "Marriage," says the



writer on "Marriage" in the *Encyclopædia of Social Sciences*, "until the most recent period has never been primarily directed towards the sentimental gratification of a spouse, a notion that is even now limited to a small section of the population of several occidental countries. The human norm is more nearly represented by two wealthy European peasants on friendly terms with each other and desiring to consolidate their estates." "Disregarding local variations," continues the writer, "the conditions preserved until quite recently in rural Poland may be considered typical of Europe, and they present in all essentials the picture outlined for the primitive peasants of other continents. All normal individuals are expected to marry; the marriage arrangements are dictated by the interests of the group precisely as in aboriginal Australia or America. . . . The free play of sexual attraction in the choice of a mate is narrowly circumscribed by the principles of social acceptability. . . . A dowry is essential." Recently the norm has undergone a change. "The emergence of individualism observable among Polish immigrants is characteristic of every country affected by industrial revolution." In the chapter, "The Family as a Social Group," which takes the form of a dialogue between Sir William Beveridge and Professor Morris Ginsberg, in *Changes in Family Life*, Sir William says, "And I have an impression that, outside Britain and America, families still have a great deal to say about marriages of their members." Professor Ginsberg responds, "Certainly. Apart from parental control in laws relating to the marriages of minors, the influence of the family, here as elsewhere, goes much deeper than the law. Marriages are still to a great extent a family as well as a private concern" (Beveridge, *Changes in Family Life*, p. 89). It will thus be seen that the choice of the individual with respect to marriage has not been uniform in the West in time or in area. The tendency is towards freedom, and it is correlated with modern industrialism, and industrialism is not restricted to the West.

## *Western Monogamy and Eastern Polygamy*

LIMITATIONS of time and space preclude the examination of the other points of contrast discussed by Mr. Parmelee, especially of the social relations between men and women in the East and the West. But a reference may be made, though Mr. Parmelee himself does not discuss it, to monogamy and polygamy. It is generally affirmed that the East is polygamous and the West is monogamous. (In this connection the Islamic world has to be included in the East, or at any rate not included in the West.) Apart from values, the validity of the thesis depends on the criterion adopted: law or practice. Law and custom permitted polygamy in the East, though in some countries it was prohibited by law in very recent times, as in Turkey and Japan; but it was not unknown in the West. "Polygamy," says the writer on the subject in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "has been permitted among many of the Indo-European peoples—among ancient Slavs and Teutons, the ancient Irish and the Vedic Indians—though it seems to have been as a rule confined to kings or chiefs or nobles. None of the Hindu law-books restrict the number of wives a man is allowed to marry; yet some preference is often shown for monogamy, and at the present day most castes object to their members having more than one wife, except for some cogent reason.

"On the other hand, monogamy was the only recognized form of marriage in Greece; concubinage existed in Athens, but it was well distinguished from marriage, conferring no rights on the concubine. Roman marriages were strictly monogamous; liaisons between married men and mistresses were not uncommon by the

close of the Republic, but such a relation was not considered lawful concubinage in after-time.

"Polygyny has been found even in Christian Europe. No obstacle was placed in the way of its practice by kings in countries where it had occurred in the times of paganism. In the middle of the sixth century Diarmait, King of Ireland, had two queens and two concubines. Polygyny was frequently practised by Merovingian kings. Charlemagne had two wives and many concubines, and one of the laws seems to imply that polygamy was not unknown even among priests. In later times Phillip of Hesse and Frederick William II of Prussia contracted bigamous marriages with the sanction of the Lutheran clergy. In 1650, soon after the Peace of Westphalia, when the population had been greatly reduced by the Thirty Years' War, the Frankish *Kreistag* at Nuremberg passed the resolution that henceforth every man should be allowed to marry two women. The Anabaptists and the Mormons have advocated polygamy with much religious fervour."

As far as the law is concerned, there can be little doubt that, on the whole, the Christian Church was opposed to polygamy. But it is necessary to note that the Church did not consistently smile on monogamy and frown on polygamy. It was opposed to marriage itself, for sex was sin, and woman the "Devil's gateway." It was only as a deplorable concession to the perversity of human society that the Church reconciled itself to the institution of marriage, and then attempted to control it even as in some countries the State recognizes and controls prostitution, not because it approves of it but simply because it cannot effectively abolish it. The Church brought marriage under its control, though, according to Mr. Joseph McCabe, it did not recognize it as a sacrament till the sixteenth century, and then decreed that marriage was indissoluble, denied divorce, and frowned on the re-marriage of widows. "Asceticism," says Mr. Riley, "forced most of the clergy to be celibates, kept many of the laity from matrimony, rendered many marriages merely nominal, and led to the Church's reprobation of the second marriage of widows. Some have argued that the last notion was taken over from the Romans, who at times reasoned

that a wife's loyalty to her husband should last after his death" (Schmalhausen and Calverton, *Women's Coming of Age*, p. 95).

Taking the law alone into consideration, it is clear that polygamy was sanctioned both in the West and in the East in ancient times, and it has since been prohibited in the West for some centuries now, and in some of the countries of the East in more recent times. The law has been moving from polygamy to monogamy.

Taking the practice into consideration, the writer in *Encyclopædia Britannica* says that "Polygamy is nowhere the exclusive form of marriage, and among most peoples who practise it the large majority of men live in monogamy." One factor favouring monogamy is that normally the number of women is never large enough to permit every man to have at least two wives, much less more. Where it is practised it is limited to a small minority of kings and nobles and the rich. And that is common to both the East and the West.

Dr. J. H. Hutton, in his Report on the Census of India, 1931, says: "Polygyny is not widely practised in India among either Muslims or Hindus, but it has been found at all previous census operations; the first half of the decade was prosperous and the economic check upon it unlikely to have operated before the end of the decade, and there is no reason to suppose that customs have changed to the extent of obliterating the very low ratio of eight co-wives to every thousand wives in a population of some three hundred million odd" (*Census of India*, 1931, Vol. I, Part I, p. 215).

While thus polygamy occurs in India, it is not characteristic of the people; it is not general; it is not the rule. Like racial equality in the British Empire and the United States, like divorce in the West, the law does not represent the general practice.

Polygamy may be viewed from another point of view: that of multiple sex-relations within wedlock as in the case of re-marriage after death or divorce of the spouse, or out of wedlock, as in the case of concubinage and prostitution. "The nominally monogamous marriage system of Christian countries," says Mr. Pitt-Rivers, "ill conceals the large proportion of polygynous and polyandrous matings; how large, it is impossible to determine exactly" (Pitt-Rivers,

*The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*, p. 16, note). The writer on "Marriage" in the *Encyclopædia of Social Sciences* says that "In Christian societies compulsory monogamy has not been construed as exclusive cohabitation for the male partner. The Code of the *Sieta partides* of the thirteenth-century Spain expressly legalizes concubinage and to the austere Protestant ethics of Samuel Johnson a husband's affairs were merely lapses from saintliness in the sight of God; socially, they were petty derelictions which a sensible wife would ignore. This one-sided latitudinarianism obtained until the recent rise of feminism, although here and there both sexes took advantage of the laxity condoned by usage, as in the polite circles of the eighteenth century." "In Scotland," says the writer on "Concubinage" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "the laws of William the Lion (*d.* 1214) speak of concubinage as a recognized institution and in the same century the great English legist Bracton treats the *concubina legitima* as entitled to certain rights." Writing on the same topic in the *Encyclopædia of Social Sciences*, Mr. Robert Briffault says that "Concubinage, associated or not with marriage, was usual and general in archaic Greece and was legitimate and respected in the city-states of historical times. . . . Similarly, in Rome under the republic the status of the concubine was legitimate and respected. . . . Under Augustus the status of concubines was further protected by special legislation. . . . While Christianity vehemently condemned all sex relations unless consecrated by indissoluble marriage and exalted celibacy over the latter, it continued during the early centuries to sanction in practice the established Roman and barbarian usages. . . . Concubinage in conjunction with marriage continued to be common among the barbarian rulers. . . . The tacit toleration of concubinage did not give place to general reprobation in Catholic and Protestant countries until after the Protestant Reformation. . . . From being originally as legitimate a form of union as marriage, concubinage thus became first illegitimate, then illicit and immoral."

"Concubinage in general," says the writer in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "was struck at by the concordat between the Pope Leo X and Francis I of France in 1516; and the Council of Trent,

while insisting on far more stringent conditions for lawful marriage than those that had prevailed in the Middle Ages, imposed at last heavy ecclesiastical penalties on concubinage and appealed to the secular arm for help against contumacious offenders."

As regards the extent of multiple sex relations, Walter M. Gallichan says: "A. E. Crawley, in his article on 'Chastity' in *The Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, says very truly that 'at least 50 per cent of the sexual intercourse that occurs in Western nations is outside the bonds of wedlock'" (Gallichan, *Women under Polygamy*, p. 328). "It is equally true that in no part of the world is polygyny so prevalent as in Christendom" (*ibid.*, p. 339). "In France, even to-day, the mistress is in many instances part of the accepted social system," says Mr. Calverton (Schmalhausen and Calverton, *Women's Coming of Age*, p. 487).

The modern tendency is thus pictured by Mr. Calverton: "But will not women with their new freedom force men to become monogamous instead of their becoming polygamous as men? This has been the hope of many reformers. Yet, upon close analysis, there are few realists who will grant that there is much reason to believe that man will ever become genuinely monogamous in sexual habit. He may observe the outward forms of monogamy, but he will not be limited by them. And there is little reason to believe that woman, once she is entirely free of man's dominance, will practice monogamy with any more fidelity. She, too, may accept its forms, it is true, but she, too, will violate them in action" (*ibid.*, p. 486).

It seems, then, that in the matter of sex relations, the difference is not between East and West, but between past and present and between law and practice. Polygamy was never anywhere the norm; it was the exception. In ancient times it was recognized in law both in the East and in the West in special cases. Later it was declared illegal at different times in different countries, Japan and Turkey being the latest. In actual practice, polygyny prevailed and may hereafter be paralleled by polyandry both in the West and in the East.

*Mr. Lothrop Stoddard on Ancient  
East and Modern West*

MR. LOTHROP STODDARD adopts in some respects another method when he contrasts the East and the West. He contrasts the *modern* West with the *ancient* East. In his recent book, *The Clashing Tides of Colour*, he says, among other things, that "Few contrasts could be sharper than the living conditions prevailing respectively in the traditional East and in the modern Western world" (Stoddard, *The Clashing Tides of Colour*, p. 189). "Even the wealthiest Oriental of olden times spent most of his money on Oriental luxuries like fine raiment, jewels, women, horses, a palace, and a great retinue of servants. But it is safe to say that the mightiest Eastern potentate lived under domestic conditions which a self-respecting Detroit factory worker would despise" (ibid., p. 189-90). He notes "the utter contrast between the economic systems of the old East and the modern West" (ibid., p. 195). He says that "Life in the old Orient was a gigantic lottery" which "westernization is eliminating" (ibid., p. 181); that the "East was virtually devoid of either industry or business as we understand these terms to-day" (ibid., p. 182); that its "primitive economy rested on the principle of status. The Western economic principles of contract and competition were virtually unknown" (ibid., p. 182); and that "Such education as existed in the old Orient was of an incredibly formal nature" (ibid., p. 184). Will most, if not all, of these contrasts be any different as between the ancient and the modern West? Are they really contrasts between the West and the East or between the ancient and the modern, both in the East and the West?

As a matter of fact, Mr. Stoddard himself admits as much when

he says that science and the Industrial Revolution "swiftly and utterly transferred the face of things, first in the West and later in the East as well" (ibid., p. 188). "The two outstanding features of the new economic order were the rise of machine-industry with its limitless stepping-up of mass-production, and the accompanying development of cheap and rapid transportation. . . . In fact, during the nineteenth century, Europe was transferred from a semi-rural continent into a swarming hive of industry" (ibid., p. 188). The same is happening in the East. Mr. Stoddard goes so far as to say that "nowhere in Asia, except possibly in India, is there any effective revolt against *Westernism, as a way of life*. Orientalism in its traditional sense cannot come back, because the old Orient has gone, never to return; because, for the first time in history, *the West has got under the Oriental's skin*. The white man may everywhere be thrown out bodily, but his ways will remain" (ibid., p. 190-91). Is it not equally true that Occidentalism also, in its traditional, ancient sense, cannot come back, as, for instance, the pre-machine age economy, the inferior status of women, the burning of witches, the patriarchal family, etc.? Westernism, in the sense of machine-industry, individualism, etc., has also got under the Occidental's skin.

"The true conquest of the East by the West is thus not political but economic and social" (ibid., p. 190). Mr. Stoddard thus distinguishes between the two types. "We hear much talk about the current Asiatic reaction against the West. Now there is undoubtedly a great and growing determination throughout the East to get rid of every kind of Western political tutelage, every sort of commercial or financial exploitation" (ibid., p. 190). In which case, is it not truer to say that certain economic and social factors have conquered both the West and the East, instead of the West conquering the East economically and socially?

Why is the same change in this respect called progress in the case of the West and westernization in the case of the East? And why does progress in the West cause no such anxiety as the westernization of the East? Says Mr. Stoddard: "Our civilization is mainly self-evolved; a natural growth developing by normal, logical and



relatively gradual stages. The East, on the contrary, is in the throes of a concentrated process of adaptation which, with us, was spread over centuries. The result is not so much evolution as revolution—political, economic, social, cultural, religious—and all at the same time. The upshot is confusion, uncertainty, grotesque anachronism, and glaring contradictions" (ibid., p. 191). Mr. Stoddard recognizes that in the West also rapid and fundamental changes are taking place. But, "Acute though our Western crisis may be, it is less serious than that of Asia" (ibid., p. 177).

Apart from the *rate* of change, there is the more fundamental proposition that the change is *indigenous* to the West but *alien* to the East. And in consequence arises the question of the compatibility of Western culture and the East. "Will the outcome be for good or for ill? Is the leaven of Westernism a vital tonic, or is it a baneful toxin infecting the East with death and decay?" asks Mr. Stoddard, and recalls that "An old adage states that 'one man's meat is another man's poison'" (ibid., p. 206). Lord Cromer had said, "It is doubtful whether the price which is being paid for introducing civilization into these backward Eastern societies is always recognized as fully as it should be. The material benefits derived from European civilization are unquestionably great, but as regards the ultimate effect on public and private morality the future is altogether uncertain" (ibid., p. 216). Mr. J. Ramsay MacDonald, England's first Labour Prime Minister, had said in his *Government of India* that "We sought to give the Eastern mind a Western content and environment; we have succeeded only too well in establishing intellectual and moral anarchy in both" (ibid., p. 209).

As evidence of this unfortunate result, Mr. Stoddard quotes Mr. Nicholas Roosevelt with approval: "When Western political and social ideals actually penetrate an Asiatic country they bring chaos in their wake. . . . When the social order of the Orient, based on the family or clan and bound together by immutable traditions, meets the Western system, with its emphasis on individualism and personal liberty, it is obvious that the result can only be explosive. Disrespect for parental authority, insistence on the equality of the sexes, the flat disregard of age-old customs, and the introduction

of the brusque manners of the West are so subversive of the entire social structure of the East that social chaos is inevitable" (*ibid.*, p. 208). The description given above of the old Oriental order of society was also, as has been repeatedly shown earlier, the old order in the West, which it has not yet quite outlived. And if the old order of the West had been maintained intact, Western wives would still be bought and sold in the market-place, Western women burnt as witches, the family system would still have been patriarchal, economy would have been almost wholly agricultural and rural, progress of science would have been arrested, slavery continued, despotism, theocracy, and autocracy would have been universal to this day.

If Westernism led to social "chaos" in the East, so did it in the West. In every generation there are old people who lament the innovations of the younger generation. There is no reason why there should be equality of the sexes in the West and not in the East; nor why age-old customs should be immutable in the East and mutable in the West.

## *Oriental Despotism and Western Democracy*

"THE contrast between East and West," says Mr. Stoddard, "appears most strikingly in the field of government. Our political institutions are founded upon Roman ideal of law and embody notions of the worth and dignity of the individual which run back to Greece and to the forests of the North. The East knew little of this. In the Orient the typical form of government had always been the arbitrary rule of an absolute monarch, whose subjects are slaves, holding their goods, their honours, their very lives, at his will and pleasure" (ibid., p. 179). He gives a vivid description of Oriental despotism. "In order to conceive what it means, let us cite an instance which has occurred in Asia many times. Some Sultan or King of Kings immures himself in his harem, casting the burdens of state upon the shoulders of a grand vazier. This official has thenceforth limitless power; the life of every subject is in his hands. Yet any evening, at the pout of a dancing-girl, the monarch may send from his harem to the vazier's palace a Negro 'mute,' armed with a bowstring. And when that black mute arrives, the vazier, doffing off his robe, and with neither question nor remonstrance, will bare his neck to be strangled. That is real despotism—the despotism that the East has known" (ibid., p. 179).

Whether capricious and petticoat government was a despotism that the East alone had known, whether it was *characteristic* of the East, whether it was the norm in countries from Morocco to Japan in historical times, and whether such government ever darkened the West need not be examined at length, since Mr. Stoddard himself says that despotism was not unknown in the West, though

not of the same quality. He says: "We Occidentals have never known despotism in its Simon-pure, Oriental sense; not even under the Roman Empire" (ibid., p. 179). In his book, *Mad Majesties: Or Raving Rulers and Submissive Subjects*, published in 1910, Dr. Angelo S. Rappoport, discussing the Divine Right of Kings, quotes with approval Cesar Laharope when the latter wondered: "Would it be just to imagine that such monsters as Caligula, Nero, the Borgias, Phillip II, Tshengis Khan, Louis XI, born to be the shame and scourge of humanity, had been sent as the *benevolent* agents and representatives of the divine Being?" (Rappoport, *Mad Majesties*, p. 26). "Calvin," says Dr. Rappoport, "was inclined to despotism and tyranny, and yet, although he was an opponent of an absolute monarchy as it existed in his time, he was of the opinion that the subjects must obey their ruler, and not only the good ones, but those who abused their power" (ibid., pp. 27-28). Dr. Rappoport's book gives examples of despotisms of the "Hapsburgs in Spain, the Oldenburgs in Denmark, the Wasas in Sweden, of Ivan the Terrible, the Tsar of Russia" and of "the Hapsburgs in Austria, the Valois, the Bourbons, the Medicis, and several other dynastic houses of Europe," exclusive of the then reigning monarchs. Madame Pompadour was not the solitary instance of petticoat despotism in the West.

Is democracy characteristic of the West? In their book, *World History*, Doctors Carlton J. H. Hayes, Parker T. Moon, and John W. Wayland say: "the power of medieval kings was not absolute—they were limited by feudalism, danger of rebellion, occasional elections, by charters, and by parliaments. Now we are to see that between the fourteenth and the seventeenth centuries a great change took place—limited monarchy grew, in many countries, into autocracy or unlimited monarchy. Here and there, during the Middle Ages in Europe, it looked as if democracy had about an even chance with monarchy; but, as it turned out, democracy had to stand aside, in most countries, for monarchy first to have its day" (Hayes, Moon and Wayland, *World History*, p. 442). "In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries autocracy flowered on the continent of Europe, that is, it reached a full and brilliant stage of development. Ambitious

monarchs not only exploited their own peoples, but also fought one another, not only in Europe, but also in distant parts of the world where they had or desired colonies . . ." (ibid., p. 441). "By the nineteenth century the forces of democracy, patriotism, and industry had become too strong to be dammed up. . . . But in each country the combination of forces was different. Each nation had its own problems and peculiar features. Democracy proved stronger than autocracy in France, Italy, England, and elsewhere, whereas in Russia, Austria, Germany and Turkey democracy was much weaker" (ibid., p. 609).

"The close of the Great War was marked by amazing political revolution throughout eastern and central Europe. . . . Most of the states of central Europe became republics. Divine-right monarchy was at last extinct in the world, except possibly in Japan and a few other less important countries" (ibid., p. 804).

There has since been another shift. Republican democracy has again been replaced in several states in the West by dictatorship, avowed or veiled. Russia, Germany and Italy are the most prominent among these. But others have also adopted dictatorship. Poland, Hungary, Greece, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Austria have ceased to be democracies, whether republican or monarchic. In all these countries freedom of speech, opinion, press, and of voting have been restricted. The methods adopted by some of the dictators recall medieval despotisms: political murders, "purges," and "liquidations."

With regard to democracy in the West, Lord Bryce, in his *Modern Democracies*, says: "Rome never became more than partly democratic, and theories regarding the natural rights of the citizen played no significant part in Roman history, the Italians having a less speculative turn of mind than the Greeks. Needless to say that the Rights of Man, as Man, were never heard of, for slavery, the slavery of men of the same colour as their masters and often of equal intelligence, was an accepted institution in all countries. Such development of popular or constitutional government as we see in the Hellenic and Italic peoples of antiquity was due to the pressure of actual grievances far more than to any

theories regarding the nature of government and the claims of the people.

"With the fall of the Roman republic the rule of the people came to an end in the ancient world. . . . For nearly fifteen centuries, from the days of Augustus till the Turks captured Constantinople, there was never among the Romans in the Eastern Empire, civilized as they were, any more than there had been in the West till the imperial power ceased at Rome in the fifth century, a serious attempt either to restore free government, or even to devise a regular constitutional method for choosing the autocratic head of the State. . . . Free government had been tried and had to all appearances failed. Despotic monarchies everywhere held the field. . . . When a rising occurred it was because men desired good government, not self-government" (Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, pp. 29-31).

Lord Bryce defines Democracy as "nothing more nor less than the rule of the whole people expressing their sovereign will by their votes" (*ibid.*, Vol. I, p. viii). And according to that definition, he asserts that "a century ago, except in Switzerland, nowhere else did the people rule. Britain enjoyed far wider freedom than any part of the European continent, but her local as well as central government was still oligarchic" (*ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 3). Complete manhood suffrage was adopted in England in 1918, and adult franchise for women was adopted in 1928.

It will be seen, then, that democracy, however it be defined, was not and is not characteristic of the West, and that a great part of the West has been almost continuously subject to despotisms of monarchs or dictators. *The contrast is not between Oriental despotism and Occidental democracy, but between despotism and democracy in both. The evolution was not simultaneous in both. And, for that matter, it was not simultaneous in any two countries of the West itself.*

Mr. Stoddard is not concerned only with the past but with the present and the future. "Equally difficult, and far more urgent from the practical standpoint, is the problem of government. We have seen that the political tradition of the East is the cycle of despotisms—a cycle barren in itself and rendering sustained progress impossible. Few Westerners grasp the inwardness of this matter, because

the Orient's political background is something quite foreign to Western experience. . . . Western countries have been organized states run by governmental machinery of various kinds. The East knew little of this until it began to copy Western political models in relatively recent times" (ibid., p. 202). That explains "why, during the last generation, most Oriental copyings of Western political models have so lamentably failed. Of this, China is the horrible example" (ibid., p. 203).

As regards the organization of the administration of governmental functions, Mr. Will Durant in his *The Story of Civilization: Our Oriental Heritage* says thus of India in the *third century B.C.*: "The Government made no pretence to democracy, and was probably the most efficient that India ever had. Akbar, the greatest of the Moguls, had nothing like it, and it may be doubted if any of the ancient Greek cities were better organized." The power of the King was theoretically unlimited, but in practice it was restricted by a Council which—sometimes with the King and sometimes in his absence—initiated legislation, regulated national finances and foreign affairs, and appointed all the more important officers of State. Megasthenes testified to the "high character and wisdom" of Chandragupta's councillors and to their effective power. "The government was organized into departments with well-defined duties and a carefully graded hierarchy of officials. . . . But the government was no mere engine of repression; it attended to sanitation and public health, maintained hospitals and poor-relief stations, distributed in famine years the food kept in State warehouses for such emergencies, forced the rich to contribute to the assistance of the destitute, and organized great public works to care for the unemployed in the depression years. . . . The same method of departmental administration was applied to the government of cities. . . ." "In short," says Havell, "Pataliputra in the fourth century B.C. seems to have been a thoroughly well-organized city, and administered according to the best principles of social science." "The perfection of arrangements thus indicated," says Vincent Smith, "is astonishing, even when exhibited in outline. Examination of the departmental details increases our wonder that such an

organization could have been planned and efficiently operated in India in 300 B.C." (Dunant, *The Story of Civilization*, pp. 443-45). It may be mentioned that Vincent Smith was among the most authoritative British historians of India.

But however that may be, Mr. Stoddard admits the possibility of the Orient copying Western models. And though China "is the horrible example" of failure to do so successfully, Japan fared differently. "The outstanding (and almost the only) example of political progress in the Orient is Japan. Here we find both a strong Government and a political system which embodies Western parliamentary institutions" (Stoddard, *The Clashing Tides of Colour*, p. 204). The reason for this is that "the Japanese are a singularly homogeneous people, who alone among Asiatics, have long possessed both deep patriotic feeling and iron self-control. Furthermore, their political tradition was not Oriental despotism but a feudalism much like that of Europe during the Middle Ages. Thus, when Japan began westernizing herself in the middle of the last century, she could erect a political structure on foundations which, elsewhere in Asia, had not even been laid" (*ibid.*, p. 204).

Thus, according to Mr. Stoddard, Japan, though of the Orient, is not Oriental; she had no Oriental despotism; she had the medieval feudalism of the West; she was patriotic and self-controlled. It would seem, then, that parliamentary institutions are correlated with the absence of despotism, and the presence of feudalism, patriotism, and self-control, and not with the West or the East.

But Mr. Stoddard is not sure of it. "There is thus little use in considering whether a particular Oriental country is fit for democratic government unless it already has a systematized government, no matter how undemocratic. To that extent, at least, the East must outgrow its political past before it can take further steps" (*ibid.*, p. 202). This would seem to imply that there is an intermediate stage in the development from despotism to democracy: ordered or good government. "What China needs, is not a strong *man*, but a strong *Government* in the Western sense. It does not matter much, in the long run, how far such a Government might have failed to qualify under the tests of liberty and democracy.



Indeed, an authoritarian Government might be the only way in which the Chinese could learn their political A B C's and so ultimately be ready for something better" (*ibid.*, pp. 203-4).

Turkey was in this intermediate stage. "Some such political apprenticeship is actually being served by another Asiatic people, the Turks, and the experiment is apparently going on well" (*ibid.*, p. 204). The Orient is not, according to Mr. Stoddard, homogeneous with respect to despotism or strong government or democracy. All of them occur. And the evolution from despotism through good government to democracy, he concedes, is possible.

Is the West itself any more homogeneous, and democratic at that? Mr. Stoddard agrees with Lord Cromer when the latter thus sermonized about the East: "From the dawn of history Eastern politics have been stricken with a fatal simplicity. Do not let us for one moment imagine that the fatally simple idea of despotic rule will readily give way to the far more complex conception of ordered liberty. The transformation, if it is even to take place at all, will probably be the work, not of generations, but of centuries. . . . Good government, however, has the merit of presenting a more or less attainable ideal. Before Orientals can attain anything approaching the British ideal of self-government, they will have to undergo very numerous transmigrations of political thought" (*ibid.*, pp. 202-3). The question may be asked whether Britain herself had gradually grown towards the British ideal or whether she had it from the earliest times; and whether other countries of the West have approached the British ideal of self-government. There are those who distinguish the British from the non-British even in the West in this respect. Mr. James A. Williamson, for instance, says: "It was not until after Durham's death that responsible government was applied to Canada—by his son-in-law, Lord Elgin. Thence it spread to New Zealand and the Australian colonies, to Newfoundland and South Africa. In our days enthusiasts talk of applying it to India. They may be right, but they may be wrong, for Asiatics are not Englishmen, and responsible government is a peculiarly British conception, needing cool heads, a sense of proportion, and generosity in allowing for the other man's point of view" (William-

for "Eastern" learning as well as his zeal for "Western" education, speaks thus of Hindu learning: "The Hindu system of learning has formed the character of the people up to the present point; and it must still be studied to account for the daily occurring phenomena of habits and manners. Whatever mental cultivation, whatever taste for scientific and literary pursuits has survived among the Hindus, is owing to it: they were a literary people when we were barbarians; and after centuries of revolution and anarchy, and subjugation to foreign rule, they are still a literary people, now that we have arrived at the highest existing point of civilization" (Trevelyan, *On the Education of the People of India*, p. 184). He felt that the "time has certainly arrived when the ancient debt of civilization which Europe owes to Asia is about to be repaid; and the sciences, cradled in the East and brought to maturity in the West, are now by a final effort about to be overspread the world" (*ibid.*, p. 168).

In his lectures on "The History of Science and the New Humanism," Dr. George Sarton, Associate of the Carnegie Institution of Washington and Editor of the *Isis*, reviews the contributions of the East and the West to science. "There is no doubt whatever that our earliest scientific knowledge is of oriental origin" (Sarton, *The History of Science and the New Humanism*, p. 81). In mathematics and medicine, in engineering, astronomy, and other sciences the foundations were contributed from the East: the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Persians, the Chinese, and the Hindus and the Arabs. "The spirit of Greek science, which accomplished such wonders within a period of about five centuries, was essentially the western spirit, whose triumphs are the boast of modern scientists. But we must bear in mind two important qualifications. First, that the foundations of that Greek science were wholly oriental, and however deep the Greek genius it is not certain that it could have built anything comparable to its actual achievements without these foundations" (*ibid.*, p. 89). He institutes a comparison between the "levels of mathematical knowledge among Muslims and among Christians in the first half of the eleventh century. There was then a splendid mathematical school in Cairo, made famous by the great

astronomer Ibn Yunus and the great physicist Ibn al-Haitham; al-Karkhi was working at Baghdad, Ibn Sina in Persia, al-Biruni in Afghanistan. These mathematicians and others were not afraid to tackle the most difficult problems of Greek geometry. . . . Pass to the West and what do you find? Wretched little treatises on the calendar, on the use of the abacus, on Roman (duodecimal) fractions, etc. We have a 'mathematical' correspondence exchanged (c. 1025) by two schoolmasters, Regimbold of Cologne and Radolf of Liège. It is truly pitiful. Their geometry was on the pre-Pythagorean level; they were not bad computers, it is true; we might compare them to the Egyptian scribe Ahmose, who had done his task almost twenty-seven centuries before!" (ibid., p. 105).

This characterization of Western science recalls Macaulay's reference to Hindu science as it obtained in India a century ago. While Dr. Sarton's estimate was based on an abundance of comparative knowledge and no prejudice, Macaulay's was based largely on ignorance and prejudice. Lord Acton had said that Macaulay "knew nothing respectably before the seventeenth century, nothing of foreign history, religion, philosophy, science, or art" (Mayhew, *The Education of India*, p. 55).

As early as 1783 the attention of the British authorities had been drawn to the scientific achievements of the Hindus. In his Introduction to Dr. N. N. Law's *Promotion of Learning in India by Early European Settlers*, the Ven. Walter Firminger, Archdeacon of Calcutta and President of the Calcutta Historical Society, quotes from a letter, dated November 17, 1783, written by Colonel Henry Watson commending Mr. Reuben Burrow to the Government for his enquiry into and knowledge of the sciences of the Hindus. Mr. Burrow, said the Colonel, "has also discovered that several branches of science which were supposed to be the invention of Europeans, were long since known to the Brahmins; that they were acquainted with the decimals and algebraic computations, and also, that they had determined the mean motions of the Sun and Moon and several other parts of astronomy to almost as great exactness four thousand years ago as the Europeans have done in the present age. . . . He is further of opinion that, from what he has already seen, that the

ancient Brahmins did possess several improvements in science that the moderns may be entirely unacquainted with, and, therefore, concludes that an enquiry after their knowledge may lead to matters of the first importance" (Law, *Promotion of Learning in India by Early European Settlers*, pp. xviii-xix). Dr. Colebrook, among the most distinguished of the earlier band of Sanskritists, had called enthusiastic and admiring attention to Hindu attainments in astronomy and arithmetic, besides philosophy and grammar. Generations of scholars since Macaulay have explored Sanskrit literature to discover Hindu achievements in the positive sciences and to assess their value, and to examine in what respects and to what extent the scientific contributions of the ancient Hindus were influenced by, or were independent of, the Greeks, and how far they were scientific, judged by modern standards of science. The literature on the subject is too vast and too scattered to be discussed here, but attention may be drawn to Dr. Sir Brojendra Nath Seal's *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, and to Dr. George Sarton's *Introduction to the History of Science*, the latter published by the Carnegie Institution of Washington. Admittedly, the latter work does not exhaust the information available to modern scholarship. "The study of Hindu science is made exceptionally difficult because of the lack of definitive chronology. For this reason, my account of it is necessarily incomplete. I have been obliged to omit a number of works which it was impossible to place anywhere because of chronological doubts" (Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, Vol. I, p. 36).

Some idea of Hindu contributions to science may be obtained from *India's Past* by Dr. A. A. Macdonell, Emeritus Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford. With reference to Medicine he says: "The age of medical science in India is attested by its frequent mention in ancient Buddhist literature" (Macdonell, *India's Past*, p. 175). "Though there can be no doubt as to the indigenous origin of Indian medicine, it has many resemblances to the Greek science, some of which can hardly be explained except by the influence of the latter. Several remedies, such as opium and quicksilver, and in diagnosis the feeling of pulse, Indian medicine owes to the

Persians and Arabs. On the other hand, Indian works on medicine (Charaka and Susruta) were translated into (Persian and) Arabic about A.D. 800. In the Middle Ages Arabic medicine became the chief authority of European physicians and remained so down to the seventeenth century. In this way Indian medical writers became known in Europe, Charaka being repeatedly mentioned in the Latin translations of leading Arab medical writers. In modern times European surgery has borrowed the operation of rhinoplasty, or the surgical formation of artificial noses, from India, where Englishmen became acquainted with the art in the eighteenth century" (ibid., p. 180). Regarding astronomy, he says: "The later post-Vedic period of Indian astronomy is entirely post-Christian. As opposed to the pre-Christian stage, it is scientific in character as well as no longer purely Indian. The system of astronomy here developed, in fact, presupposes knowledge of Greek astronomy" (ibid., p. 182). With regard to mathematics he says: "The theory that our decimal system is derived from India still holds the field, though the objections raised against this view appear to require a new examination of the question. . . . Algebra was also highly developed. . . . In all these respects Indian algebra rises appreciably above the level attained by Diophantus, the Greek algebraist of Alexandria (c. A.D. 250). The Indian mathematicians had by this time arrived at very advanced results in analysis, and, what represents the highest level of their attainments in the mathematical field, they had discovered a method of solving indeterminate equations of the second degree. This method is by a high mathematical authority (Hankel) declared to be the most delicate operation in the theory of numbers that had been achieved before the time of the great French astronomer Lagrange (eighteenth century)" (ibid., pp. 191-92).

Enough has been said to indicate that science was not unknown to the Hindus. It has already been stated how much modern European science owed to Muslim science in the Middle Ages. And "The Persianized Muslims," said Dr. Sarton, "had discovered the Greek and Hindu sources of knowledge" (Sarton's *Introduction to the History of Science*, Vol. I, p. 17).

The distinguishing feature of modern science is the experimental spirit and method. "This was primarily due to the Muslims down to the end of the twelfth century; then to the Christians. . . . However much one may admire Greek science, one must recognize that it was sadly deficient with regard to this (the experimental) point of view of modern science" (Sarton, *History of Science and New Humanism*, p. 114). The final conclusion to which Mr. Sarton comes is as follows: "The seeds of science, including the experimental method and mathematics, in fact, the seeds of all the forms of science came from the East, and during the Middle Ages they were largely developed by Eastern people" (ibid., p. 119).

If, in the last few centuries, the contributions made by Easterners to the development of science are not many or profound, it is not a feature which may be said to distinguish the West from the East. For both had their "Dark Ages" when science was at a discount. The "Dark Ages" in Europe almost obliterated the scientific achievements of the Greeks. Their learning was rescued from oblivion by the Muslims, from whom the later Christians acquired it. "In the Middle Ages," says Dr. Sarton, "the difference between East and West was not very great. The leading philosophers of all countries were engaged in the same sort of activity. Before the twelfth century, one of the Eastern groups, the Muslims, was considerably ahead of all the others, East and West. Muslims were then in the van of mankind. From the twelfth century on, the supremacy passed gradually to the Latin world but the process was not completed until the end of the Renaissance, when the laicization of Western science was well under way. Until the sixteenth century (included), there is good reason to consider both Eastern and Western developments, but after that time Western science began to grow at an accelerated pace, while Eastern civilization remained at a standstill, or even deteriorated" (Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, Vol. I, p. 28).

For the limited purpose of examining the concept of "Western" science, it is not necessary to enquire into the causes of the ebb and flow, as it were, of scientific contributions by the West and East, except to note the parallelisms. The East supplied the foundations,

the Greeks built on it; then were added the contributions of the Arabs, the Jews and the Christians of the West. As Dr. Sarton puts it, "whenever a nation dropped out of the race, another was ready to take up the torch and continue mankind's eternal quest" (ibid., Vol. I, p. 30).

✓ *Science both in the East and the West was at some stage cramped by scholasticism.* "Western and Eastern peoples," says Dr. Sarton, "were subjected to the great scholastic trial" (ibid., Vol. I, p. 29). The differences, according to him, were that "the Western people weathered it, while the Eastern failed. The Western people found the cure, the only cure, the experimental method; the Eastern people did not find it or did not fully understand it, or neglected to apply it" (ibid., Vol. I, p. 29). He goes on to say that "the essential difference between East and West is that the latter overcame scholasticism while the former did not. . . . It is not so much a matter of temperament, for there are men of Eastern temperament (for instance, the belated schoolmen) in the West, and *vice versa*. It is a matter of fundamental method. . . . For example, Japan is becoming more and more a part of the West, so far as the intellectual mission of mankind is concerned. On the contrary, some European nations, which prefer argument to experiment, are orientalized, I mean, immobilized, to that extent. The great intellectual division of mankind is not along geographic or racial lines but between those who understand and practise the experimental method and those who do not understand and who do not practise it" (ibid., Vol. I, p. 29). It will be noted that Dr. Sarton gives two different significances to East and West. The first is geographic; the peoples who live in the East or in the West. The second refers to scientific method: scholastic or experimental. Japanese scientists of to-day are Western; the fundamentalists of the West, and perhaps the Roman Catholics also, are Eastern! Inasmuch as science in the West was dominated by scholasticism till the sixteenth century, it was Eastern, while science as taught in the East to-day is Western. There is no correlation apparently between the people of the East and scholastic science and the people of the West and experimental science. Under such circumstances, the emancipation of science from

theology may be expressed more appropriately, more unambiguously, by characterizing modern science as experimental (as opposed to scholastic) rather than as Western (as opposed to Eastern). Dr. Sarton himself, in spite of his frequent use of "Western" and "Eastern" science, does not adopt such classification in his *History of Science*. The units of his classification are Jewish, Muslim, Chinese, Hindu, Pre-Hellenic, Classical Antiquity, Medieval (Latin and Greek), Central Asiatic, Far Eastern, and so on. The bases are race, religion, time and smaller geographical areas rather than East and West. But of these also he sees the limitations. "After the sixteenth century, when science was finally disentangled from theology, the distinction between Jewish, Christian, and Muslim science ceased to be justified, but it keeps its historical value. In spite of his deep Jewishness and his abundant use of Jewish sources, we do not count Spinoza as a Jewish philosopher in the same sense as we counted Maimonides or Levi ben Gershon; he is one of the founders of modern philosophy, one of the noblest representatives of the human mind, not eastern or western, but the two united" (Sarton, *History of Science and the New Humanism*, pp. 113-14).

*Science has been and is just science, neither Western nor Eastern.* Its character has changed in the process of time, both in the East and the West. In the earliest stage science was overlaid by magic and superstition; later it was hampered by scholasticism, and in modern times it became experimental. It is an evolution in time. But the evolution was not simultaneous among all peoples, not only as between East and West but as between the different peoples of the West itself. Nor was it simultaneous in all subjects of study.

Scholasticism was a universal phenomenon. Dr. Sarton speaks of the "universal occurrence of scholasticism"; he thinks that the various forms of it, Jewish, Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, and Vedantist (Hindu), were "largely autonomous." "The contemplation of so many independent, yet convergent streams of thought seems to leave us no alternative but to conclude that scholasticism was a necessary stage in human progress" (Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, Vol. I, p. 27).

The influence of scholasticism was not different in the East and



the West. Says Dr. Sarton: "It is highly instructive to see that this same problem (or pseudo-problem), the amalgamation of rationalism and faith, had to be solved over the entire civilized world. The faiths involved were different, but the problem remained essentially the same. The most impressive comparison is that relative to the three great Mediterranean religions, because in those three cases the intellectual experience was to a large extent identical. Thus we can witness the desperate efforts of a large number of Muslim, Jewish and Christian schoolmen to reconcile Hellenic rationalism with three different sets of religious dogmas" (ibid., Vol. I, p. 27).

The influence of religion on science in the East was no different from that in the West. The Jews were followers of Judaism when they made their contributions to science, and to-day some of the most eminent scientists are Jews. The Arabs when they made their great contributions to science between the eighth and twelfth centuries were already Muslims. The people of India were Hindus and Buddhists when they made their contributions. There seems to be no justification for holding the view that the religions of the East inhibit science while the religions of the West stimulate it.

Dr. Sarton has said that since the sixteenth century the Eastern civilization remained at a standstill or even degenerated, and thought that it was because the Easterners did not discover or apply the experimental method. To the question as to why the Easterners failed in this respect, Dr. Sarton says that "it is impossible to answer." But he ponders: "Would the explanation be, perhaps, that Eastern people, say, the Muslims, had reached the limit of their development, that they were like those gifted children who startle the world by their precocious achievements and then suddenly stop and become less and less interesting, while others, at first less brilliant, pass far ahead of them?" (ibid., Vol. I, p. 29). Dr. Sarton put it more positively when he said that "the Arab genius was less vigorous and less fertile" (Sarton, *History of Science and the New Humanism*, p. 105). If it means anything, it is that the limitation is racial. And yet Dr. Sarton has stated unequivocally that the difference between the East and the West was not of race but one of method, the experimental method, and that, too, since

the sixteenth century; and he stated further that the new method was being adopted by Japan, and, he might have added, in all places where modern science is taught. In this connection, it is interesting to note his observation that "it is not sufficient to consider the evolution of a single nation, because that evolution may have been handicapped, interrupted, or altogether halted by wars and other calamities, or even it would seem by sheer intellectual exhaustion. It is as if certain peoples, after having made a great intellectual effort, were obliged to lie fallow for a while and thus recruit enough strength to go further ahead" (Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, Vol. I, p. 30). Modern facts seem to justify the latter view that some temporary and passing causes interrupted the flow of scientific achievement in the East. The stream is flowing again; the East is again making contributions to science. From a broader point of view, such statements as the "Awakening of the East," the "Challenge of the East," the "Renaissance of the East," indicate the same idea.

Is there a difference between the quality and quantity of contributions made by the East and the West which will justify a distinction between the two? A confident answer to this question is possible only when the history of science is fully known, when a work like Dr. Sarton's *History of Science* is completed. As it is, the record of the contributions made by all peoples and in all ages is not complete. Nor has all the extant information been collated and made readily available. Such information as is readily available is conditioned by an "almost exclusive devotion to Western thought."

That contributions to scientific knowledge have been uneven may, however, be granted. But is there a correlation between the unevenness and East and West? Ancient Greece made great contributions, while modern Greece has very little to its credit. The Romans "brought about the fall of ancient science and silenced the scientific spirit for centuries." Many centuries later the Renaissance originated in Italy. Northern Europe was "barbarian" in the old days. And in recent centuries it is, as it were, the centre of the scientific world. All these are of the "West," and yet they exhibit a very wide differential in their scientific contribution, which may

be explained by local historical causes, but which hardly have relevance to a distinction between West and East.

As to quality, referring to the discovery of the method of kindling of fire, the domestication of animals, the development of language and writing, the invention of the wheel, Dr. Sarton asks: "Can any one of our modern discoveries, however startling, begin to compare with those which made possible all the others?" (Sarton, *History of Science and the New Humanism*, p. 79).

## *Not Inclusion but Exclusion*

WHAT makes the system of education sponsored by Macaulay and the Anglicists in India a hundred years ago "Western" is not what it *included* but what it *excluded*; it was not so much the inclusion of "English science and English literature," but the exclusion of the indigenous literatures, classical and vernacular. The exclusion was inspired by contempt for literary and scientific contributions of the Indian peoples. In Europe the science taught at any time approximates to the latest advances then made, and not the level attained in times long gone by, albeit it was all through Western. It is modern science that is taught, and not the science of the ancient Greeks, though the latter was also "Western" and formed the foundation for all modern science. Primitive and, from the modern standpoint, untenable in many respects as was the Western science of the previous ages, no contempt is poured on it and its exponents of bygone ages. They are referred to with appreciation, gratitude and reverence as pioneers. But Macaulay and his colleagues poured ridicule and contempt on Hindu science. The result was that the educational system precluded the critical examination and assimilation of such scientific achievements as stood to the credit of the Indians. It was left to other individuals and bodies to undertake such investigation, and even then the results thereof were not incorporated in the teaching in the schools and colleges. The educational institutions had an inevitable tendency to instil an inferiority complex among the students and sap confidence and self-respect.

That ancient "Hindu" contribution to science was not the trash that Macaulay made it out is attested by what Dr. W. C. D. Dampier-

Whetham, F.R.S., says in his *History of Science*. "In one point the Buddhist philosophy of India touched a problem definitely scientific. A primitive atomic theory was formulated, either independently or by derivation from Greek thought, and about the first or second century before Christ the idea of discontinuity was extended to time. . . . Indian arithmetic is remarkable, in that there is evidence to show that as early as the third century B.C. a system of notation was used from which was developed the scheme of numerals we employ to-day.

"It is possible that Indian thought influenced the schools of Asia Minor, and through them those of Greece; and it is certain that, at a later time, during the Arab domination in the lands of the Eastern Mediterranean traces of the mathematics and medicine of India mingled with the learning saved from Greece and Rome, and re-entered the schools of Western Europe by way of Spain and Constantinople. This explains the fact that, when the Indian scheme of notation replaced the clumsy Roman figures, the primary source of the numerals was forgotten and they were misnamed Arabic" (Whetham, *History of Science*, pp. 9-10).

As for literature and philosophy, the Indian classical languages and vernaculars have literatures and philosophies which were not unworthy of study and cultivation. Mr. Mayhew says that "India had in Sanskrit and Arabic its own classical and structural languages, responsible for its culture to a far greater extent than Latin or Greek has been for our culture. And in the works of Tukaram and Tulsidas it had a vernacular at least as highly developed as the language of Anglo-Saxon Chronicles" (Mayhew, *The Education of India*, p. 88). The place of Sanskrit literature and philosophy in the literature and philosophy of the world and the influence of the former on the latter has been ably summed up by Professor M. Winternitz in his Calcutta University Readership Lectures, 1923. This is the philosophy about which Friedrich Schlegel wrote with "enthusiasm and inspired enthusiasm" (Winternitz, *Some Problems of Indian Literature*, p. 60), which Warren Hastings, the Governor-General, said "will long survive when the British dominion in India shall have long ceased to exist, and when the sources which

it once yielded of wealth and power are lost to remembrance" (ibid., p. 62), the philosophy which Wilhelm von Humbolt praised as "the profoundest and loftiest thing the world has seen" (ibid., p. 62), and which Schopenhauer said was "the production of the highest human wisdom" (ibid., p. 60). And this is the literature which includes works of Kalidasa who "certainly takes his place in world-literature by the side of Shakespeare," and in particular his drama, *Shakuntala*, about which Goethe wrote that "the first time when I became aware of this unfathomable work, it excited such an enthusiasm in me and attracted me so much that I never left off studying it" (ibid., p. 67). There is the book of fables, *Panchatantra*, of which Professor Winternitz says that "no work of Indian literature belongs so truly to the literature of the world" as it did, and of which Ph. Wolf could justly say that "next to the Bible, it had been translated into most languages of the world," and which had "inspired whole nations, and to which kings and princes paid attention and honour" (ibid., pp. 69-70). Such literature and such philosophy had no place in the system of education sponsored by the British Government in India. The situation is thus summed up by Mr. Mayhew: "English as a temporary medium of instruction was reasonable. English as a living and virile language was bound to influence India. But English as a substitute for the indigenous classics was doomed to disastrous failure. And Macaulay's confusion of these two aspects of English was to be equally disastrous" (Mayhew, *The Education of India*, p. 88). The system was "Western" not because of what it included but because of what it excluded with a contempt which was undeserved.

According to Mr. Mayhew, Raja Ram Mohan Roy, the Hindu reformer and savant, was even more responsible than Macaulay for the "Western" character of education in India. It will be interesting to see what were the views urged by the Raja. In his letter to the Governor-General, Lord Amherst, the Raja wished that the money allotted for education by the Government might be spent in giving education in "mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, anatomy and other useful sciences, which the nations of Europe have carried to a degree of perfection that has raised them above the inhabitants

of other parts of the world" (Trevelyan, *On the Education of the People of India*, p. 66). He referred to the Sanskrit school run by the Government as a seminary "similar in character to those which existed in Europe before the time of Lord Bacon." After drawing attention to the "state of science and literature in Europe before the time of Lord Bacon" and the "progress of knowledge made since he wrote," he continued: "If it had been intended to keep the British nation in ignorance of real knowledge, the Baconian philosophy would not have been allowed to displace the system of schoolmen, which was the best calculated to perpetuate ignorance. In the same manner the Sanskrit system of education would be best calculated to keep this country in darkness, if such had been the policy of British legislature. But as the improvement of the native population is the object of the Government, it will consequently promote a more liberal and enlightened system of instruction; embracing mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, anatomy, with other useful sciences, which may be accomplished with the sum proposed by employing a few gentlemen of talents and learning educated in Europe, and providing a college furnished with necessary books, instruments, and other apparatus" (ibid., pp. 70-71). The Raja was pleading for the *displacement of scholasticism by science*, of dialectics and metaphysics by useful knowledge. *He was not asking for Western as against Eastern education*; he would not have Western scholasticism in preference to Eastern scholasticism; *he wanted science instead of scholasticism*. At the same time he did not despise Indian philosophy and literature or the Indian vernaculars. He studied the Quran and Sufism in Arabic and Persian, the Upanishads in Sanskrit, the Bible in English, Hebrew and Greek, and he is said to have studied Buddhism in Tibet. He founded the Brahmo Samaj, one of the most enlightened denominations of Hinduism in India, based on his comparative study of religions, and he himself claimed that his Brahmo Samaj was but the restoration of Hinduism to its pristine purity, purged of all the social evils that had gathered round it during the centuries. Notwithstanding that the Indian vernaculars were then thought unfit for the expression of philosophical thoughts, he himself translated

into his mother-tongue, Bengalee, the Upanishads from Sanskrit. And he wrote in English as well.

The experience of India, however, is not common to the East as a whole; it is peculiar to herself. For, in China and Japan, as well as in the Islamic countries, indigenous languages and literatures as well as foreign languages are taught, even as in Europe. And science is taught in its latest developments, wherever occurring and by whomsoever contributed. It is a universal phenomenon.

What then is meant by the oft-repeated statement that current education in India as well as in the rest of the East is "Western"? Is there an "Eastern" education? And what distinguishes them? As has been shown above, the distinction does not seem to centre round either the medium or the content of education. There are undoubtedly differences, but they are not aligned along East and West, and there is no uniformity in the East and in the West. Where a tendency is not universal, it has other co-ordinates than East and West. For instance, modern science is increasingly shifting from the scholastic to the experimental. Where the rulers and the ruled belong to different linguistic groups, as, for instance, India and Formosa and Malta, and till recently Ireland, the language of the rulers has a prestige and usefulness so that it forms the medium of education at the higher, if not all, the stages of education.

Is there any other feature which is at the back of this distinction? In South Africa, for instance, the same subjects may be taught in the same language to the Bantu, the Boer, and the British. None the less, it is said of the Bantu alone that he was receiving "Western" education, but not of the British or the Boer. The British in Cape Town and the Bantu in Fort Hare may have the same education in the same, English, language, while the Boer may receive the same education but in the Afrikaans language at Stellenbosch. Here there is more in common between the British and the Bantu than between either and the Boer. Yet the Bantu is getting "Western" education, while the others are getting just "education." The British student in Cape Town may be Catholic or Anglican, the Boer in Stellenbosch may be the Dutch-Reformed Churchman, and the Bantu student in Fort Hare may be an Anglican. The first two, in spite



of difference of religion, receive just "education," while the Bantu receives "Western" education, and it is only in his case that the question is asked whether he should be given "Western" education, whether it is good for him, and so on. Can it be, then, that it is not the language, nor the content of education, nor religion that distinguishes "Western" education, but rather something which is common to the Britisher and the Boer, but separates them from the Bantu? Is it race or colour? The same content of education given to a *white* Australian or American or South African is just "education," but given to a *brown* Chinese or Japanese or Hindu, or the Turk, or the *black* Negro or the *Red* Indian is "Western" education and is discussed as "Western" education of "non-Western peoples." *The feeling seems to be that education as given to the White race is its own, its creation and its inheritance. But the same is foreign to the non-White races, who acquire it either voluntarily or under compulsion; something different, something alien and exotic, the suitability of which is a matter for anxious consideration in order to avoid failure or disaster.*

## *Educational Segregation*

THE very revealing articles in the *Year Book of Education*, 1935, by Dr. W. Bryant Mumford, formerly Superintendent of Education in Tanganyika, and now Lecturer in Comparative Colonial Education in the London University Institute of Education, may throw some light on "Western education." He reviews the educational policies of European nations in their Colonies as regards non-Europeans. The first stage was the "Missionary period." In the early days of the Portuguese and Spanish colonial expansion, educational policies were "little concerned with questions of race—whether or not to make 'dark-skinned Europeans' of the 'coloured' races. They aimed at making obedient Christians of all peoples. As the power of Portugal gave way to the superior power of the Dutch, French and British companies, so the aims of colonizing and the spread of Christendom gave way to aims frankly commercial" (*Year Book of Education*, 1935, p. 816).

The second was the period of "Europeanization." "Although both Europeans and natives pressed for more school facilities, they desired them for different and mutually antagonistic reasons. The white man desired native education in order to train human tools for his economic and administrative machine and to make more efficient servants of the natives, whereas the natives desired the same education that they might attain an equality with and even perhaps challenge the white man in his own sphere" (*ibid.*, p. 817).

The third stage was of "European Reactionary Movement towards Segregation." "Europeans in the dependencies were and are still a privileged ruling class. The hard-and-fast division of a population into master and servant according to colour of the skin rather than by any question of ability is, of course, a highly artificial

and unstable arrangement. . . . To preserve the sanctity of white prestige the custom grew up that natives were often forbidden to speak to a white man in a European tongue, and as far as possible the native was prevented from even learning it. Europeans began to demand separate schools in a European language for their own children and separate schools in native language for native children" (ibid., p. 818).

The fourth stage was that of "Native Movement towards Cultural Nationalism." "During recent times, on the other hand, in many parts of the world, there has developed amongst natives themselves a desire for differentiation of curricula between races, a desire to form their national schools, giving equal place to their own national aspirations and the new teachings from Europe. . . . These native philosophers believe that Western education does not give a sufficient place to music, philosophy and art, nor lead to a full life; it is inhuman, they think, and only provides well for those who "grab" well. The native philosophic leaders attempt to create a new school system which will give first place to their nationalistic aspirations, ideals and culture, and only a second place to those selected aspects of European education which they feel have a contribution to make to native life. This movement is an attempt to reconsider education, not as an element of Western culture, nor as a training for a European world, but in its wider sense as something belonging to the people themselves. They accept the body of European teaching; they feel that, in common with all people, they are heirs to the cultural heritage of the world. But after taking that body of teaching, they want to make it their own, add their own contribution and fit the whole into their life and their organization in their own way" (ibid., p. 819).

"Amongst some European thinkers there has developed much sympathy for these nationalistic ideals. In view of the unrest, the greed and unequal distribution of benefits, the materialism and lack of appreciation of the joy of living in European culture, some Europeans tend to doubt whether, in dependencies, the unlimited propaganda of white man's ways of life is really beneficial to native life. Some Europeans, who have studied native cultures, have begun

to doubt whether the European is the only person who has something to teach and the native the only person to learn.

"Some Europeans feel that, if the native is to acquire a position of equality and attain the respect of the white man, it must be done by the native showing his capacity and his achievements in his own culture—that, by following the European and demonstrating his ability only in European matters, he will always belong to a secondary group, but that if, *in addition* to proving his ability in European matters, he could develop some things worthy from his own cultural inheritance, then he would be in a position to demand equality and respect.

"To summarize, two schools of thought in educational policies can be distinguished. One would encourage European schools on European lines with a European language as the main or sole medium of instruction, and one would look towards nationalistic native schools following native lines and looking towards native ideals, giving equal place to new and old tongues" (*ibid.*, p. 820).

An analysis of the foregoing extracts shows that the *distinction between Western and non-Western educational systems is not based on educational considerations but on those of racial politics: the claim of the white man to racial superiority and of the non-white to equality, that is, equality of status and of opportunity.* Where the White man has political control over non-Whites, he has often presumed that his civilization was, as it were, his own property, and that it was in every respect superior to that of the Native, that he had nothing to learn from the Native, and that it was for him to decide what in Native culture should be suppressed, and what from his own culture should be implanted. And this he has often done in such a way that the superiority of the Whites may not be questioned and the Native's claim for equality may not be realized. The Native, on the other hand, resents the claim to unqualified superiority of the Whites, even as the non-Nordic Whites resent the claim to superiority of the Nordics, and claims self-determination in shaping his civilization. It is a political conflict based on race, and it dominates educational policies.

It governs largely the question of the medium of instruction.

Even when White people favour and even insist on Native mother-tongues as the media, it is not always or even largely on educational grounds, but political. In the matter of curricula, there could be no differentiation made in the teaching of science: science has no race or politics. The only question is whether science should be taught at all and how much. Of languages, literatures and fine arts there are many even in the West; and the distinction is not between Western and non-Western. *Science, by its objective validity, has a universal range, while languages, literatures and fine arts, in view of their subjective validity, have limited range of appreciation. The valid science is one; the valid arts are many, not merely two, Western and non-Western.*

But when it comes to a question of education in comparative politics and political history, the distinction becomes clear. Western political history tells of the development of the ideas of liberty and equality, and the methods used to institutionalize these ideas. European history reveals that autocracies and foreign dominations are not permanent natural laws, immutable and eternal; that European peoples were not always blessed with democracy, but achieved it after having lived for centuries under autocratic and even alien rule; that in the achievement of democracy, civil disobedience, bloody revolutions, even regicide were resorted to, in addition to peaceful and constitutional methods. Is it desirable that such ideas should be accessible to subject races? Is "Western education," in so far as it means the teaching of European history, not unsuitable to Natives?

Mr. Pitt-Rivers was vehemently opposed to the introduction of "European systems of education" (Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*, p. 239)—"our education" (*ibid.*, p. 35)—as he claimed it, among non-Western peoples. "The process of native education on European lines serves to stimulate the antagonism of the white man, for it means that the coloured man as he becomes divorced from his native life and occupations, and is equipped for trade and skilled handicraft, becomes a competitor, instead of being merely a hewer of wood and a drawer of water. At the same time, the religious and social teaching which the Bantu

receives from the white man, inculcating the idea of equality of rights and conditions, fosters and accentuates his resentment at the contrast between Christian theory and practice" (ibid., p. 29). He speaks of races which "fail entirely to become reconciled or contented under European control. This world-wide phenomenon of recalcitrant and irreconcilable black races is sometimes referred to as the 'Native Problem' " (ibid., p. 27). He goes on to say that "a feature of considerable interest and importance in connection with this world-wide unrest among subject races, and this revolt against European tutelage, lies in the fact that the movement is articulated and led to a marked degree by those members of the subject races that have been most closely under the influence of our proselytizing culture, and who have, in the process, assimilated most 'successfully' European education, European religion, and European blood" (ibid., p. 28).

Mr. Pitt-Rivers has taken note of India as well. He speaks of the "growing discontent of Indian peoples with conditions of European rule" and disapproves of the "Anglicizing programme," including "our system of Public Instruction in India" (ibid., p. 29). It may be pointed out that the "revolt against European tutelage" in India has not been led by people who have assimilated "European" religion and "European" blood. The "mixed-bloods," the Anglo-Indians, who have most "successfully" assimilated "European" education and *religion and blood*, are among the supporters of the British rule, and it is the Hindus, who have assimilated neither European religion nor European blood, that have all along offered the most determined opposition to European rule.

Summing up the influence of ninety years of "Western education" in India, Mr. Mayhew says: "We must set the admitted facts that the direct influence of western ideas and methods is felt within a very small, though perhaps important, section of a vast population, that it is within this small section that friendship between Englishman and Indian is becoming increasingly difficult every year" (Mayhew, *The Education of India*, p. 22). The cause of this estrangement is, obviously, "Western education." This is "Western" education, not because of the subject matter of the education, nor because

of science or geography, or history, or the languages, or the educational methods, or even religion, but because of the history of the evolution of "liberty, equality, and like," the "main ideas" of "Western culture" (*ibid.*, p. 61).

When Westerners affirm "Western education" is unsuitable for non-Western people, they simply mean that it is not to the advantage of the Western overlords to let ideas of democracy, equality, and liberty spread to their non-Western subject peoples. They imply no differentiation in what may be called the "non-political" sphere of education.

The control of education in the interests of a political group based on race, religion, or economic status, etc., when that group happens to get control of the state is of more general occurrence. Germany, Italy and Russia to-day furnish the outstanding illustrations. *Democracy in education, the universal accessibility of universal knowledge, is yet a far-off dream, even where its desirability is admitted.*

## PART III





## *The Standards of Classification*

IN the previous pages the variety of connotation of Orient and Occident have been noted, and the views of certain writers on the subject of Oriental and Occidental civilizations have been examined. The present and subsequent chapters may be devoted to the examination of the correlations of culture.

With Professor Clark Wissler, we may again wonder how the words Oriental and Occidental came to qualify units of civilizations. Primarily these terms have reference to the rising and the setting of the sun. But the sun rises and sets on every point of the equator every day.

Then the East came to mean "that part of the earth's surface situated to the east of some recognized point of reference." And that point was the Levant and the Bosphorus; "usually those countries immediately to the East of the Mediterranean or Southern Europe, which to the Romans were 'the East.'" Later, Orient meant the whole of Asia and Occident the whole of Europe, except that Russia had an ambiguous status. Subsequently, the Occident included the United States of America, Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. There is, however, no unanimity as to what is West and what is East, even geographically. The West sometimes means only Western Europe, sometimes Europe, sometimes Europe and Asia up to India; the East means sometimes only India and China, at other times, Asia as well as North Africa, up to, and including, Morocco.

Naturally Occidental civilization meant the civilization of the people of the Occident. As to the characteristics of either Oriental or Occidental civilizations, the *New English Dictionary* does not

go beyond saying that Oriental meant "brilliant, lustrous, shining, glowing, radiant, resplendent" or superior, while Occidental signified the reverse, inferior. Also Occident meant "Christendom."

As has been shown in the previous pages, Western and Eastern have come to signify many other features, and contrasting and even conflicting features. In fact, civilization has been conceived of as dichotomous, Eastern and Western, each having a pattern of its own and developing along its own lines, which are mutually incompatible and immiscible. The dichotomy recalls the dichotomy of plant and animal kingdoms: gymnosperms and angiosperms, and vertebrates and invertebrates.

This classification was preceded by the distinction between civilization and the "uncivilized" culture of the contemporary "primitives." The latter includes the culture of the indigenous peoples of Australia, America, and Africa. Professor Clark Wissler, however, classifies civilization under three groups: Euro-American, Oriental and Middle American, the last of the indigenous peoples of "Australia, the Arctic, South Africa, Patagonia, etc." It will be seen then that "culture" in the comprehensive sense is at first divided into "Civilization" and "Primitive societies," as Professor Toynbee puts it. Civilization is then sub-divided into Eastern and Western, even as plants are first divided into gymnosperms and angiosperms, and the latter into monocotyledons and dicotyledons.

"A comparative scientist," says Mr. Pitt-Rivers, "no matter what his subject may be, has to standardize, in accordance with some plan, the objects of his investigation. For this purpose he needs a standard or norm which may be equally applied to every class and category of object within the scope of his subject" (Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*, p. 194). What shall be the standard by which Western and Eastern Civilizations may be measured, as it were?

When civilization is divided into Western and Eastern, a contrast is implied. It is the differences between the two that are emphasized, and not the factors that may be common to both. On the other hand, Western Civilization implies certain homogeneity between its component parts. Two or more peoples have Western Civilization

in so far as they have characteristics in common, characteristics which are at the same time uncommon as between the West and the East. If the characteristics are common to both the East and the West, they do not distinguish the one from the other. If, however, certain characteristics are not common to the West but only to a part of the West, and a small part at that, they are not Western; they are local or exceptional.

If, for instance, a group of people is said to be Catholic, it means that the individuals composing the group have the Catholic form of Christianity in common. The individuals may differ in other respects, for instance, professions, but this they have in common. Similarly, if a group is said to be Protestant, it means that all the individuals composing it have Protestantism in common, however much they may or may not differ in other respects. When two groups are distinguished as Catholic and Protestant, it is the difference between the two that is drawn attention to, and not the similarity between the two in that they are both Christians. A number of people who have Western Civilization must have certain factors in common, however they may differ in other respects. And at the same time, they must have something which differentiates them from those who have Eastern Civilization.

It is not enough that certain factors just occur in one group, but are not common to the group, in order to make them group characters. Something to be characteristic of a group must be the norm for that group, the rule and not the exception. Speech is characteristic of human beings, not muteness, which may occur in some cases; Gaelic occurs in the West, but it is not characteristic of the West. Lynching of Negroes occurs in the West, but is not characteristic of it. According to a news item in the *New York Times* of August 13, 1935, a mother had her second child when she was only fifteen years old, her first child being fourteen months old at the time. But child-marriage and child-motherhood are not characteristic of the West. Vegetarianism, mysticism, and a thousand other cultural traits occur in the West and in the East, but are not characteristic of either. In comparing civilizations, or for that matter any two factors, the norm, and not the exception, must be considered.

It is also necessary to note the distinction between form and substance, between law and practice. For instance, monogamy is the law in the West, but the double standard of morality prevails in practice. The constitution of the United States makes no discrimination against its Negro citizens, but in practice such discrimination exists. In most States that have a democratic form of constitution the Government is in fact aristocratic, perhaps plutocratic. Even where the law knows and sanctions no discrimination against women, practice sanctions and sustains it. In the circumstances, the form and the law are less valuable than the substance and the practice in assessing the character of a civilization.

Sometimes, perhaps most often, the contrast between Western Civilization and Eastern is based on the *relative occurrence of some one culture-trait or other*. When the West is said to be scientific and the East religious, it is not meant that science does not obtain in the East and religion in the West. Nor even that science is the norm in the West and religion in the East. It only means that there is more religion in the East than in the West; more science in the West than in the East. It is to be noted, however, that in making such comparisons, the comparison is really with reference to particular traits and not of whole civilizations. There might be more crime in one unit than in another, and one may compare them. But he is not comparing civilizations, because crime is not the norm for either community. "We should not," says Dr. J. B. S. Haldane, "describe a people as short because it included one chondroplastic dwarf in ten thousand while its neighbours included one per million" (*Congrès International Des Sciences Anthropologiques et Ethnologiques*, 1934, p. 60).

It is not enough to consider only the present, but the past also must be taken into consideration. Western Civilization has not become Western to-day; it has been so at least since historical times, from the days of ancient Greece. There must be some *constants* which gave Western Civilization its distinctive character and differentiated it from the Eastern. Either pattern of civilization must have, in the words of Mr. Pitt-Rivers, "a constant degree of relative homogeneity, not only in area but in age." As, for instance, the

constants of Christianity are the personality of Jesus, the cross, and the doctrine of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. Other factors may change: the organization of the Church, the ceremonial, belief in the textual veracity of the Bible, etc. What, then, are the constants of Western and Eastern Civilizations, the constants which have characterized the great majority of the people of the West and of the East since historical times? What are the factors which are *coextensive, coterminal, and coeval with either civilization?*

Taking the more common view that the West includes Europe, United States and Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and that the East includes Asia and Northern Africa along the Mediterranean Sea, what is the greatest common measure of civilization in the West and in the East?

As has been shown in the previous pages, all the leading religions of the world were born in the East. And spread therefrom. Islam spread from Arabia to Spain and Morocco in the West and to the Philippines in the East. To-day the West has very few Mohammedans, and Islam is mostly confined to the belt from Morocco to Bengal in India; then it tapers off to the East, there being hardly any Mohammedans in Japan. Hinduism and Buddhism, Taoism and Shintoism are more or less localized in the East. Christianity spread East and West from Palestine. According to the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, Christianity, in its early Nestorian form, reached India and China even before it spread to the Germanic nations between A.D. 590-800. The tradition is strong in India that St. Thomas, the Apostle, was the first Christian missionary that went to India. Christianity spread West, and is now the religion of the great majority in the West. Before the birth of Christianity, the West, including the Greeks, the Romans, and the barbarians of the North, were pagans.

Polytheism, monotheism, mysticism, and asceticism, sacerdotalism, ceremonialism, other-worldliness and pessimism, fatalism and free-will, theism, atheism and agnosticism, faith and superstition, all these and many others were and are common to the East and the West.

The situation has not been static either in the East or in the West. The change is due primarily to the development of science; the development of exact and objective knowledge. The evolution of religion, both in the East and in the West, has been from paganism to one of the historic religions and from them to a religion of *humanism, dominated more and more by science*. Increasing numbers of people, both in the East and the West, are losing their faith in historical and authoritarian and supernatural religions, and becoming sceptics and agnostics. They are veiled "pagans," while some of the people in Germany are turning professed pagans and others in Russia are professed anti-religionists. There is yet invented no method of measuring accurately the religiosity of people; only a qualitative appraisal is possible, and that is vitiated by subjective prejudices and predilections. The estimate is further vitiated by the fact that the same individual may be scientific in certain respects and wholly unscientific in others.

As regards social organization, both in the East and the West, the patriarchal family was the norm during the ages until the Industrial Revolution. And individualism was further stimulated by the Great War. Women had an inferior status; parents played a decisive part in arranging the marriages of their children, and social status was a significant factor. Normally, woman had no place in public affairs, in the professions, or in the academies. Both in the East and the West, polygamy and concubinage were recognized by convention as well as by law. They were never, however, the norm.

In the economic sphere, until the Industrial Revolution, both the East and the West were characterized by agriculture and the handicrafts. Since the Industrial Revolution, both the East and the West are becoming increasingly industrial, and machinery is invading even agriculture. All the factors correlated with Industrialism are following it both in the East and the West: urbanization, organization of labour and capital, rapid transport, and increasing demand for political and social and economic equality.

In the political sphere, right through the historical period, non-democratic governments were the norm both in the East and the West, and to-day there are both democratic and non-democratic

tendencies and governments both in the West and the East. During the twentieth century, and particularly since the Great War, there was a great extension of democracy both in the West and in the East, and in more recent years some of these democracies gave place to dictatorships, avowed or veiled.

The analysis so far made reveals no cultural traits which are common to the West but distinguish it from the East, and no traits which are common to the East but uncommon as between the East and the West. If anything, the similarity is most striking. The differences are between the past and the present, a function of time, rather than of area. Similar changes are taking place both in the East and in the West, though the changes are not simultaneous in both, nor is the rate of change uniform. *There is a lag in time between the two, as there is a lag between any two parts of the West or the East, between any two persons of the West or of the East, and between any two culture traits in the same person.*

Professor Willey illustrates another method of approach. "Knowing from what part of any culture area individuals come, it can be predicted within rather definite limits what reactions they will make in most of their life situations" (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 550). He then proceeds to illustrate the thesis by discussing how an American born in New England would behave as compared with a Red Indian. There is something common between individuals born and bred in New England and that is different from what is common among Red Indians. Following the same method, what can be predicted of an Occidental or of an Oriental? Neither the Orientals nor the Occidentals are homogeneous with respect to language, nationality, customs and habits, governments or other cultural traits. It cannot be predicted that the Occidental will be scientific and the Oriental superstitious; the former may be a fundamentalist and the latter a scientific researcher. The former is not necessarily democratic and the latter despotic; the reverse may be true.

*It seems, then, that the narrower the culture-area, the greater the prospects of its being homogeneous; and the larger the culture-area the more heterogeneous it is. And the heterogeneity will be even greater*



*if, in addition to the space factor, the time factor also is taken into consideration: if an Oriental and an Occidental of to-day are compared with an Oriental and Occidental of, say, a couple of thousand years ago.*

*Homogeneity is at the maximum when the culture-area is, as it were, one individual; as the culture-area expands to family, village, town, state, and continent, there is less and less of homogeneity and more and more of heterogeneity.*

*Also, in the past, there was greater homogeneity over wider areas. In the present there is greater heterogeneity in the same area. And in the future there may be greater homogeneity in certain respects over wider areas along with greater heterogeneity in other respects even within smaller areas.*

## *Unity of the West*

WHILE the heterogeneity of the East is often granted, the unity of the West is as often asserted. "The argument of these essays," says Mr. H. G. Wood in *The Unity of Western Civilization*, "has been to prove that even now (1915), in the greatest armed conflict of the world, the term 'Christendom' is not inapplicable to Europe. There is a real unity in Western civilization—a unity due in large measure to the influence of religious faith and organization. . . . The spiritual achievements of the Greek and Roman, Jew and Christian, have remained the common possession of the West, the foundation of what is still Christendom" (Marvin, *The Unity of Western Civilization*, p. 280). Mr. J. W. Headlam says in the same book: "On this common basis—the Bible, the Church, and the Latin language—was established the education of Western Europe, and the form it then assumed it retained for over a thousand years, almost without change. By this a common cast was given to the intellect, and the nations were disciplined by common spiritual teaching" (*ibid.*, p. 183). "Such were the bases," says Professor Ernest Barker, "on which the unity of medieval civilization had to depend. There was a contracted world, which men could regard as a unity, with a single centre of coherence. There was a low stage of economic development, which on the one hand meant a general uniformity of life, in fief and manor and town, and on the other hand meant a local isolation, that needed, and in the unity of the Church found, some method of unification. With many varieties of dialect, there was yet a general identity of language, which made possible the development, and fostered the dissemination, of a single and identical culture. Nationalism, whether as an economic development, or as a way of life and a mode of the human spirit, was as

yet practically unknown. . . . The medieval lines of division, it is often said, were horizontal rather than vertical. There were different estates rather than states. The feudal class was homogeneous throughout Europe; the clerical class was a single corporation through all the extent of Latin Christianity; and the peasantry and the townsfolk of England were very little different from the peasantry and the townsfolk of France" (ibid., pp. 98-99).

That was in the medieval ages. By the sixteenth century the "unity of a common Roman Church and a common Romance culture," says Professor Barker, "was gone. *Cuius regio eius religio*. To each region its religion; and to each nation, we may add, its national culture. . . . It is a world with which we are familiar—a world of national languages, national cultures, national religions, national wars, with the national State behind all, upholding and sustaining every form of national activity" (ibid., p. 119). "Since the Reformation," says Mr. Wood, "religion has made for division rather than co-operation." "If it be true," he continues, "that the Bible and the Greek spirit are the great common factors of Western civilization, then we must recognize that these two great influences tended to fall apart and even to oppose each other in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The humanist element in the Reform-movement grew less and less, while humanism itself became more definitely secular. The European mind has since been conscious of a disturbing division between religion and culture" (ibid., p. 281). Since the Reformation, "religion," says Mr. Headlam, "which had been the great unifier, became the chief engine of separation" (ibid., p. 187). Educational institutions, he continues, "which originally in reality, and for so long in appearance, were the vehicles for the expression of the common European civilization, have been almost entirely won over to the cause of the national expression. . . . Even religion has become national and God has once again become a tribal deity" (ibid., p. 192).

Is there anything, then, that is common to the peoples of the West, the peoples of Europe, the United States and Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand? It is not geographical situation: Australia and New Zealand are Western, though they are as far

east as China. Is it Christianity? There are Jews in the West. Further, the Christian Negroes of the United States or of South Africa are not included in the West. And Christianity has adherents in the East. The Christian world cuts across East and West and across racial differences. All the inhabitants of the United States or of South Africa are not included, nor the people of "Latin America." The *coloured races* are excluded. *The only common feature of the peoples included in the West seems to be race, rather the white complexion.* Whatever may be the strict anthropological justification for it, it is the sense of belonging to the white race.

As has been shown earlier, not only popular writers but serious historians, philosophers and even anthropologists trained to accurate thinking, have used White Civilization as synonymous with Western Civilization.

## *Race and Culture*

Is there a correlation between Western Civilization and the White race?

It may be readily admitted that during the last two or three centuries most of those who contributed to the unprecedented growth of human knowledge and culture have belonged to the White race. Was it merely a coincidence or was there a correlation between the two? "Race," says Professor R. R. Marett, "in the only sense that the word has for the anthropologist, means inherited breed, and nothing more or less—inherited breed and all that it covers, whether bodily or mental features" (Marett, *Anthropology*, p. 60). "When we speak of racial characteristics," says Professor Franz Boas, "we mean those traits that are determined by heredity in each race and in which all members of the race participate" (Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life*, p. 20<sup>1</sup>). A racial character, then, must be a biologically hereditary character and must be shared by all the members of the race.

Is Western Civilization a racial character? "Culture is not," says Dr. Ruth Benedict, "a biologically transmitted complex" (Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, p. 14). "Not one item of his (man's) tribal social organization, of his language, of his local religion, is carried in his germ-plasm" (ibid., p. 12). Culture is a social heritage and not a biological inheritance.

Admitting for the sake of the argument that all Western Civilization is the contribution of the White people, was it because of their race? If it were a race characteristic, *all* the members of the race should participate in the contribution. But as a matter of fact, all the members have not done so. During the time the White

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people have been White people, their contributions to human cultures have varied enormously between individuals, between groups of various kinds and in the successive epochs of time, from the days of ancient Greece and Rome, through the Dark Ages, the Middle Ages, right up to and including modern times. The Greeks of the ancient days were in the van of civilization, but the Greeks of to-day have lagged far, far behind. Northern Europeans, who were but barbarians in ancient times, are to-day in the van of civilization. Again, every White man is not a Newton, a Darwin, a Marconi, a Ford, or an Edison.

Perhaps an examination of the nature of culture and its development may be instructive. "The culture of any people," says Professor Dixon, "comprises the sum of all their activities, customs, and beliefs" (Dixon, *The Building of Culture*, p. 3). Every one of these activities, beliefs and customs must have been the invention of someone, somewhere, sometime. Invention, says Professor Dixon, "lies at the very basis of the origins of culture" (*ibid.*, p. 49). And the "factor of genius is basic to all invention" (*ibid.*, p. 39). Culture or civilization is thus the result of the inventions of geniuses.

But mere invention does not make a culture. "A discovery or invention, once made," says Professor Dixon, "is without result and sterile unless it is adopted. Without its diffusion beyond the discoverer or inventor the new trait remains a merely personal eccentricity, interesting or amusing, but not significant" (*ibid.*, p. 59). To become a culture trait it must be adopted by a group, small or large. On the part of the members of the group "a certain amount of appreciation and imagination, i.e. genius, is needed for them to see the value of the new trait and adopt it" (*ibid.*, p. 59). Thus a new trait has to be first invented; it presupposes genius of the necessary calibre; then it must be adopted by a group and the group must have enough genius to appreciate the new invention.

Are any of these features correlated with the White Race in respect to Western Civilization? "A new discovery or invention," says Dr. Dixon, "is, in the vast majority of cases, made by an individual. There are, of course, instances, particularly in our modern, highly organized type of invention, in which several individuals

co-operate, but from the nature of the case such instances must in the earlier times have been few. We are, therefore, undoubtedly justified in treating discoveries and inventions as essentially one-man affairs" (*ibid.*, p. 59). Invention, then, at any rate as far as its norm is concerned, is an individual creation. It is not the product of a group, much less of a whole race.

Is genius a racial character? Inasmuch as genius is a marked deviation from the average in personality or ability, it cannot be common to a group or a race. Professor F. H. Hankins says that "A man of genius is a biological accident. He is a fortuitous, unlikely combination" (Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization*, p. 373<sup>1</sup>).

If genius is not a racial character in the sense of being common to a whole race, is its frequency a racial character? Are there relatively more geniuses in one race than in another? "Any discussion," says Dr. Dixon, "of the correlations between inventions and genius meets at the outset the almost insuperable difficulty that, unlike opportunities and needs, genius cannot be independently measured. . . . It is true that we may perhaps form a rough estimate of the frequency of genius among a people, by the number of men of genius which it has produced, and of its quality and grade, by their fields of productivity and relative greatness. But at best such an estimate rests to a large extent on this or that estimator's personal opinion as to where the level of genius begins, and it obviously omits from consideration the countless persons of actual genius who for one reason or another never had the chance to demonstrate it" (Dixon, *The Building of Culture*, pp. 55-56).

If genius cannot be measured independently, can it be measured by its inventions and achievement? "We cannot, then," says Professor Dixon, "estimate the genius of a people, either its frequency or its character or its grade, save by its products" (*ibid.*, p. 56). But even that is not without vitiating difficulties. "One of the many difficulties, however, in any attempt to judge even by the products, is that in many cases we cannot be sure whether a trait in use by a people, or a whole group of peoples, was actually invented by them

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or not. The place of origin of most of the great basic inventions is utterly unknown" (ibid., p. 56). Dr. Dixon applies the tests of inventions patented in different countries, all White. "If one calculates the number of patents issued per thousand of population, there is a great difference between, say, Spain and Portugal, with 3.5 and 2.0 per thousand respectively, and France, Great Britain, and the United States, with 17.4, 14.6, and 13.5. Yet the significance of such figures is probably small because of the many evident sources of error in such simple comparisons. When Sweden shows but 0.9 and neighbouring Norway 15.0, it is clear that no such means will suffice" (ibid., pp. 56-57).

It is difficult then to estimate genius. Apart from frequency and character, it varies in degree "from attainments but little above the average to great geniuses of all time." Says Professor Hankins, "aside from the general fact that well-endowed stocks produce superior men in much greater frequency than mediocre stocks, little is positively known of the racial ingredients or the extent of the racial complexity of men of super-ability" (Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization*, p. 373).

In passing, it may be noted that Dr. Hankins thinks that "it can be stated with comparative safety that the world's geniuses have been with rare exception cross-bred, in areas of race mixture" (ibid., p. 373). This recalls in some respects Mr. Pitt-Rivers' theory that miscegenation produces a more generalized, and therefore, more adaptable stock.

As has been stated above, Dr. Dixon recognizes the difficulty, the "almost insuperable difficulty," of distinguishing genius objectively and measuring it independently of its products, which, in turn, are conditioned by opportunity and need. He thinks, however, that, judged by this standard of the products of genius, "there seems to be a very real and often very great difference between peoples, nations, and races, so that, for example, the inventive productivity of the Negro and the other dark-skinned races is far inferior to that of the others" (Dixon, *The Building of Cultures*, p. 56). He holds the view that "in spite of the claims made by some for the equality of ability of all peoples, it is impossible to doubt



their variability in the production of genius, both as to numbers and grade. It is true, for example, that there have been Negroes who have shown marked ability, but they have been few, and although these stand far above the average Negro and indeed, above the average white, they are nevertheless far below the heights which geniuses of the white race have attained" (ibid., p. 40).

Dr. Hankins himself comes to a similar conclusion, basing it on mental tests, which lend themselves more easily to objective definition and independent measurement. He says: "We have sought, using the negro-white comparison, to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that the races are unequal in mental equipment with consequent difference in cultural powers" (Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization*, p. 322).

What is the nature of the inequalities in mental equipment of the races and how are they related to their cultures? Dr. Hankins reports that "Professor Joseph Peterson has made a most objective and critical estimate of all the studies, including his own, made up to 1923. The general uniformity of the results by different investigators using different tests is so striking that it calls for a uniformity of causation to explain it" (ibid., p. 318). And Dr. Peterson had found that "about 83 per cent of the whites are more efficient than the negro of medium ability, while approximately only 15 to 18 per cent of the negroes reach the whites of medium ability" (ibid., p. 319). *It is clear from this that there is no absolute gap between the intelligence of the Negro and the White; the White level of intelligence does not begin where the Negro level ends. To a large extent they overlap.*

The nature of the overlap is illustrated by the following table, which is abridged and adapted from Dr. C. C. Brigham's Table No. 1, "Distribution of the intelligence scores of the main groups of the principal sample on the combined scale," showing the intelligence scores of White Officers, White and Negro soldiers recruited during the Great War by the Government of the United States.

Commenting on these figures, Mr. Brigham says: "Of the officers, 98.87 per cent are above the average of the white draft, and 99.97 per cent are above the average of the negro draft. Of the white draft

86.31 per cent are above the average of the negro draft. Only 13.13 per cent of the negro draft are above the average of the white draft. This method of figuring gives us some indication of the

Combined Scale Intervals	Proportion in each Ten Thousand		
	White Officers	White Draft	Negro Draft
24	4	—	—
23	68	2	—
22	394	13	—
21	1,060	48	3
20	1,628	107	7
19	1,824	192	15
18	1,736	319	34
17	1,387	499	73
16	935	729	140
15	538	993	254
14	265	1,279	437
13	115	1,560	760
12	39	1,490	1,090
11	9	1,009	1,251
10	2	662	1,351
9	1	472	1,406
8	—	306	1,225
7	—	179	911
6	—	87	557
5	—	36	290
4	—	13	128
3	—	4	48
2	—	1	16
1	—	—	4

(Brigham, *A Study of American Intelligence*, p. 80.)

differences between the groups. If the distribution of intelligence in the two groups were the same, 50 per cent of either group would exceed the average of the other group. If the distribution were absolutely distinct, and there were no overlapping, then 100 per

cent of one group would exceed the *highest man* in the other group" (ibid., p. 82).

If, apart from the question of its absolute validity, the above table generally represents the comparative character of the overlap of the intelligence-grading of the two racial groups, what is its significance as regards *race and civilization*? "We see," says Dr. Hankins, "that there is a considerable difference in the average and range of distribution of negro and white intelligence. These differences are highly important for the relative fecundity of the two groups in superior men. They mean that there are certain levels of mental power attained by the white man which are never attained by the negro and that the proportion of whites potentially able to achieve any of the higher grades of intellectual activity exceeds the proportion of negroes similarly gifted. Such differences signify the differences between groups potentially capable, under favourable circumstances, of rising to high levels of achievement and those capable of mediocrity only" (Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization*, pp. 321-22). Dr. Dixon, who postulated racial differentials in genius, says, "If we admit, as I believe we must, that peoples like individuals vary in grade and frequency of genius, and perhaps as well in its character, we see at once how far-reaching the implications of this fact are as regards invention. For, confronted by the same opportunities, one people with a higher grade and frequency of genius than the other will be able to take advantage of them to a correspondingly greater degree" (Dixon, *The Building of Cultures*, p. 40). In this sense, then, it would mean that there is a racial basis for civilization.

But does that follow? If, as Messrs. Dixon and Hankins suggest, cultural achievement is correlated with intellectual capacity, the quality of invention will vary with the grade of intelligence: higher intellects will produce higher cultures and lower ones will produce lower. *The table shows that groups which are homogeneous racially are heterogeneous intellectually and groups which are homogeneous intellectually are heterogeneous racially.* It has been said that culture depends on invention and invention on intelligence. If an invention needed intelligence of grade 25, none among the White officers,

the White draft, or the Negro draft would be capable of it. As the grade required is lowered, an increasing number of White officers and White draft and Negro draft will be competent.

As the grade is raised higher and higher from the minimum, the number of persons in each group will rise until its mode is reached and then the numbers will begin to grow less until the maximum is reached. When grade 24 is reached, no Negro will be found in it, while the group of White officers will be represented by just 4 members, an almost microscopic minority.

It has been postulated that the greatest inventions need the greatest mental capacity or genius. And if the highest reaches of mental capacity are to be found in the Whites, the greatest inventors will also be White. Creators of lesser inventions which require only lesser intelligence will come from both Whites and the Negroes. But not because they are White and Negro, for these are racial characters, and racial characters must be common to all those who belong to that group. And it has been shown that racial groups are not intellectual groups as well.

Inventions, it has been said, are the products of individuals and not of groups, much less of a group like a race. And an invention will remain a personal affair until it is adopted by a group. Only then it becomes part of culture. And as Dr. Dixon said, even appreciation and adoption of a new invention by a group needs some imagination and genius on the part of the members of the group. If intellectual equipment conditions inventions, it conditions diffusion also. To understand the mathematical theories of Professor Albert Einstein a high level of intelligence is a prerequisite. As is the case with invention, appreciation and diffusion also will depend on the nature of the invention. Some of the simple ones can be adopted by people even of the lower grades of intellect; others require a higher level. The division will be horizontal, along the grades of intelligence cutting across the race group, and not vertical, along the lines of race.

But between invention and appreciation there is a difference which is highly significant to civilization. *Appreciation and adoption of an invention does not require the same intellectual capacity as does*

*its invention. What it takes a genius to invent can be appreciated and adopted by the mediocre.* A trait which needed grade 24 intellect to invent, does not need a similar grade to appreciate it; people of far lower grades also can appreciate it. And they may include both Whites and Negroes.

It required the genius of a Beethoven to create the music he composed, and he was white; thousands of mediocres, both White and Negro, play his music, and millions even less gifted enjoy it. It required high genius to discover the laws of electricity and invent the electric lamp; but millions of people very far removed from genius manipulate the electric lamp switches.

The examination of the table given above on page 173 shows that the range of overlapping intelligence grades is very large and includes the great majority of people of both racial groups, and that there are a few levels in which one or the other group is not represented at all. At levels of 22 and above there are no Negroes, and at level 1 there are no Whites. They represent a small minority in each racial group and not the norm of either.

The minority at the top levels has a significance far larger than its numbers warrant. Genius is always in a minority. But one invention of a genius might revolutionize a whole culture. On the other hand, the minority at the lower end is not so significant. It cannot create. It may not be able even to appreciate the inventions of a genius. There can, however, hardly be any invention which a white person can appreciate but which a Negro cannot. In the table the minimum level for the White draft is 2 and for the Negro is 1. Is there likely to be any element of civilization which the White man of grade 2 can appreciate and the Negro of grade 1 cannot? Is the difference large enough to have any significance on the appreciation of civilization?

Professor Franz Boas says that "the differences between races are so small that they lie within the narrow range in the limits of which all forms may function equally well" (Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life*, p. 41). He goes on to add that "so far as our experience goes, we may safely say that the differences between family lines are much greater than the differences between races" (*ibid.*,

p. 50). If this greater variation in the same family does not prevent its members sharing the same civilization, does it follow that members of two racial groups with less variation cannot do the same? Professor Boas comes to the deliberate conclusion that "general experience of ethnologists who deal with recent ethnological phenomena indicates that whatever organic differences between the great races may be, they are insignificant when considered in their effect upon cultural life" (ibid., p. 60).

If the table referred to above represents the type of the intellectual differential between the races, two conclusions seem to follow from it. *Since both Whites and Negroes are represented in most of the grades except a very few at either end of the scale, comparatively minor inventors may come from both, but the highest inventors will be Whites, as they alone are to be found in the highest grades. As for appreciation and adoption of the inventions, both Negroes and Whites are exactly alike; what the one can assimilate the other also can.*

The above conclusions follow on the assumption that there is a permanent gulf between the maximum intellectual levels of the White and Negro, and that it is correlated with race, a comparatively immutable biological factor. But this assumption is not universally held. Professor Boas says: "Up to this time none of the mental tests gives us any insight into significant racial differences that might not be adequately explained by the effect of social experience" (ibid., pp. 58-59).

In his recent study, *Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration*, Dr. Otto Klineberg examines how far mental tests applied to Negroes disclosed racial or social correlations. He enquired if the Negroes in New York were superior to the Negroes in the south of the United States; and if so, was it because they were so when they migrated from the south to New York, or did they develop that superiority since coming to New York; and, if so, had the length of residence in the new environment been responsible for the change? His conclusions are as follows:

"As far as the results go, they show quite definitely that the superiority of the northern over the southern Negroes, and the tendency of the northern Negroes to approximate the scores of the

Whites, are due to factors of environment, and not to selective migration. . . . This rise in 'intelligence' is roughly proportionate to the length of residence in the more favourable environment.

"Even under these better environmental conditions Negro children do not on the average quite reach the White norms. Since environment of the New York Negro child is by no means the same as that of the White, except perhaps as far as schooling is concerned, this result does not prove that the Negro is incapable of reaching the White level. . . . What we can safely say is that as background improves, so do the scores of the Negroes approximate more and more closely the standards set by the Whites" (Klineberg, *Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration*, p. 59).

He goes on to say that "it is clear that there is no direct connection between skin colour and either length of residence in New York or standing in the tests" (*ibid.*, p. 60). "It is safe to rule out the hypothesis that the amount of White in inter-mixture has very much to do with the results reported in this investigation" (*ibid.*, p. 61). Further, "as far as intelligence goes, the material reported in this study gives evidence to the effect that the Negro who leaves the South for the North is not on the average superior to the Negro who remains behind, and that the present superiority of the northern over the southern Negro may be explained by the more favourable environment, rather than by selective migration" (*ibid.*, p. 62).

The previous discussion has shown that culture is correlated with intelligence, but, inasmuch as intellectual homogeneity does not coincide with racial homogeneity, culture is not correlated with race. But such a correlation becomes possible if there is cultural segregation, if diffusion is interrupted and controlled. For instance, let us take an invention made by a White which is simple enough to be acquired by a White of even so low a grade as 2 in the table. As far as it rests on capacity, the Negroes also of every grade can acquire it. But if the inventor or the White group *restricts the diffusion* of the invention to the Whites and prevents any Negro from acquiring it, then the trait will be common to the Whites and not shared by the Negroes. Racial homogeneity will then coincide with cultural homogeneity.

If a White of grade 2 can cast a vote in a political election, a Negro of the same grade is equally equipped to vote, but he may be prevented from voting. A Negro of grade 16 is competent to be an officer if a White of that and even a lower grade is competent; but he may be denied the opportunity. In such cases, all Whites will vote and no Negro will; and all officers will be White and none Negro. Culture and race will seem to be correlated, though it is really a case of coincidence due to restriction on diffusion.



## *Primitive Race and Primitive Stage*

THERE are those, however, who argue that there is a correlation between race and civilization. Mr. Lothrop Stoddard in his latest book, *Clashing Tides of Colour*, quotes with approval Dr. Paul Reinsch's remark that "Low social organization and consequent lack of efficient social action form the most striking characteristic of the Negro race," and here he adds a footnote to say that "We are here speaking of the full-blooded Negroes. The powerful states which have at times arisen in the Sudan and Nigeria are due primarily to Islamic inspiration, and the ruling classes have always been more or less impregnated with Arab, Berber, or Hamitic blood" (Stoddard, *Clashing Tides of Colour*, p. 372). He proceeds to say that "Such was the Dark Continent at the white man's coming, and such it had been for unaccounted ages. Black Africa had apparently reached a political, economic, and social level ranging from utter savagery to, at most, barbarism; and, of and by himself, the African showed no signs of rising above that level. We need not tarry to consider the much-discussed question as to whether or not the Negro is capable of creating a civilization of his own. He *never has* done it; so far as history shows, no purely Negro civilization has existed in recent times. Therefore, it was a race primitive and backward wherever it had not been quickened by Islamic influences that confronted the inpouring tides of Western, white civilization" (*ibid.*, pp. 372-3). He then says: "Look at the native as he is—and also as he was" in order to note the great change due to the influence of White Civilization. "Indeed, the peace, order, justice, hygiene, economic betterment, and opportunity for individual initiative brought about

by white rule are appreciated by the natives themselves, who do not want to give up these benefits" (ibid., p. 378). An analysis of these passages shows that, in the opinion of Mr. Stoddard, primitive culture is characteristic of the Negro race. If the Negroes were able to develop powerful States in Sudan and Nigeria, it was partly because their ruling classes were more or less impregnated with Arab or other blood. This means that progress was correlated with blood-mixture or biological change. But such blood infusion is not predicated when it is said that the Negro made progress under Islamic inspiration or White civilization. Islam is a religion and a Negro could become a Mohammedan without being impregnated with Muslim blood. While it is said that the Negroes made great progress under White civilization, it is not contended that the progress was confined only to those who were impregnated with White blood. Apparently it was possible for the Negro to remain a Negro by race and make progress under the influence of Islam or White civilization. Civilization is, then, independent of race and blood.

On the other hand, has White civilization, the civilization of the White man, been the same during even the last thousand years, while he has been a White man? White men also were barbarians and savages a few centuries ago. Some of them are even to-day. Professor Arnold J. Toynbee speaks of "the White barbarians of Morocco, Albania, the Caucasus, Kurdistan, and the Indo-Afghan border" (Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. I, p. 237). "If we had taken our survey of White barbarians two centuries ago instead of to-day, our list would have included the Scottish highlanders" (ibid., p. 237). Even to-day can it be claimed that White civilization means "peace, order, justice" considering the history of Europe? Are these characteristic of the White race as primitivism is said to be of the Negro? *It is one thing to speak of a race being at a particular moment in a primitive stage of civilization and quite another to speak of a race being primitive.* Race is not as mutable as civilization is, and there is no correlation between the two. The White race was not born fully civilized and the Black uncivilized. All move from the primitive to the more complex type of civilization, though not necessarily in step. That the Negro has not developed a high

civilization in the past is no indication that he will not do so in the future. The White race had not produced the industrial civilization some three centuries ago, nor the wireless until very recently. The realities of to-day were the almost inconceivable fables of some time ago. The civilization of the United States of to-day is not the same as it was two centuries ago. Even to-day in the United States itself are to be found White people who live in conditions which may be called primitive. Writing in the *New York Times* (February 18, 1935) and the *New York Times Magazine* (March 24, 1935), Mr. Meyer Berger gives a graphic account of the Conklin family which lived a primitive life in a forest clearing only thirty-two miles from New York. The Conklins were of "pure English stock" and settled in Rampos over one hundred and fifty years ago. Other families were the Hogenkamps, Starrs and Pitts. These forest-dwellers had no formal marriage ceremonies; they never used cash; their principal occupation and source of income was the making of primitive wooden ladles and other wooden ware, of hampers and fruit baskets out of beaten and hand-dried swamp maple; their womenfolk seldom came out of the cabins, and never when strangers were about; they used mattresses, but never beds; they were wholly illiterate; the women did not wear shoes; and Mr. Berger found a bare-footed woman in slovenly calico chopping wood, "waking the mountain echoes with each stroke."

There does not seem to be any correlation between the White race and highly-developed civilization and the Black race and primitive civilization. With reference to a contrary thesis of the racialists, asks Professor Arnold J. Toynbee: "How, on this showing, could the Cantonese become converted to Far Eastern civilization a dozen centuries ago. . . . or the Scottish highlanders to our Western civilization one century ago, when they had proved their incapacity for civilization by having previously remained outside the pale? At the moment of their cultural conversion, did they undergo some kind of racial transubstantiation? Were they suddenly and mysteriously endowed with some inward spiritual grace of which no outward visible sign could be detected even by the trained ethnologist's eye? Such are the extravagances into which

we find ourselves driven in the last resort if we proceed on the hypothesis that some fractions of Mankind are racially incapable and others racially capable of civilization *a priori*, and that a race stands convicted of inherent and incurable incapacity if it happens not to have contributed to the creation of any civilization by the time in the history of the species when the censorious observer is moved to make his observations. No such *reductio ad absurdum* lies in wait for us if we adopt, instead, the hypothesis by which the French observer, M. Delafosse, explains the failure of the Black race to make creative contributions up to date, and if we apply this hypothesis to other races or portions of races which have played the same passive role as the Black race during the whole or some of the time during which the species of societies called civilizations has been in existence" (Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. I, p. 238).

*Creation v. Imitation*

PROFESSOR TOYNBEE speaks of the passive role of the Black race. Mr. Lothrop Stoddard meant about the same thing when he said that the Negro "of and by himself" showed no sign of rising above the level of the barbarian, and attributes the failure to the racial character of the Negro. Is that statement correct? Is there a correlation between race and passivity, even if only past achievements, and not future potentialities, are taken into consideration? Have all or most of the members of, say, the White race played a creative role in civilization, and all or most of the members of the Black race a passive one? It is not possible here to attempt an exhaustive review of the contributions to culture definitely attributed to the Black race. It is enough to say that the Black race is not without them. Dr. James Weldon Johnson has brought together some of the cultural contributions of the Black race in his *Native African Races and Culture*. He quotes Professor Franz Boas to say that "while much of the history of early invention is shrouded in darkness, it seems likely that at a time when the European was still satisfied with rude stone tools, the African had invented or adopted the art of smelting iron. . . . It seems not unlikely that the people that made the marvellous discovery of reducing iron ores by smelting were African Negroes. Neither ancient Europe, nor ancient western Asia, nor ancient China knew iron, and everything points to its introduction from Africa. At the end of the great African discoveries towards the end of the past century, the trade of the blacksmith was found all over Africa, from north to south and from east to west. With his simple bellows and a charcoal fire he reduced the ore that is found in many parts of the continent and forged imple-

ments of great usefulness and beauty" (Johnson, *Native African Races and Culture*, p. 19).

After referring to agriculture, the domestication of animals, and in particular the milking of cattle and the products of native workmen, the blacksmith, the weaver, the woodcarver and the potter which were "cultural achievements of no mean order," Professor Boas concluded by saying that "the occurrence of all these arts of life points to an early and energetic development of African culture" (ibid., p. 20). Mr. George W. Ellis, the author of *Negro Culture in West Africa*, is quoted as saying that "some of the kings—possessing two capitals, and living in fortified castles that had glass windows and were decorated with sculptures and painting—had pageantries of the most stately magnificence. Indeed, when England, Germany, and France were just emerging from barbarianism in intellectual, industrial and political development, some of these dynasties had attained a comparatively high degree of civilization; and geographers and historians mention Ghana and Timbuctu and other interior towns as the resorts of the rich, the learned and the pious of all countries" (ibid., p. 12). The Basutos under their leader Moshesh knew enough of army organization and strategy as to defeat the British invasion of Basutoland under Sir George Cathcart in 1852 (ibid., p. 11). Professor Malcolm M. Willey says: "If we turn to Africa, on the other hand, it will be discovered that while the natives of the Kalahari desert may not have highly developed material traits in their culture, yet the art, folklore, and languages have been developed to a remarkable degree. With some of the West African tribes one finds standing armies numbering thousands, and controlled by military despots. There are vast kingdoms, with land systems as intricate as those of the feudal days of Europe. There are court attendants and officials—ambassadors, tax collectors, etc.—and ceremonies that all but rival those of the court of a modern European government" (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 532).

While, then, it is not correct to assert that the Black race made no creative contribution to civilization, can it be said that all or most of the members of the White race have made such contributions?

Or is it the fact that most of them have had to play the passive role? Compared to the number of White individuals of all ages and areas, the creators of civilizations are few—infinitesimal in number. The rest but copy what the few create. Even the creators have imitated and assimilated their social heritage and the creations of their own contemporaries. It may not be an exaggeration to say that 99·9 per cent of all peoples, irrespective of race, play a passive, as opposed to a creative, role, and even the others, who create, play a passive role with regards to 99·9 per cent of their civilization. What even the greatest creator adds is almost infinitesimal as compared to what he inherits from the accumulations of generations which had preceded him. Referring to the acquisition of new cultural traits, Professor Toynbee says: "One of these alternative means is original creation, since without creation the diffusion of the products of creation is impossible *ex hypothesi*. At the same time, it is not admissible to ascribe every acquisition of every quality of every representative of every species to a separate and original creative act, since our empirical observation shows us that, in any species, the creative individuals are in a minority, and that in the life of any creative individual, his creative acts are rare events. . . . Diffusion is the means by which acquisitions are actually made in many cases and perhaps in the majority" (Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. I, p. 426). *Imitation by the vast majority of what an infinitesimal minority created is the normal method of the growth of culture.* "The prevailing mode of acquiring culture," says Professor Clark Wissler, "has always been to imitate the traits of other peoples. It is nature's economy, for if each people were forced to work out all phases of their culture alone, no one can guess at the ages that must ensue before anything like the present cultural state of the world could be attained. . . . In fact, without the imitative function it is difficult to imagine how man could have a culture at all, for it must be perpetuated by the imitation of the older by the younger members of the group" (Wissler, *Man and Culture*, p. 206).

It seems, then, that all humanity, irrespective of race, colour, or East and West, is in the same boat inasmuch as every individual acquires culture by imitating others. Some comparatively few indi-

viduals create new cultural traits, and they may all be of the same colour and race and belong to the West. But that has no significance inasmuch as the creations are not due to the fact that they belong to a particular race or colour or to the West; and inasmuch as everybody else, whether he belongs to their own race and colour and to the West, or belongs to another race or colour and to the East, is in the same situation of having to acquire the new traits by imitation. The relationship is between the *individual creator and the rest of humanity*, and *not between one group and another*. Whatever else may condition the diffusion of the new creation, it is not race, colour, East or West.



## *Group and Culture*

BUT this relationship is not universally admitted. It is very often, if not universally, assumed that a creation belongs to a group and diffuses from one group to another. Thus, for instance, Sir James Fraser says that "to sift out the elements of culture which a race has independently evolved and to distinguish them accurately from those which it has derived from other races is a task of extreme difficulty and delicacy" (Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. I, p. 426). Here a race, which may consist of millions of individuals, is taken as a unit. Professor Dixon speaks of the difficulty of ascertaining "whether a trait in use by a people, or whole groups of peoples, was actually invented by them or not" (Dixon, *The Building of Cultures*, p. 56).

Dr. Dixon does not imply that every individual of a group invented a trait, but he seems to assume that *the creation of one individual in a group is of that whole group*. The matter is put even more clearly by Dr. Hankins. He says: "The frequency of superior individuals born within a group is of the greatest significance for the role of that group in cultural evolution. These individuals are the natural leaders of the group. They represent its genius, its originating, pioneering, ruling, crowd-swaying individuals. It is their genius which moulds the group folk-ways and mores, their inventive ability which solves the primary problems of the practical arts, their statesmanship which holds the group together and enables it to meet the great exigencies of inter-group struggle for domination, and their creative genius which produces those rare flowers of culture—scientific discovery, philosophical generalization, and aesthetic masterpieces. Such men are always a very small proportion of any group, but as Professor Thorndyke says,

'The ability of a hundred of its most gifted representatives often accounts more for a nation's or race's welfare than the ability of a million of its mediocrities' " (Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization*, pp. 305-6). Here it is admitted that culture is produced by the gifted individuals, that such individuals are few and that the "flowers of culture" are rare, but it is claimed that the creations of these few individuals *belong* to one group, which may be a whole race or nation—but not to another group, which may be another race or nation. The same idea is further exemplified by Dr. Hankins when he says: "When it is added that the higher ranges of human genius appear much less frequently than one in a million of those born, it is obvious that of two groups, much alike otherwise, one might occasionally produce men of the rank of Newton, Darwin, Goethe, Wagner or Pasteur, and the other never. One might produce men of conspicuous ability, and the other few. In the long run one would produce cultural levels which the other could only imitate" (*ibid.*, p. 306). Here it is postulated that Newton and others belong to certain groups, whose cultural levels alone they raise by their inventions. They do not raise the levels of other groups. The work of a genius belongs to his group, but not to all humanity. When the members of the group to which the genius belongs imitate him, it is not imitation; it is indigenous invention! If another group imitates, it is imitation of an exotic culture! Says Professor Dixon: "Of these two sets of elements—exotic traits brought by diffusion and local traits arising either out of their cultural heritage by adaptation or discovered and invented by their own genius and correlated in some degrees often with the environment—of these two elements the fabric of a people's culture is woven" (Dixon, *The Building of Cultures*, p. 271). And there is contempt for imitation. Dr. Wissler recalls that "in America we place a high value upon originality, and in consequence hold in contempt those we believe to be imitators. It is this spirit that prompts us to sneer at the achievements of the Japanese and stigmatize them as imitators" (Wissler, *Man and Culture*, p. 206). The Japanese imitate what the Americans invent, and those who imitate are not on the same cultural level as the creators, and hence the Japanese are not

on the same cultural level as the Americans. Dr. Wissler, however, pleads that "it is no stigma for the Japanese to imitate Americans in some traits of culture, for that is the one human way to enrich a culture, and as Americans, we should not be so sure that we can invent everything that is worth while" (*ibid.*, pp. 206-7). It is not here professed that every American is an inventor, or that every American invented his culture. It is apparently assumed that if one American invents a trait, it is as if all Americans had invented it simultaneously and each for himself, and nobody imitated another. If an American copies another, it is not imitation. But if a Japanese copied an American, he would be imitating, and not creating. What one American invents is indigenous to all Americans, but exotic to the Japanese and others.

Notwithstanding Dr. Wissler's plea that imitation should not carry a stigma about it, he thinks it is a characteristic of the "barbarian." He correlates White with invention and civilization, and the Negro with imitation and barbarism. Referring to the acculturation of "natives" by Europeans, he says: "In fact, the whole known history of European nations is a record of the extension of their cultures by teaching, in one way or another, the essential traits to barbarians. Yet, this is not the point, for the real question is, are all these 'barbarians' equally competent to invent fundamental traits and to advance culture in a decisive manner?" (*ibid.*, p. 290). But are all Europeans, every individual member of the White race, competent to invent fundamental traits of civilization? The answer may be found in what Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes said in another but very similar connection: "In so far as he (man) believes in supernatural causation of observed phenomena, thinks illogically, and relies upon opinion and heresy rather than upon scientifically ascertained facts, his thinking is that of a primitive man, whether he be a graduate of a university in 1927 or an illiterate Indian of the north-west Pacific coast tribe. When judged by these criteria alone, it will be seen that probably a majority of contemporary Americans think much as did the primitive man, and many millions of Americans are primitive in some aspects of their mental life" (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 59-60). Judged by

contributions to civilization most people, of every race and colour, and of the West or the East, are "barbarians." Yet Dr. Wissler would call the Americans and Europeans and all Whites civilized, because he would give every White person credit for every invention made by any White person at any time.

"If one is to credit," says Professor Ernest A. Hooten, Professor of Anthropology in Harvard University, "all Whites with every cultural achievement made by any White race or race of mixed origin styled 'White,' the same latitude must be extended to the Negro. Under such an interpretation, a large share of responsibility for the great civilization of India must be assigned to Negroes, since there is unquestionably strong Negroid strain in the Indian population, and who can prove that Indian culture is due wholly or predominantly to the White strains in that great mixed group of peoples?" And he adds immediately: "Every civilization grows up, to a great extent, from the borrowings and accretions from other cultures" (Hooten, *Up from the Ape*, p. 592<sup>1</sup>). "If it is the first step that counts," says Professor R. H. Lowie of the University of California, "science, like all culture, is not the work of one or two favoured nations or races, but of humanity as a whole" (Lowie, *Cultural Anthropology*, p. 341). In which case, the credit for every invention must go to everybody!

Dr. Wissler is not alone in taking the view that imitation is characteristic of the barbarian. Says Dr. Dixon: "Thus the superiority of matches over the fire-stick or flint and steel leads every savage people to desire them, and, if trade facilities are adequate, their use supplants the more primitive methods which are thus entirely discarded. Yet the savage does not and cannot make matches for himself. The silk-ways across Asia supplied Rome with silk, yet, although the material was long used, it was centuries before silk manufacture entered Mediterranean culture as a trait. Such cases of the use of products of a higher or different culture are not, strictly speaking, cases of true diffusion at all. It is obvious, then, that we must make a distinction between the transfer from one culture area to another, of the use of a material product supplied by

<sup>1</sup> Published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

trade, for their supplies of which the one culture is dependent upon the other, and real diffusion of a cultural trait such, let us say, as the making of wine or the use of the alphabet" (Dixon, *The Building of Cultures*, pp. 117-18). Is it not true that civilized people, the White people, also appreciate the superiority of matches and use them, but most of them, perhaps 99·9 per cent of them, do not and cannot make them? If making is the test of civilization, are not all these "savages"? Again, if the fact that the Mediterranean culture *used* silks at one time did not incapacitate it from *making* it subsequently, is there sufficient reason to suppose that the savage who at one time *used* matches *cannot make* them ever after?

To what extent is the view of Messrs. Dixon and Wissler tenable that the invention of an individual belongs to the whole of his group and no other?

What group does Darwin, for instance, represent either in the creation of his famous theories or their dissemination? He certainly had a background; he acquired, by imitation, the learning relevant to his theme produced by his predecessors in his line of work. He built on it. But his creations were not the inventions of a national, a linguistic, a territorial, a religious, or any other similar group of his time. All the people of England, or of Europe, or of the West did not come together one fine morning and create the Darwinian theories; they are not English, or European, or Western in origin. They are his own. His theories were assailed by many in his time and have been so since. And was the spread of his theories circumscribed to his group? They are available to all who can read his books and have some previous equipment in the subject; and these qualifications transcend groupings based on other considerations, such as race, religion, recreation, forms of government, etc. Darwinism has a history, but it has no correlation with colour, race, language, or political institutions. It is not the creation of England, or Europe, or of the West. It is not indigenous to one group and exotic to another. It was exotic at first when it was new, and it later became indigenous. It is not that it was indigenous to England, but exotic to France and Germany or Japan. *Every new creation is exotic until it is accepted. Then it becomes indigenous.* The citation of cause

for which Harvard University conferred the honorary degree of Doctor of Science on Dr. Albert Einstein in June 1935 ran thus: "Acclaimed by the world as a great revolutionist of theoretical physics, his bold speculations, now become basic doctrines, will be remembered when mankind's present troubles are long forgotten." His speculations were exotic for a while, and are now "basic" and indigenous. They are not, however, indigenous to the Germans or the Jews or the Whites or the West, and exotic to the British, the Christians, the Browns and Blacks, or the East.

*A group for one factor does not necessarily mean it is a group for all other factors.* A number of individuals form a group, inasmuch as they have something in common; and only to the extent to which they have characteristics in common. A grouping based on geographical situation, or racial or colour characteristics, or language, or religion, or form of government, or vocation and the like, does not necessarily mean that the group is homogeneous in other respects. The same individual may have, and, in fact, has, a multiple personality, as it were, being a member of different groups for different cultural traits. Dr. L. L. Bernard refers to some of the current groupings as follows: "The general composite control environments are such as the racial, economic, political, aesthetic, ethical, religious, cultural, educational, etc. Such environments as these are very general and include large classes of social objects. The composite specific environments include such types as American, British, Latin, Scandinavian, Jewish, Italian, New England, Southern (U.S.), Republican, Democratic, Socialist, Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, Mohammedan, revolutionary, conservative, masculine, feminine, etc. There is literally almost no limit to the number of composite specific environments" (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 418). Two individuals may be Nordic by race, but not necessarily Americans by citizenship, Christians by religion, labourers by profession, Democrats in American politics, and so on. One factor does not necessarily determine the others. At the same time, the same individual cannot be a Christian and a Mohammedan, a Democrat and a Communist, a labourer and a professional, Nordic and a Negro.

## *The Typical American*

TAKING a smaller geographical unit than the West, viz. the United States of America, Dr. James Truslow Adams attempts to answer the question: What is a typical American? (*New York Times Magazine*, May 19, 1935). He starts with the population of America and eliminates as not "typically American" the Negro and the coloured people as well as foreign immigrants, including the British, and the first generation of American-born children of foreign parents, who together form some 40 per cent of the total population. "Evidently, the validity of a conception of a national character, difficult enough to define for any nation, is rendered yet more dubious when it is based on the traits of only 60 per cent of the people and is held not to apply to the remainder." He, therefore, abandons the statistical method and tries out other methods. One such is the conception of "an ideal, probably largely derived from fiction and illustrations (nowadays from the cinema), of what such a type ought to be." Failing it, he resorts to another method: "To establish a typical national character, we naturally search for only those points in which the character of one nation may differ from that of another. In doing so, we discard all that vast substratum of human nature in which we all share."

This method also fails, because, among other reasons, "nationals of any country have a strong tendency to consider as 'typical' those traits which they most admire in themselves; whereas there is an equally strong tendency among foreigners to stress those traits of the same people as typical which they, as foreigners, most dislike or from which they suffer."

"For example," he continues, "the English rather pride them-

selves on their honesty and on their disinterested administration of foreign lands which they took either, as has been said, 'in a fit of absence of mind' or for the good of the natives. On the other hand, in the rest of Europe the legend of 'perfidious Albion' persists." Then he applies such criteria as the influence of the "frontier" and "career open to the talents," and he finds them all unsatisfactory. "We often complain of the sameness of American life, of a nation of Babbitts; but the magnificent work, the *Dictionary of American Biography*, as successive volumes appear, is rapidly dispelling that notion." "Recently the *Automobile Buyers' Guide* sent out a questionnaire which was answered by 211,000 car owners as to the ten most important qualities required by them in their cars. I was not surprised, in a nation which above all others is accused of a passion for speed, to find that particular quality set down as tenth and lowest." He then proceeds to "build up a national character from examining those of men and women who might be instinctively recognized as simon-pure American and by no possibility of anything else." He reviews the lives of George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John D. Rockefeller, Henry Ford, Thomas A. Edison, John Adams, P. T. Barnum, Calvin Coolidge, Mark Twain, Abraham Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt. But the review does not yield any definite result. Then he falls back on "sheer impressionism," and can only say that there is some "difference between ourselves and our European ancestors and contemporaries." He adds, however, that "it is not perhaps important just what the difference may be which strikes me merely as one individual." This is subjective impressionism of one individual which may not agree with that of another. A truly objective scientific appraisal is rendered difficult, says Dr. Adams, for "both our country and population are so vast and varied, there are so many sections, so many types and races, that few men could claim even a fairly intimate acquaintance with any considerable number of them." If such be the variety in America alone, it could not be less when a larger group, the White race, or the West as a whole, is taken as a unit.

In the same article Dr. Adams refers to the characteristics of Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Italians. "The traditional conception



of an Englishman is of a fair-haired, blue-eyed person, yet in London observation in any busy street or in the parks will quickly dispel the illusion. Moreover, everywhere in Europe one finds enormous differences within short distances as from county to county in England, or as in a drive I took not long ago in Italy.

"In the delightful coast town of Amalfi, where we were staying, we commented on the gentleness, the sweetness, and the friendliness of the people. Only a few miles away, up in the mountains, there was a complete and astonishing change. The inhabitants shook their clenched fists at us as our car passed; they spat on the car and threw stones. They appeared to be wholly different people, yet they and the Amalfians were equally 'Italians.'

"Instances of such differences could be multiplied indefinitely. What peoples could be more different in many ways than the gay and boastful Gascon of the South and the reserved and dour Breton peasant of the North? Yet we include them both under one head when we speak of 'the French.' "

In passing, it may be noted that Dr. Adams, in exposing the invalidity of generalizations, has himself generalized about the people of Amalfi and the nearby towns in Italy and the Gascons and the Bretons of France. The error lies in postulating that *if a number of individuals have one element in common, they must have something else also in common*. The peoples of Italy have this in common that they are, for political purposes, the citizens of Italy, but that does not mean that they have a common attitude towards strangers. Similarly, the people of France have this in common that they all owe political allegiance to the French Government, but they do not on that account have a common temperament, either gay or dour. The same individuals may at times be dour and at other times gay, both in France and Italy and everywhere else.

The Americans and Canadians immediately on either side of the artificial boundary line between the U.S.A. and Canada are very much alike in all aspects of culture, except the political. The American in Maine has more in common with the Canadian on the other side of the boundary than with an American in Florida or California in regard to industry, agriculture, climate, dress, customs

and manners, superstitions and ideals. But politically he has more in common with a far-away American in Florida or California than with his next-door neighbour in Canada.

Japan is said to imitate America. But in so far as America is really American, Japan cannot copy her. What is unique to Americans is their political nationality. That is what distinguishes an American from a Britisher, or German, or Japanese; it is his nationality. Not Christianity, not automobiles, not capitalism, not chewing gum. A Japanese cannot be a national of the United States at the same time that he is a national of Japan. In the crucial test of a war, he cannot enlist in both armies. *What a group, which is Japanese for purposes of nationality, can acquire from another group, which is American for purposes of nationality, is only that which, by its nature, is unrelated to nationality and is, therefore, not American, but universal. Similarly, an Oriental can acquire from an Occidental that which is not Occidental but is universal.*

## *Integration of Culture*

It has been urged, however, that a culture is not a mere bundle of cultural traits which are unrelated to one another, but that it is an integrated complex and a cultural unit and that, therefore, it would be valid to speak of a Western Civilization and of the Japanese imitating it. "A culture," says Dr. Ruth Benedict, "like an individual, is a more or less consistent pattern of thought and action" (Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, p. 46). "The whole, as modern science is insisting in many fields, is not merely the sum of all its parts, but the result of a unique arrangement and inter-relation of the parts that has brought about a new entity. Gunpowder is not merely the sum of sulphur and charcoal and saltpetre, and no amount of knowledge even of all three of its elements in all forms they take in the natural world will demonstrate the nature of gunpowder. New potentialities have come into being in the resulting compound that were not present in its elements, and its mode of behaviour is indefinitely changed from that of any of its elements in other combinations. Cultures, likewise, are more than the sum of their traits" (ibid., p. 47).

It may be granted at once that when two and more cultural traits subsist together, they must integrate themselves into some kind or other of pattern. Even the most disorderly mob in a free-fight has a pattern at any moment. But the concept of a pattern has significance only when the pattern is constant; when there is a constant correlation between the different traits, with a definite recognizable form. To take the example given by Dr. Benedict, gunpowder has a definite and constant composition and reaction. Certain elements interact in certain proportions and produce certain definite results; it has a pattern. But if the elements form other

combinations with other elements, as they do, the resultant pattern will not be that of gunpowder but of something else. Similarly, while Western Civilization or, for that matter, any culture, must have a pattern at any moment, does it have a constant pattern—certain cultural elements combined in certain defined forms, which are constant? Or is the pattern ever changing, like that of a kaleidoscope? Are the different traits linked together that they stand and fall together; and if they fall apart, lose their significance? The concept of pattern has little value if it means only the description of an historical incident; it will have value only when it leads to the intelligent interpretation and anticipation of phenomena. *In a pattern the cultural traits are not only consistent with one another, but constant as well. A pattern is known by its constants.* If the configuration changes, the result will be a *new* pattern.

It is obvious that every culture must be consistent with the biological needs of the group, as getting a living, mating, warring and recreation. This type of integration is universal to all cultures. "Cultures at every level of complexity, even the simplest," says Dr. Benedict, "have achieved it. Such cultures are more or less successful attainments of integrated behaviour, and the marvel is that there can be so many of these possible configurations" (Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, p. 48).

## *Western Civilization and Physical Environment*

If, then, even the uniform and constant biological needs can be met by a great variety of configurations of cultures, what distinguishes each one of these configurations, for instance, Western Civilization, from the others, and what determines its form? Why are similar needs met by different means? One reason is that culture configuration is correlated with environment, and if the environment varies, cultures also vary. Says Dr. Dixon: "Each ecological area, each region possessing an environmental character of its own, begot a culture area, in part correlated with it, and comprising a larger or smaller series of individual cultures, each the product of a people's genius, but all expressive, in varying degree and sometimes in varying fashion, of that common background shared by all" (Dixon, *The Building of Cultures*, p. 285). Professor Bernard classifies the environment into three orders: the physico-social, the bio-social, and the psycho-social. The first refers to the physical non-living environment, such as soil, minerals, fuels, water, winds tides; the second to the living environment of cultivated plants and domesticated animals, and the third the non-material social environment, such as customs, habits, beliefs, etc. (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 412 and 415). In so far as a culture configuration is correlated with physical environment, it is apparent that the East is not an ecological unit, nor the West, even if the East meant only Asia and the West only Europe. Even the United States is not an ecological unit or area, but a series of them. Says Professor Dixon: "Yet no less certainly are regional varieties of that (American) type taking shape before our eyes, varieties

growing directly or indirectly in large measure out of the special restrictions and opportunities offered by the different environments which the United States affords. The characteristic flavour of the culture of New England or of the South has long been apparent, but no less surely are other forms taking shape in the newer regions of the Middle West, the prairie states, the South-West, California, etc. A vast experiment in the influence of environment on culture is thus going on, of the significance of which we are, as a rule, only dimly conscious; an experiment in which from a single parent culture, not one but a whole series of new cultural types and subtypes are being born. The process is nothing new, for it has been active throughout human history and has been responsible in no small degree for the variety of cultures which the world has known" (Dixon, *The Building of Cultures*, p. 289). In so far as physical environment conditions a culture configuration, there will be as many such configurations as there are environments, and if the United States is not a single environment, much less so is the West or the East. Eastern and Western Civilizations are not, therefore, correlated each with a particular physical environment.

It should also be noted that in so far as a culture configuration is conditioned by an environment, a change in culture must be preceded by a change in the environment. The damming of a river and the creation of a lake is bound to bring about a change in the culture configuration. If a change in culture is not accompanied by a change in the physical environment it is apparent that there is no correlation between the two. The physical environment of the English people has not appreciably changed during, say, the last two or three centuries; but the culture configuration has changed considerably. The same seems to hold true of the culture configuration in every culture-area.

Professor Ellsworth Huntington has postulated correlation between climate and civilization. And he comes to the conclusion that "since similar resemblances between the distribution of sociological and climatic conditions are found all over the world, there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that climate sets the general pattern for the distribution of a large share of the world's activities" (Davis

and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 281). In so far as climate conditions the configuration of culture, the United States alone has, according to Dr. Huntington, five different cultures. They could not certainly be less if a larger unit like the East or the West is taken into consideration. Eastern and Western civilizations are not, therefore, correlated each with a particular climate.

Physical environment cannot account for all the traits of a culture pattern. As Dr. Huntington says: "On the intricate pattern thus laid out by geographical environment, man himself imposes still other irregularities, especially through the migration of people and ideas, through natural selection, and through the rise of men of genius with their inventions, reforms and other new ideas" (ibid., p. 281). Thus, according to Dr. Huntington, "physical environment appears to have little to do with the fact that for many centuries women wore trousers and men skirts in the interior of Turkey, while in France the reverse was the case. . . . On the other hand, the fondness of the South Chinese for rice and tea and of Englishmen for beef and mutton is closely connected with the geographical environment" (ibid., p. 194). In illustration of this thesis, he says that knife and fork are correlated with the Englishmen's beef-eating and the chop-stick with the Chinese rice-eating. "But the fact that the English table is high and is surrounded by chairs, while the Chinese table is so low that people can sit on the floor has no such obvious geographical relationships, and may have none at all" (ibid., p. 195). In passing, it is interesting to enquire if the Chinese eat pigs and poultry or any other kind of meat, and whether eating pork and chicken needed knife and fork even as the English eating of beef did. It is also noteworthy that the fork was not co-eval with meat-eating of the English, but is a comparatively recent invention. "A motion picture," says Professor R. H. Lowie, "quite correctly shows Henry the Eighth of England tearing a chicken apart with his bare hands. Until 1600 polite French society knew nothing of forks; in fact, the middle classes did not take to them until the eighteenth century. Thus, the Ona who siezes a lump of guanaco meat with his hands and tears off morsels with his teeth is only two hundred years behind the most advanced Caucasian nations. And these

were millennia behind the Chinese, who used ivory chopsticks in the Chou dynasty (1122-247), and wooden or bamboo ones before that. On the other hand, knives, spoons and ladles are widely spread on all levels of culture" (Lowie, *Cultural Anthropology*, p. 65).

Geographical environment does not, then, account for all traits of culture, particularly the non-material. Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedanism were born in a physical environment which has remained much the same. But even to the extent to which physical environment conditioned cultural pattern, the relation between the two has not remained constant. *Physical environment was more potent in the past than it is to-day, and is likely to be less in the future.* "For one of the striking features of modern civilization," says Dr. Dixon, "is the extent to which it is able to override environment and become independent of it" (Dixon, *The Building of Cultures*, p. 290). "The physical needs were, as a rule, those which were first met by inventions great and small and in bewildering number and variety. In many cases, the correlation with environment is clear. . . . But although many of the vast number of inventions here made are correlated in some degree with particular environments, and were devised to meet some local need, probably the majority are based not on regional but on universal needs and factors, and being independent of environment, are useful in Kalamazoo and Timbuctu as well. This tendency, recognizable also in the history of inventions as a whole, has, it would seem, significance for the future" (ibid., p. 291). The diffusion of culture independent of physical environment has progressed with increasing rapidity as the obstacles to the diffusion have been mitigated or eliminated. "On a scale wholly unprecedented, as we have seen, a type of culture originating, in the main, in one environment (that of Western Europe) is spreading into every kind of environment from the arctic to the tropics, from the stark deserts of the Sahara to the languorous strands of the South Seas. In marvellous fashion, however, this culture shows itself able to dominate environment, to build a Kalgoorlie in the heart of the pitiless desert, or carry the luxuries and sanitation of New York into the feverish jungles of Panama" (ibid., p. 301).

Even in earlier days, when man's control over nature was much



less than what it is to-day and diffusion was comparatively restricted by natural barriers, Europe and Asia were not two exclusive cultural areas. "The Old World—Eurasia and Africa and the long looped archipelagos and continental islands of the Pacific—forms one great unit, linked all through the tropics in a belt along which, from end to end, peoples and cultures have been free to drift at will. Throughout this vast area diffusion has been free to distribute, as it might, inventions and discoveries wherever made, and here on every hand its influence may be seen. Here, until the verge was reached, were no impassable seas; no deserts that could not be passed round; no barriers that man and his culture has not passed and repassed, sometimes again and again. Here the rise of Rome to greatness could enrich the silk-merchants of far-off China; send Roman guards to add brilliance to the courts of South Indian kings; build Roman baths in Britain; make Egypt and the Nile pay tribute, and, arousing the avarice of the northern hordes around the Baltic, lead them to move southward for plunder and conquest. But behind its barriers of three thousand miles or more of open sea the New World lay, immune, inviolate" (Dixon, *The Building of Cultures*, pp. 273-74). It is not necessary to pause here to examine whether or not there was diffusion as between the Old World and the New even in the earlier days; it is enough to note that East and West, meaning Asia and Europe, did not even in the days of ancient Rome form two different and exclusive cultural areas, each correlated with a particular physical environment.

To-day physical barriers to diffusion are less potent. Cultural traits have leaped such barriers. *To-day the whole world is a unit for the diffusion of culture.*

## *Pattern of Western Civilization*

ENVIRONMENT is not merely physical but cultural and social also. This includes social organizations, languages, religions, arts, sciences, conventions, beliefs, etc. When civilizations are classified into Eastern and Western, does each of these possess a pattern which is correlated with whatever is meant by East and West? Has there been a constant pattern of either of these civilizations during the time they have been Eastern and Western? Or is it the case that the patterns have been in a constant state of flux and change, so that each of these has any significance only when the date and time are mentioned? England, for instance, has been England for the last two thousand years and the civilization of the English people has been Western civilization. But the pattern has not been as constant; it has undergone continuous changes, so that a pattern is significant only for a particular period of time. Elizabethan civilization is very different from the Victorian and the post-World War civilization. Even during the shorter period since the Puritans came to America, the changes in the culture of America are striking. "Imagine yourself living in Boston in 1776," says Professor Malcolm M. Willey. "There would have been no fine city streets, nor seven-story buildings. There would have been no trolley cars nor automobiles. Newspapers were of the simplest kind, published once a week, and containing 'news' months old. Farm life prevailed. There would have been no factories and humming looms. No moving pictures would have existed to provide the evening's entertainment. In fact, life in Boston in 1776 would have been far more simple than it is even to-day in a remote New Hampshire farm community. At least the latter has the telephone, the radio, and the newspaper to bring contacts with distant centres.

"What is Boston to-day? A city of vast populations, tremendous industry, and busy factories, automobiles, steamships, trolley cars, and a thousand and more mechanical devices that were undreamed of in the earlier years. To the simple conditions of life of the Puritan fathers, all these material things have been added, bit by bit. . . . The simplicity of the colonial period both in material and non-material culture has been changed into bewildering complexity through the accumulation of innumerable traits" (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 557-58). The American, or rather the Boston, pattern of 1776 was very different from the American pattern of 1935. Both are American, but yet how very different! If a larger unit, Europe or the West, is taken into consideration, and a longer period of time, the differences will be found to have been even greater. The patterns are very different, though they are all said to be Western.

Not only has the pattern of culture changed while the unit of place and people and race remained constant, but the mutual relations between the various cultural traits which go to form a pattern have also changed. While some traits have remained more or less constant, others have undergone revolutionary changes. "The material civilization, in our own generation at least, multiplies and develops at prodigious speed. The automobile changes from a crude 'horseless wagon' to a superlative twelve-cylinder affair within a few short years. Patents are granted annually by the thousands. . . . Our customs, however, show no such rapid tendency to change. Our codes of morals are modified but slowly. We still use the ceremonies of our grand-parents. Our economic philosophy changes but little. At the same time our scientific knowledge is increasing at an accelerated speed" (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 579). *Thus not only is Western civilization—and for that matter, all civilizations—undergoing changes in its pattern, but the culture-complexes which go to form the pattern are undergoing differential changes.*

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that Professor M. M. Willey says that "rates of culture change vary in different areas all the way from the almost imperceptible change in small and primitive society

to the rapidity that characterizes our own" (ibid., p. 557). Is it true? Or *is it truer to say that certain traits in "our civilization" as well as in the "primitive society" are characterized by rapidity of change, while others in both are not?* In the previous paragraph Professor Willey referred to the differential rate of change of different traits in "our" civilization. He said that scientific knowledge was increasing at an accelerated speed, while economic philosophy changed but little. "Primitive societies" of Central Africa, on the other hand, are becoming Christians, driving automobiles, using modern rifles and undergoing rapid changes in some other aspects of culture. An Associated Press telegram, dated Papeete, Tahiti, July 29, 1935, which appeared in the *New York Times*, announces the opening on that day of the first beauty parlour in Papeete! The telegram says that automobiles, electric lights, telephones, refrigerators, and movies had already reached the place in a steady procession, and the latest innovation was the beauty parlour. Considering how long European civilization took to travel from the level represented by the Tahitian "primitives" of even a decade ago to the level it occupies to-day, the contemporary "primitives" have undergone very rapid changes in their civilization. But in some respects only. But that is so in European civilization as well. Science has recorded perhaps the most rapid change. And perhaps funeral ceremonies have undergone the least change.

There are those who contrast the "dynamic civilization of the West" with the "static civilization of the East." Professor Toynbee, however, thinks that the "Unchanging East" is a "catchword" which "collapses at a touch." And he continues: "We are left wondering how this vulgar error can ever have obtained its hold" (Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. I, p. 164). He imagines a Bagdadi boy who learns, through modern archaeological investigations, something of the civilization of the lake-dwellers of his own country in the ancient days of Ur and Babylon, and then goes to Switzerland. There he observes "with astonishment and delight that the pastoral life with which he is familiar from the books about the ancient lake-dwellers . . . is being lived, apparently unchanged, by the Swiss herdsmen of today! How different from Iraq, where

the disinterested vestiges of Ur and Babylon and Nineveh proclaim to any Bagdadi who sets eyes on them that, in his country, Life is a flux and history, a synonym for change. And now the Bagdadi has discovered the 'Unchanging West!'" (ibid., Vol. I, p. 167).

It seems, then, that *some traits in each and every civilization have at certain times changed more rapidly than others*. Characterizations about whole civilizations must take account of both the slow-moving and fast-moving traits in each, and arrive at an index figure, as it were, which will be the resultant of their differential rates of change. It is only then that civilizations may be compared. Without such indices, the comparison is vitiated because what are really being compared are some fast-moving traits in one with slow-changing ones in another.

On the whole, the *rate of progress seems to be a function of time rather than of space, or race, or of the East and the West*. Culture grows, as Professor Willey puts it, like "a dollar at compound interest in the bank" (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 572), slowly at first but later with every increasing acceleration. The contrast is not between a static, "unchanging" East and a dynamic and ever-changing West, but a comparatively static past and a dynamic present, both in the East and in the West. And that, too, in certain respects. Mr. Lothrop Stoddard testified that "throughout its huge length and breadth, Asia writhes in *utter revolution*. . . . This prodigious transformation is more sudden, more intense, and above all more complex than anything the West has ever known" (Stoddard, *Clashing Tides of Colour*, p. 191).

Not only do culture traits in Western civilization change at differential rates, but they seem to do so *independently of each other*. All the culture traits of the pattern are not linked together; some diffuse independently of each other. For instance, the White people acquired the tobacco and the corn culture complex from the American Indian, but not the whole pattern of his culture. Similarly, the American Indian acquired the horse complex from the Spanish, but not the whole pattern of Spanish culture. The English acquired several traits from the French, but not the whole French pattern of civilization. For instance, Professor Otto Jespersen says that

apart from the words *king* and *queen*, in the English language "all words relating to government and to the highest administration are French" (Jespersen, *Growth and Structure of the English Language*, p. 79). "Feudalism was imported from France" and "nearly all English expressions relating to that difficult science (heraldry) are of French origin" (ibid. p. 79). And so were the terms used in military matters and law, ecclesiastical matters, in art and sport and dress. "The French were the teachers of the English in most things relating to art" (ibid., p. 84). "From 1362 English was established as the official language in the courts of justice, yet the curious mongrel language known as 'Law French' continued in use there for centuries; Cromwell tried to break its power, but it was not finally abolished till an Act of Parliament of 1731" (ibid., p. 80, note). "The French led the fashion in the Middle Ages, just as they do to some extent now" (ibid., p. 83). Though the English were so greatly and in some respects intimately influenced and continue to be influenced by certain complexes in the French culture, they had not to take over the French pattern. Innumerable other examples may be given of culture traits of a pattern diffusing independently of others in the same pattern. Gunpowder and printing and tea were acquired by the West from China, but not Chinese religion or calligraphy or the other complexes of the Chinese cultural pattern. Regarding the independent diffusion of cultural traits, Messrs. H. E. Driver and A. L. Kroeber of the University of California observe as follows: "While we are not prepared to answer this question categorically, we believe that culture traits are in the main, if not in absolutely all cases, independent. This is because so many of them have been shown over and over again in all parts of the world and in all domains of culture, to occur at times dissociated even if at other times or places they are frequently or even preponderantly associated, that it becomes a fair inference, until contrary cases are demonstrated, that all traits can occur independently of each other" (Driver and Kroeber, *Quantitative Expression of Cultural Relationships*, pp. 212-13). And they claim that such is also the opinion of nine-tenths of competent and authoritative anthropologists.

If such be the case, *the concept of a pattern of Eastern or Western civilizations lacks precision as well as significance. A pattern which is constantly changing, the traits of which are also changing unequally and independently and which are not linked together in some constant relation, can hardly be a pattern with any significance: it is really a series of patterns and not a pattern.*

## *Pattern and Change*

NEVERTHELESS, a contrary view is often maintained. Not only that, but *it is even contended that the existing pattern conditions future development*. For instance, Professor Willey says: "Civilization cannot be conceived, it must be reiterated, as a collection of isolated traits. The traits and complexes all bear relation to each other, like the particles in the Kaleidoscope design. Consequently, new traits must be fitted in with what already exists" (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 535). Professor Clark Wissler takes the same view. He says that "the new trait that is offered must find something to fit into, otherwise it will be repulsed" (Wissler, *Man and Culture*, p. 190). As illustrations of the selective action of the prevailing pattern are mentioned the adoption of the horse and the rejection of the wheel by the Plains Indians of America, and the rejection of the "Russian agitator's economic ideas" in present-day America. Both the horse and the wheel were new traits to the Plains Indians. But they accepted the horse trait "because the horse was fitted into the older transportation complex," while "the wheel, a trait entirely foreign to their culture, the Indians refused to accept" (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 535). Is it the case that the Indians continued to reject the wheel even to this day and will continue to do so for ever in the future, or was there merely a lag in time between their acceptance of the horse and the wheel? If they have since taken kindly to the wheel, how was the prevailing pattern accommodated to this? The *New York Times Magazine* of July 14, 1935, contains an article on the new policy towards the Indians of Mr. John Collier, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The writer of the article, Mr. Frank Ernest Hill, says: "Some



Indians speak no English, are inexpert with tools and live in crude shelters; others have acquired modern houses and automobiles and serve as teachers, doctors, lawyers and storekeepers. . . . Unquestionably Indians generally are willing to use much of the White man's equipment and means to knowledge, but often are backward because their economic grip on life is a precarious one. Many of the tribes hold grants of land that is inferior or insufficient in extent, yet manage well with their facilities, and are deft as artisans and mechanics, sometimes eager for better tools, machinery and methods." The article is illustrated with three photographs which show the Indians at work with a caterpillar tractor, with horses and plough, and with wheeled vehicles. It is apparent that the pattern of culture of the Indians permitted the acquisition of the wheel and much else besides.

With reference to Russian communism and the United States, Professor Willey says: "One of the major patterns of our culture is materialism, with its capitalistic organization and profit seeking. This doctrine is firmly embedded in our social heritage. . . . Consequently when individuals from other lands, where economic pattern is differently developed, come to these shores and suggest modification of the prevailing economic patterns, their ideas are met with strongest of resistance. The traits or complexes which they seek to introduce are so at variance with our own dominating complexes, that were they accepted our own pattern would be demolished or badly disrupted. (At least so it is believed.) Hence the resistance to the so-called Bolsheviks and the I.W.W. Hence our distrust of the 'foreign agitator.' Hence much of the business man's fear of the trade union" (*ibid.*, p. 534). If, as Professor Willey would have it, "everything, in short, must conform to the pattern" (*ibid.*, p. 534), did the new Bolshevik culture complex conform to the then prevailing Russian pattern? And was there no resistance to it in Russia too? Was Bolshevism any less "entirely foreign" to the Russian pattern before the Revolution as it is to the United States to-day, or as the wheel was to the American Indians? If a new complex must fit into the prevailing pattern, culture will be static; the new will only replace the worn-out parts, as, for instance,

in an automobile. But as Professor Willey points out, "Culture is dynamic"; the "culture complexes clustering in any one area are constantly shifting, new traits and complexes are being added, and inner changes are taking place" (*ibid.*, p. 557). The pattern itself is in consequence dynamic. Rather, the old pattern changes, yielding place to a new.

The concept that each culture has a pattern and that new traits must fit into the old pattern accounts for the doubts regarding the fitness of non-Western civilizations for westernization, and the consequences of such acculturation. That new culture complexes should fit into the prevailing pattern or they will be resisted and rejected is "an important concept to bear in mind," says Professor Willey, "while studying civilizations. It enables one, for example, to understand the difficulties with which the so-called inferior races adjust themselves to the White culture that is engulfing them. One often hears it said with regard to the Indian, the Negro and the other primitive groups that they are slow to appreciate the advantages of the White man's civilization, and their failure to adopt it is cited as evidence of their non-adaptability and inferiority. . . . But such an attitude naïvely overlooks the very point we have been stressing. Many of the traits and complexes from White civilization with which the more primitive groups come in contact in no way fit into their own pattern of civilization. Hence they do not take over. People reject traits they do not understand or which do not fit into their scheme of things. We reject the Russian agitator's economic ideas. The Indian rejects our theory of law and morals. The principle is identical. The complexes do not fit the pattern, and consequently are resisted" (*ibid.*, p. 536).

The story of any civilization is, on the whole, one of accumulation of new culture traits and complexes, the widening of its "culture base." If a new trait had to conform to the prevailing pattern, that culture would be almost static and stagnant. To take the examples given by Professor Willey, it may be asked whether the Indian-corn complex was in conformity with the then prevailing pattern of the Europeans who took it over to Europe? Was Christianity in conformity with the then prevailing pattern when it spread

to Europe? Moreover, was responsible government in conformity with the previous pattern of the divine right of kings in England? Were trade unions, the Labour Party, and even a Labour Government in conformity with the previous pattern prevailing in England? Was Protestantism in conformity with the previous Roman Catholic pattern? Is the paganism in Germany under Herr Hitler in conformity with the previous pattern of religion in Germany? Was Bolshevism, both in its political and economic aspects, in conformity with the previous patterns under the czars? These are not the only instances of new traits and complexes which were not exactly in conformity with the existing culture patterns.

In all these cases certain individuals, often a small minority, felt dissatisfied with the existing patterns and sought changes, some of them so drastic as to be called revolutions. And the changes were brought about by persuasion, or by coercion when resistance was offered. In other cases, new cultural traits were accepted according as they met a need, added to human comfort and convenience, or gave pleasure, or were rejected for contrary reasons. In still other cases, new traits were forced on people. *But all these happened irrespective of their conformity with the then prevailing pattern of the whole group. Changes are generally promoted by those who stand to gain by them, and resisted by those who stand to lose by them, while they are viewed with indifference by still others who are not immediately affected by them.* And when the changes are incorporated, the existing pattern undergoes modifications and a new pattern is formed. People all over the world, irrespective of their previous cultural patterns, seem to accept readily material cultural traits, such as railways, automobiles, and other modern means of locomotion; telegraphs, telephones, wireless, and other means of rapid communication; gas and electricity for heating and lighting, newspapers, schools, cinemas and theatres, etc. They dislike taxes, though. Most do not change their religion and social customs so readily, if they do at all. The determining factor seems to be objective certainty. Those traits which are objectively certain and are not matters of subjective experience varying with individual personality tend towards universal diffusion. Mathematics, science, pure and applied,

and material straits have objective validity, and hence have universal appeal. Religion, art, literature, social customs have subjective validity, and are more restricted in their appeal. *The greater the objective validity of a culture trait, the greater its potentiality for diffusion; the greater its subjective validity, the less its potentiality for diffusion—if free to diffuse.*

Even in cases where the utility of a new trait is beyond doubt, some people fail to adopt it, not because it does not fit into the prevailing pattern, but because of inertia and conservatism or other cause. The United States, for instance, is noted for the extensive adoption of mechanical appliances and gadgets. Nevertheless, there are some who have not gone the same way. A news item in the *New York Times* of July 15, 1935, runs as follows: "Whiteside county is one of the most prosperous rural counties of Illinois, but a Survey by County Farm Adviser, P. H. Shuman, showed that among the 2,196 farm families in the Whiteside County 1,800 had no bath tubs, 1,743 still use oil-lamps, 800 farm homes have no kitchen sink, 750 still carry water to and from the kitchen, and 700 farm women have no washing-machine."

Whether a new trait will be accepted or not cannot be predicted with any confidence from the existing pattern. It can be known only after the event—when it has become history. Did the pattern of the culture of the Plains Indians, as it was, give sure indications that the horse complex would be adopted and not the wheel complex? Or, was it only after the event that an explanation was framed to suit the event? If the wheel also had been accepted, the explanation would have varied. The culture pattern of Russia under the czars at the beginning of the century did not foreshadow the Bolshevik Revolution. Nor can it be foretold that a similar revolution will not take place in other countries, or even that the Bolshevik culture pattern, now established in Russia, will last, and will not itself change in unpredictable ways. *The concept of pattern can be read into the past because it cannot change.* It has a pattern in so far as it is factual history. (Interpretive history is liable to change, depending on the interpreter.) The future of Western or Eastern civilization does not lend itself so readily and certainly to the

concept of a pattern. An eclipse may be predicted by a long time, but not a political situation, nor the most popular brand of tooth paste. "In all studies of social customs," says Dr. Ruth Benedict, "the crux of the matter is that the behaviour under consideration must pass through the needle's eye of social acceptance, and only history in its widest sense can give an account of these social acceptances and rejections" (Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, p. 232).

It may be noted in passing, however, that students of Marxism postulate economic determinism, and in consequence cultural determinism. It is not possible, perhaps it is not even necessary, to examine this view at length here, because, in the first place, the theory is concerned with the broad sweep of history, and not with its evolution in detail. It is perhaps more like the biologist's theory that evolution is from the simple to the complex. Even the biological theory of evolution is a generalization from the past rather than a prediction of the future. After *homo sapiens*, what next? Even the most profound authority on Marxism could not have foretold in 1900 what actually happened in 1906, in 1917, in 1921, and in 1935, even in Russia, much less in the other parts of the world. Nor can he foretell what will happen ten years later either in Russia or elsewhere.

Further, the Marxist theory is universal in its scope, and recognizes no East and no West, no race or colour. It postulates that certain economic conditions create certain cultural patterns, whether in the East or in the West.

## *Culture Pattern: Its Limitations*

THE concept of pattern is useful and valid only in so far as it postulates and reveals some constant correlations between the culture complexes that compose a pattern, so that given one of the correlating factors, the others may be predicted. If, for instance, a boat is seen, a sheet of water may be predicted; if people are seen in bathing costumes, a swimming-pool or a bathing-place can be predicted. The concept is valid only when, as Professor Willey says, "within every society the traits and complexes are arranged in combinations or 'patterns' that bear more or less definite relationship to each other" (Davis and Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 531). He elucidates the point further by stating that "the word *pattern*, as related to the *pattern* of any culture, embraces those elements or combinations of elements that make that civilization stand out from all others. The pattern of each civilization is unique; it is this pattern that enables us to distinguish one civilization from another" (ibid., p. 533). But in so far as a culture is dynamic, its component factors have no constant relationship. Independent change of the factors is fatal to a pattern; at any rate, it is no longer the same pattern. The pattern changes as fast or as slowly as its component parts change. And, inasmuch as change is more rapid to-day than it has been in the past in every civilization, patterns change more rapidly to-day than they did in the past. *Rate of change is a function of time, and not the characteristic of a special civilization. It is not a case of a slow-moving civilization versus a fast-moving one, but of a slow-moving past versus a more rapid-moving present and perhaps a faster-moving future, And this, too, with reference to some aspects of a civilization and not the whole of it.*

Another feature characteristic of a pattern is the mutual compatibility of the different components. Says Professor Willey: "Every civilization, composed of innumerable traits and complexes, is a unified whole in which all the complexes fit together and adjust to each other" (ibid., p. 533). "The word *adjustment* implies some kind of an harmonious relationship between two or more elements which are dynamic. If all things were unchanging, the problem of adjustment would disappear. It is because a change in one element, or set of elements, necessitates a change in a second set that difficulty arises" (ibid., p. 578). Since, however, "culture *is* dynamic" and culture complexes diffuse and shift independently of each other, the "various complexes are not always well adjusted to each other." "Furthermore, the larger the culture base, the greater will be the possibility of maladjustment. It is probably true that there are many more social problems in our own culture area than would be found in a simpler area" (ibid., p. 579).

One of the principal sources of such social maladjustments is the "culture lag." Cultural complexes "have different rates of growth, or grow at different rates at different times" (ibid., p. 579). And if one complex changes without a corresponding change in other dependent and related complexes, a cultural lag is occasioned and leads to maladjustment. "Sometimes the lag is not great, and the more slowly changing complex is soon adjusted to the complex that is changing more rapidly. Sometimes the dependent complex lags far behind and the adjustment is a matter of generations" (ibid., p. 580). Professor Willey gives several striking examples of social maladjustments due to cultural lag. The most illuminating of them is the status of women and the Negro. "In an age when agricultural family was the unit, life naturally centred primarily in the home. The man tilled the soil and raised the produce. The woman ran the house, which usually included spinning and weaving cloth, and making it into clothes, preparing the foods, churning the butter, dipping the candles, and many other items of labour entirely unknown to the city woman of to-day. There were no bakery shops, canned goods, nor delicatessens. Each family produced largely for itself, and the woman had no small part in that system of produc-

tion. Also, it was the mother's duty to teach and train the children, for there were no public schools. With such a background, it is readily understood how the mores centred in the concept that the woman's place is in the home. Under such a scheme of life, it was. The agricultural environment with all that it involved and the mores of the women were well adjusted. Then came the tremendous change represented in the industrial revolution and the development of city life. Large-scale production in factories replaced the simpler home industry. One by one the older tasks of the women were taken away from her. She no longer spun her cloth and sewed the clothes. Neither was she required to do all her baking and preserving, for foodshops and canning factories did it more efficiently than she could. The public school relieved her of her function as a teacher. At the same time, there were opportunities in the outer world. The factories called for workers, education opened up the possibility of careers, and financial independence actually became a reality for women. Changed material conditions—the introduction of the factory and loom and city life—made necessary a re-adaptation of the old mores. Women's place was, strictly speaking, no longer entirely in the home unless she wished it to be.

"But have the mores and folkways changed? Have the non-material traits—the attitudes towards women—been modified to meet the changed conditions? As a matter of fact, women themselves, as Dr. Pruette has amply shown, are torn between the new desire to go out into the world and the old mores which tend to pull them back into the monotonous life of the home. Here is clearly a problem growing out of the different rates of growth of the two associated complexes. One set of traits *lags* behind the development of the other" (ibid., p. 581).

"The so-called race problem develops from a similar maladjustment. This is especially true with regard to the Negro. From the time of his unwilling advent to this country, the Negro has been regarded as an inferior group. The slave psychology has had us in its grip. This attitude towards the Negro perhaps is not unnatural. He was the servant, he was unlettered, he was without cultural accomplishment when compared with our own—he was culturally



less developed. Our attitude towards him, our adjustments, were upon the basis of this status. The new Negro is now arising, adapting himself to the white man's pattern, and actually contributing to the cultural development it represents. There are talented, educated Negroes in large numbers. Having been given a half-hearted political status, the Negro is now bidding for cultural status. But the old attitudes of the white group persist. In spite of his accomplishment, the Negro finds the white man regarding him still as the inferior and resenting the cultural advance. The actual Negro cultural development on the one side has outstripped the white attitudes towards the Negro achievement on the other. There is a lag. There is a social problem—a cultural, not a racial problem" (ibid., p. 583).

In the two examples given above, the one based on sex difference and the other on race difference, the results are similar: there is a lag between the developments of associated cultural complexes, and instead of harmony, there is disharmony and conflict. If the cultural complexes cease to undergo further changes, an harmonious adjustment may be reached in time. But as long as they continue to change independently and at different rates, maladjustments and conflicts are bound to occur. It is to be noted that in the examples quoted above, new complexes were not in conformity with the old patterns, nor did even associated complexes change in step, as it were. Also, the change from agricultural to industrial economy, from slave to free status, are not characteristic of the West or of the East, but are universal. Whatever be the country or the group, agricultural economy brings about certain cultural complexes and the industrial certain others; slavery produces certain results and freedom others. There is as much sense in asking if women and Negroes are *fit* for industrial economy and emancipation as there is in enquiring if Americans are *fit* for them either, and if the East should be westernized or the West easternized.

It is sometimes said that the concept of pattern has greater validity in the case of the so-called primitive people. Folk culture, as distinguished from "modern stratified society," is said to possess "essential homogeneity" (Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, p. 55). It is presumed that "primitive" culture has undergone fewer changes; has

been more or less static. But it is admitted that many of the so-called "primitive" peoples have elaborate and complex ritual. "The Zuni," says Dr. Benedict, "are a ceremonious people," whose "interest is centred upon their rich and complex ceremonial life," which "requires the memorizing of an amount of word-perfect ritual that our less trained minds find staggering and the performance of neatly dovetailed ceremonies that are charted by the calendar and complexly interlock all the different cults and the governing body in endless formal procedure" (ibid., pp. 59-60). Is it to be presumed that all this complex ceremonial, as well as all the other complexes that go to form the "pattern" of the Zuni culture, appeared at the dawn of Zuni history fully formed, like a biological mutation, or like Pallas Athene, and that it remained unchanged since its birth till to-day? Or would it be truer to presume that it grew and developed in time? Its history may not be available in the records in the libraries of Europe and America. Much of the information available refers to the pattern as and when it was observed by travellers and investigators—a static view. But if successive surveys of the primitive cultures for the last thousand years were available as in the case of Europe, they would have thrown light on the question whether the cultures underwent changes or remained static, or whether it was our knowledge of them that has been static.

But whatever that may be in the case of "primitive" tribes, the concept of a culture pattern as applied to Western Civilization and Eastern Civilization is of little significance. As Dr. Benedict says, "*Western civilizations, with their historical diversity, their stratification into occupations and classes, their incomparable richness of detail, are yet not well understood to be summarized under a couple of catchwords*" (ibid., p. 54). "In the retrospect it may be possible to characterize adequately a great and complex whole like Western Civilization, but in spite of the importance and the truth of Spengler's postulate of incommensurable destiny of ideas, at the present time the attempt to interpret the Western world in terms of any one selected trait results in confusion" (ibid., p. 55). And when the selected basis is so intangible and elusive as the "West," it is worse than confusion.

With reference to the "Western" and "Eastern" Civilizations, the concept of "culture area" as well as of "cultural pattern" seem to have little significance. "There is a tendency among sociologists to waste time over the 'culture area concept.' There is, properly speaking, no such concept. When traits group themselves geographically, they must be handled geographically. When they do not, it is idle to make a principle out of what is at best a loose empirical category. In our civilization there is, in the anthropological sense, a uniform cosmopolitan culture that can be found in any part of the globe, but there is likewise unprecedented divergence between the labouring class and the Four Hundred, between those groups whose life centres in the church and those whose life centres on the race-track. The comparative freedom of choice in modern society make possible important voluntary groups which stand for as different principles as the Rotary Clubs and Greenwich Village. *The nature of the cultural processes is not changed with these modern conditions, but the unit in which they can be studied is no longer the local group*" (ibid., p. 230). On account of the divergences of culture-complexes at any one time and the changes in the complexes in time, Western Civilization conveys no definite and uniform ideas; different persons at different times attach different meanings.

In the foregoing discussion it is important to note the distinction drawn between culture-pattern and culture-complex. The latter is a more or less intimate and constant association of culture-traits, while the former is a combination of culture-complexes, the whole of culture. While the horse and harness is each a culture-trait, together they form a culture-complex. Christianity, the cross, the church, and redemption through Jesus Christ form a complex. The steel industry, the rubber industry, the mineral oil industry, and the automobile industry form a complex. But Christianity, the automobile, the radio, baseball, dressing for dinner, smoking, writing a will, practising at the bar, and faith in astrology form a pattern, but not a complex. Some may be present without the others, and each can spread independently of the others.

## *Moral Values in East and West*

It will be recalled that one of the contrasting connotations of Eastern and Western Civilizations referred to moral qualities and values. It was held that the moral values of the East were different from those of the West, and hence there was a conflict between the two. It would seem, however, that the fundamental moral values are universal, and know no East or West. Truth, justice, mercy, kindness, charity, and such like moral qualities are valued by all; and falsehood, injustice, cruelty, and uncharitableness are condemned by all. These do not vary with race, or area, or sex, or caste, or East or West. The contrast is not between the East and the West, *but between those who profess them and those who practise them.*

There are those, however, who insist that moral values are a function of a culture and vary with each culture. A virtue in one group may be a vice in another. An example was furnished at the Seminar-Conference of Education in the Pacific held in Honolulu in July 1936. "In American Samoa native servants are branded by many of the Navy wives as thieves because they take food home from the ice-chests to their relatives. But the Samoan servant is being honourable according to his own culture. The great thesis of Samoan life is that if there is food and a hungry person, the honourable man will bring them together. Was the boy right or wrong? There is no answer. He was right in Samoan morals, wrong in American morals" (Felix M. Keesing, *Education in Pacific Countries*, p. 40). But is it true? Is it not true that American morals require that the starving man should be fed, even if meant taxing the rich? What else is poor relief, famine relief, unemployment

relief, and a thousand other social services rendered by the State, as distinct from private organizations? Even in America the hungry may not be left to starve and die if there is food anywhere within reach. The difference between Samoa and America may be that in the first case the relation between the recipient of relief and the taxpayer is more direct than in the second, where there are a number of intermediate steps to pass through, like the State, the tax-gatherer, and the executive organization for relief; there is a *difference in the organization of relief, but not in values*. Food and the hungry person must and are being brought together in America as in Samoa.

Granting that an act which is honourable in the eye of a Samoan is criminal in the eye of an American, does it follow that there is a difference in the values that they both prize? Is it not considered good and noble and virtuous in America to share one's goods with those less endowed, and even spend oneself in the service of others, and that food and the hungry should be brought together? Are not the virtues which the American prizes the same as the ones that the Samoan prizes, with this difference, that while the Samoan lives up to his moral values, the American does not? In so far as the moral values of the American are "Christian," both he and the Samoan *profess* Christian morals. But while the heathen and primitive Samoan *lives up* to his Christian ideals, the Christian and civilized American avows them only in theory, but *denies them in practice*. And it seems strange that civilized Christian missionaries, professing Christian communism but practising anti-Christian individualism, should attempt to Christianize and civilize the heathen barbarian who *lives* Christian communism without professing it? If practice is better than precept, the heathen is a better Christian than the Christian.

There are still others who confuse moral values with particular applications thereof, such as customs and manners, and hold that moral values are relative to cultures. For instance, it was pointed out that a Melanesian widow had to wear continuously the bones of her husband slung round her neck, and Eton and Oxford defined "good form" for the Englishman. It has already been pointed out that habits and tastes and customs are innumerable,

and that each has a smaller culture area than, say, a culture trait belonging to the physical science group. *Within the same culture group, in the current accepted sense, these applications of moral values vary from time to time.* In the same culture long skirts were good at one time, short at another; it was improper to disclose ladies' heels at one time, it was quite proper at another; divorce was wrong at one time, but quite proper since; burning of women as witches was proper at one time, it is very improper now; marrying a deceased wife's sister was bad at one time, it is quite proper now. While thus the applications vary from time to time and are a function of time, the fundamental values are constant. One must do the correct thing and avoid the incorrect; do the just act and avoid the unjust; be kind rather than cruel; be noble than be ignoble; and so on.

It would seem, then, that in so far as moral values are concerned, they are not only of universal application in space, but also in time; they are coextensive, coterminal, and coeval with civilization. *Arranged in the order of universality in time and space, moral values come first with maximum universal diffusion in time and space. Then come the physical sciences, a function of time with universal diffusibility in space; then the social sciences, a function of time with limited diffusibility, and finally the fine arts, a function of time with even more limited diffusibility.*

## *Westernization and Modernization*

VERY frequently Western Civilization is used in the sense of modern civilization. There is the implication that the West is modern and the East is ancient; and the westernization of the East means the modernization of the East. The only sense in which a civilization can be said to be modern is that its culture complexes have had a recent, modern, origin. The West has radios and telephones, which were recently invented, and hence the West is modern. But it is not every home or individual in the West, however, that has to-day the radio or the telephone. Are such ancient and Eastern? The West is Christian, and Christianity is some two thousand years old. Is the West modern, or ancient and Eastern? Modernization, in the sense of the adoption of culture traits invented in recent times, is going on both in the West and the East; both are being westernized, though in both there are many culture traits which are ancient and Eastern.

Modernization cannot be good for the West and bad for the East. Certain culture traits, whether ancient or modern, are good and others bad, and their values fluctuate in time. The use of poison gas in war is modern but bad; slavery was ancient but bad; the wheel was ancient and good; the telegraph is modern and good. Modernization is good or bad according to the culture trait concerned, and not according as the culture area is East or West.

## PART IV





## *Critique of Current Concepts*

IN view of the admittedly inadequate character of this study, only very tentative conclusions are permissible. If Western Civilization is that civilization which all or the great majority of the people of the West through the ages shared in common, but which they have not shared with the East; and, contrariwise, if Eastern Civilization is that civilization which all or the great majority of the people of the East have through the ages shared in common, but which they have not shared with the West, then there seems to be no justification for the dichotomous division of civilization into Eastern or Western. Whatever significance and correlations other bases of classification may have, this seems to have none. Western Civilization conveys no definite meaning and has no definite cultural correlations.

Neither Western Civilization nor Eastern is correlated with any specific geographical or climatic environment. Nor is it correlated with any particular religion; most Westerners are Christian, but all Christians are not Westerners.

The notion that Western and Eastern Civilizations are either complementary or contradictory or conflicting seems to have no justification. Certain culture traits are neutral to, or contradictory of, or complementary to, others. Western Civilization is not correlated with science, mechanization, nationalism, democracy, materialism, secularism, speed, change, progress, mass education, universal suffrage, monogamy, sex-equality, individualism, industrialism, inventions and inventiveness, comfort, honesty, directness in speech and thought, religious toleration, reign of law, optimism, humanity, kindness, charity, sports, prosperity, high-standard of living,

courage of convictions and character. And Eastern Civilization is not correlated with the opposite ideals, institutions, and qualities. All of these opposing sets occur in both the cultural areas, the East and the West.

The proportions of these traits are not constant either in the West or the East, or as between the West and the East. There is no reason to suppose that, for instance, the West had always more science than religion, or that it was always ahead of the East in science.

Western Civilization or Eastern Civilization is not coextensive and coterminous with its culture area, the West or the East; nor has it been constant since it was designated as such. Western Civilization or Eastern Civilization, whatever it may mean, has no pattern; much less a pattern which was set at the dawn of civilization, and which has since conditioned its development with an "iron hand." The concept of a pattern, whatever be its validity in other matters, has little or no validity or significance when applied to Western Civilization or Eastern Civilization. Each of these is not an integrated pattern, the component parts of which have a definite, harmonious and constant relation to one another. The component parts are constantly undergoing changes, each in its own way and at its own rate, thereby causing cultural lags and maladjustments. In terms of the pattern concept, Western Civilization or Eastern Civilization is a series of patterns rather than a pattern.

The only factor of Western Civilization which appears to be coextensive and coterminous with its area and coeval with its duration is the racial factor, correlated with the "White" complexion. But there is no real correlation between race and civilization.

The concept of culture-area with reference to Western or Eastern Civilization is hardly applicable. *Each culture complex has its own culture area, which, however, fluctuates in time* and cuts across other culture areas. International organizations, pure and applied science, and news transcend the culture-area limits of the East and the West, and have a wider and ever-widening culture-areas. Languages and literatures, nationalities, particular habits, customs and superstitions have smaller culture-areas than either the West or the

East. Certain culture traits have culture-areas restricted to one person alone. For instance, the organizing genius and moving eloquence of Mr. Lloyd George are his own.

The concept of integrated culture gains in validity only as we go back in time and as we narrow the culture-area. With the advance of time and the enlargement of the area, culture becomes more varied and more complex, and the pattern breaks up into a series of patterns. Professor Toynbee attempts to delimit the culture-area, the "intelligible field of historical study," which included England. He finds that in the economic plane, the culture-area to-day is "coextensive with the whole habitable and navigable surface of the planet" (Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. I, p. 30). On the political plane, the culture-area is again world-wide, though not to the same extent, inasmuch as England's political relations with Latin America and Eastern Europe are not so intimate. In what he calls the "cultural plane," the culture-area is very much smaller. "It is confined to the countries occupied by Catholic and Protestant peoples in Western Europe and America and the South Seas" (*ibid.*, p. 31).

This is the situation to-day. It was different in the days gone by. "As we take further cross-sections at earlier dates," says Dr. Toynbee, "we find that, on all three planes, the geographical limits of the society which we are examining contract progressively (*ibid.*, p. 32). He examines the situation in A.D. 1675 and A.D. 1475 and A.D. 775. The culture-area contracts progressively, but the coincidence between the three planes increases. "In a primitive cross-section, taken about A.D. 775," says Dr. Toynbee, "the boundaries shrink still further on all three planes, while becoming still more closely coincident as between one plane and another (*ibid.*, p. 32).

To-day, with a very much more complicated civilization, with an ever-widening culture-base, and with unprecedented methods of and inducements for rapid diffusion, culture-areas as large as the West and the East mean no less than the world as a culture-unit. Western Civilization, Eastern Civilization, and World Civilization mean about the same thing; they cannot be distinguished. The difference between them is something like tweedledum and tweedledee!

Under the circumstances, questions regarding the westernization of the East or the easternization of the West or the westernization of non-Western civilizations, of the good and evil results arising from such acculturation, do not arise. They do not lend themselves to answering any more than whether tweedledum is good for tweedledee.

*There is no meaning in asking whether the "West" should be "easternized" with respect to porcelain, tea, printing, paper, gunpowder invented by the Chinese; with respect to discoveries of the Hindus and Arabs in mathematics, science, and philosophy. Similarly, there is no meaning in enquiring whether the "East" should be "westernized" with respect to the philosophies of Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer, Spinoza and Dewey, the economics of Adam Smith and Marx, the scientific discoveries of Galileo, Newton, Darwin, and Einstein.*

Each of these traits was invented by a genius who in one case was a citizen of China, in another of India, of Arabia, of Greece, of Germany, the United States and England. But he did not invent it because he was a citizen of China or other; his genius was not shared by others, and the invention was not the product of a national or racial group. China has had many millions of citizens before then, and since. None of them, except those who had previously laboured in the same field as the inventor and made the latter's work possible, is entitled to share the credit of his invention. Printing was the gift of an individual inventor to the world; he happened to be a citizen of China. It was not the creation of all the Chinese of the day. Both Chinese and non-Chinese who have since used printing had to learn from him. And so with the rest.

If in Asia and Africa and in Europe railroads, telegraph and telephone systems were built by Westerners, it was not because they were Westerners, but because they were engineers and some of them geniuses in that line. It is not enough to be a White man to be able to build railways. At first all railroad engineers were Whites. To-day there are Japanese, Chinese, Indian and Turkish engineers as well as White engineers; and there may be African engineers to-morrow, if they are not there to-day.

Whether acculturation is good or bad depends on the nature of the culture-complex and the use made of it. Tea, silks, paper and printing, decimals and mathematics, automobiles, machines and good roads are as agreeable to all of the West or the East. On the other hand, industrial slums, poverty, gangsterism, lynching, war, inquisition, persecution, exploitation by other groups are as equally objectionable to all in the East and the West.

What any individuals of the East or the West accept can be known only after the event, when it has become history; there is no organic law of the cultural evolution of the East or the West which could foretell their behaviour.

Civilization grows by the accumulation of culture-traits and complexes. Every new trait has to be invented at least once. It then diffuses. And genius is basic to invention. Genius is a biological accident; it is individualistic; it is not a group character. A genius is very often indebted to the discoveries made by his predecessors in his particular line; each invention is the crown of a series of inventions made earlier, but no invention is the work of a number of individuals of a race, a language, a nationality, etc. The creator of a particular invention may be a White man, but the invention has no racial correlation either in its creation or diffusion. Everybody other than the creator has to acquire it by imitation. And diffusion is not limited by race.

Most people of every racial or other group acquire their culture by imitation of the inventions of the creators, past and contemporary. The few create; the many imitate. While genius of varying order is required to create new traits, the same order of genius is not needed to imitate and copy them. No race, as a racial unit, is so lacking in intelligence as to be unable to copy what a genius of another race invented. The creative geniuses are always a small minority, even if they all were White. The creations of the White geniuses are equally available to both the Whites and non-Whites to imitate and copy. Marconi gives the radio to the world, East and West; it is not Italy or the West that gave it to England or the East. Some Chinaman invented paper and gave it to all whom it may concern; it was not China or the East that gave it to Japan or the West.

No new invention is indigenous to one group and exotic to another; every invention is new to every group at first; and it becomes indigenous when accepted and among those who accepted it. The distinction is between new and old, and not between something indigenous to one group and exotic to another.

A number of individuals who have a culture complex in common and constitute a group need not necessarily have other culture complexes in common. Those who own automobiles need not necessarily be Christians or anthropologists.

Every new trait anywhere upsets the existing adjustment or balance of civilization; it is not true that a new trait may fit into Western Civilization, but upset the balance of Eastern Civilization.

It is not a question of Western Civilization being good or bad for the East, but of particular culture complexes being good or bad for either. It is not a case of one man's meat being another man's poison, but of what is sauce for the goose being sauce for the gander.

In so far as two or more distinctive civilizations are postulated, one of them cannot acquire the other; both can acquire what is universal. The same individuals cannot at the same time be members of the Harvard and the Yale University Football teams, because they are mutually exclusive, but the members of both can belong to the American Football Association, which can be common to both. In so far as an individual is a member of Eastern Civilization or of Greek Civilization, he cannot be a member of Western Civilization or Chinese Civilization; he can acquire only what can be common to both and is universal.

Under such circumstances there is no meaning in speaking of Western and Eastern Civilizations, much less in speaking of them as mutually opposed since the dawn of civilization. There is no meaning in saying that each should develop along its own lines and seek its fulfilment in so doing.

## *Differential Diffusion of Culture Complexes*

IF, as has been contended in this thesis, civilization consists of numerous culture traits and complexes, each one of which is the creation of an individual and not of a group, and diffusion is not from one culture group to another but from the individual inventor to the numerous imitators, the question naturally arises as to why all culture traits and complexes have not a uniform and universal diffusion. Granting the concept of a Western Civilization and the westernization of the East, all the numerous culture traits of Western Civilization have not had a uniform diffusion in the East. Some culture traits, like the use of matchsticks, have become universal or almost so; but not Christianity or Shakespeare. The cinema has had a wider diffusion than archaeology; machinery more than the Rotary Clubs; and so on. All the creations of even the same inventor have not had uniform diffusion: the chemical contributions of Joseph Priestley have had a wider currency than his contributions to theology. There is thus a differential diffusion of different culture traits or complexes.

This differential diffusion depends, it would seem, not on the compatability of the new trait with the existing pattern, nor the race of the imitator, but very largely on the *validity and utility of the culture complex itself*. Culture complexes may broadly be divided into the physical sciences, the social sciences and the fine arts, both pure and applied. Culture-traits of the first group have wider diffusion than of the second; the second wider than the third. Because of their objective validity, the culture-traits of the first group tend to have universal diffusion; because of their subjective



validity the fine arts tend to have restricted diffusion; and the social sciences, which share to some extent the objective validity of the physical sciences and the subjective validity of the fine arts, have an intermediate diffusion. Mathematics, astronomy and the other physical sciences, pure and applied, have a maximum of objective validity and hence tend to have universal diffusion, if diffusion be unrestricted by other causes. Fine arts, on the other hand, have a maximum of subjective validity and hence tend to have a comparatively restricted diffusion, even if free to diffuse. Two and two will make four to all, irrespective of race, nationality, language, religion or intelligence quotient. Similarly, the laws of physics and chemistry, of astronomy and mathematics, of engineering and agriculture, are of universal validity. So also, good roads and bridges, cinemas and radios, matches and automobiles, railroads and buses, have universal validity and, therefore, acceptance. On the other hand, not all the members of a race, religion, profession, language, or geographical area like the same book, the same song, the same poem, the same building, the same clubs, the same clothes, or share the same tastes and superstitions. Not even the members of the same family, not even twins who have the maximum identity of human personality, share the same tastes. Nor does the same person share the same taste as a child and as an adult. As a child, he was thrilled with *Æsop's Fables*; as an adult he reads Aldous Huxley. Why, in the same day the subjective validity of a trait for one and the same person may change in a few minutes. The song which thrilled him at first will pall on him if repeated often. The song is the same; the same gramophone record repeated the same song in identical tones; but its validity has changed. Its validity was subjective, and it has changed. The social sciences, as has been said above, are betwixt and between the physical sciences and the fine arts; they are partly objective and partly subjective in their validity; their diffusion also is intermediate between the diffusion of the physical sciences and the fine arts. Social sciences are largely matters of opinion, and individuals will continue to differ on matters of opinion. Almost every opinion will have its proponents and its opponents.

The diffusability of a culture complex depends on its validity. A culture complex having the maximum objective validity has maximum diffusibility; another having a maximum of subjective validity will have minimum diffusibility. In other words, the greater the objective validity, the greater the diffusibility; the greater the subjective validity the less the diffusibility. Valid truth is one; valid opinions several; valid tastes are innumerable. Science is one and superstitions many.

The rate of diffusion depends on the facilities, physical and other, for diffusion. A culture-trait may have maximum of objective validity, like safety matches, but physical barriers like mountains, oceans and deserts, or legal barriers, may prevent its universal diffusion. But if these barriers are overcome, they diffuse. The Negro in the Southern States of the U.S.A. can vote, if not prevented.

Another factor that influences diffusibility is utility of the culture-trait or complex. Those which meet the fundamental physical and biological wants will have the widest diffusion, while those which satisfy aesthetic tastes will have limited circulation. Biological needs are few in number, and each is universal in demand; aesthetic tastes are many in number, and each is limited in appeal.

Another factor that accounts for differential diffusion is the lag in time. Since every culture trait is created by an individual and has to diffuse from him to others there is always a culture lag. Some individuals will acquire it earlier than others. Different culture-traits have different rates of radiation, and the culture lags will, therefore, vary from trait to trait.

There is no single centre for the creation of all culture-traits; different traits were and are created at different places at different times, and each is diffusing at different speeds. It is like the radio programmes in the air on any day. From a large number of stations all the world over individual speakers or singers are creating talks and songs; the individuals' voices are carried over the world, criss-crossing the voices proceeding from other places and from other individuals; and all those who have suitable receiving sets can hear any station they choose. Each voice has at any moment a circle of

listeners which may encompass the whole world or only a part of it. It is not a case of a country, say the U.S.A., speaking and another country, say England, listening; but one voice speaking in the U.S.A., and millions, both in the U.S.A. and England and other countries as well, listening in. The creative voice is one; the listening area extends to all who have a receiving set in any part of the world.

*The one creates, the many receive.*

## *Process of Acculturation*

THOSE who adopt the dichotomous division of civilization do not consistently mean it. They have really in view the questions of speed of change and of the voluntary or compulsory character of acculturation. Some people prefer slow rate of change and change in one culture-complex after another, instead of a rapid change on all fronts. They prefer the evolutionary to the revolutionary pace. Should, for instance, modern industrialism be introduced in an hitherto non-industrial area with such speed as to drive out of their occupations large numbers of artisans who are so far advanced in life that they cannot readily change over from their previous vocation to the new, and must, therefore, suffer much privation and misery? Or should the progress of industrialization be so adjusted as to minimize such dislocation? Should, for another instance, full democracy be introduced at one stroke among a people who at the time were governed autocratically, or should it be introduced in homoeopathic doses? Should, for yet another instance, the religious faiths of peoples be disturbed by the rapid introduction of another religion or of scientific knowledge, or should such acculturation be controlled as to ensure a smooth change by being spread over a long period?

But these questions are as relevant in the West as in the East. All change anywhere disturbs the existing equilibrium, and it is a universally applicable question whether an evolutionary or revolutionary change should be permitted, granting, of course, that the change can be controlled.

The other question is whether a change should be voluntary on the part of the people who are to undergo the change, or whether one group which has political or other power over another should

use its power and prestige to force the change on the subject group. Should acculturation be voluntary or compulsory? Should it be dependent on the appreciation of the innovation on its merits in comparison with the old trait it is to replace, or on the power and prestige of the governing group? In the latter case, there is the danger that traits which are good on their own merits and which the governing group itself might copy from the subject group might be destroyed and replaced by inferior ones of the governing group.

But this, too, is a universal problem. Should Nazi culture be forced on the Germans? Should Fascist culture be forced on the Italians? Should Communist culture be forced on the Russians? Should democracy be forcibly replaced by dictatorships in certain European States? Should force or fraud or prestige be used to propagate religion and other beliefs? Should citizens be conscripted for an imperial war?

A discussion of the merits of revolution or evolution or of consent or compulsion in promoting change is not relevant to the present discussion; the relevant question is whether these problems distinguish Western from non-Western Civilizations, or whether they are of a universal nature.

It may be observed, in passing, that, as regards speed of change, ontogeny may be a recapitulation of phylogeny, but it does not take the same time. Each generation starts where the previous one left off, and not directly from the bottom of the culture-ladder. Acculturation is at the top-level already attained. In the fields of "Western" education, religion and material culture, like dress and articles of trade, White teachers, missionaries and tradesmen have not asked the "primitives" to undergo a probation of centuries, but acculturated them at the most modern level, so that the acculturated "primitives" covered centuries in a very short time. But when it comes to self-determinism, self-government and parliamentary and free institutions for the non-White peoples, the Whites have often held that long tutelage under White masters was essential, for did not England take centuries to develop such institutions? Apparently, it is quicker for the "primitive" heathen to bridge the great chasm of centuries in spiritual matters, and become Christians, than to

imbibe such temporal traits as democracy. Spiritual growth can be very rapid, but political growth must be very slow, as slow as the White masters choose.

There is a third group of people who, when they speak of the clash between Eastern and Western Civilizations, do not mean change by evolution or revolution, by consent or coercion, but just a clash of race. The clash is between those who assert and those who contest, the claim that a White man, just because he is a White man and for no other reason, is and must be superior, politically and economically, to the non-White. It is a racial conflict, and not a conflict of civilizations, for the conflict does not necessarily extend to languages, religions, superstitions, customs, habits, arts and literatures, social and cultural organizations, any more than in the West itself. It is not between the Civilizations of the East and the West, but between the claim to racial privileges and the claim to racial equality in the economic and political fields.

## *Coincidence and Correlation*

In the past it was perhaps natural that race and space should be linked with civilization. All organized knowledge is the classification of individual facts according to resemblances and differences, in order to deduce generalizations, so that one concept comprehends a large number of individual facts. Among the multiplicity of facts some constants are sought round which to group other facts. Such obvious factors as place, race, sex and birth temptingly offer themselves as the nuclei round which to group other characteristics, as the bases for cultural alignments. *Culture complexes which were found together at some time by historical accident were thought to be correlated permanently into a pattern. Historical accidents were taken for sociological laws.* Whole sets of culture-complexes were built round these biological and geographical bases. Women's civilization was different from men's; civilization of one race different from that of another; and the civilization of the high-born from that of the low-born; the civilization of Europe different from that of Asia.

But in reality there seems to be no correlation between race or sex or birth and culture, as the democratic philosophy of to-day freely acknowledges. It is true that a man cannot be a mother, nor a woman a father. This is a biological, immutable factor, good for all time. It is historically true that women had an inferior status, were kept out of education and public life and professions, were considered incapable of undertaking these tasks and were made subservient to men. But, as is now freely acknowledged, there is no organic correlation between the female sex and these historical culture-complexes. To-day the unscientific and accidental character of this relation has been recognized, and sex is increasingly losing

significance in the field of culture. Coincidences are being distinguished from correlations.

Similarly, birth determined culture-forms. The patrician and plebeian, the master and slave, the lord and the commoner, castes and classes based on the accident of birth, had each a culture of its own. That was again purely historical accident, and not a cultural correlation.

So, too, in the case of race. Civilization has been correlated with race, but such justification as it has is only historical. It is merely a recital of past history, and not the expression of an organic law which pre-determines cultural evolution.

In his penetrating analysis of the "Concept of Race" in *Harper's Magazine* (May 1935), Professor Julian Huxley notes that "in spite of the work of the geneticist and anthropologist, there is still a lamentable confusion between the ideas of *race*, *culture* and *nation*. In this respect, anthropologists themselves have not been blameless, and therefore the formidable amount of loose thinking on the part of the writers, politicians and the general public is not surprising." And he concludes: "It would be highly desirable if we could banish the question-begging term 'Race' from all discussions of human affairs and substitute the non-committal phrase 'ethnic group.' That would be the first step towards the rational consideration of the problem at issue."

The same may be said of the concepts of Eastern and Western Civilizations, or of similar type of concepts like British, French, American, Chinese, Arabian, Negro and Indian Civilizations. They are not only unilluminating but invalid and confusing even when used only in a purely descriptive sense, without implying any correlations. A house or a road may be known by a name or a number, but the name or the number is merely descriptive, and not correlative. It does not mean that house No. 1 is inhabited by the first citizen or mayor of the town. Robinson road does not mean that all the citizens in that road are Robinsons; there may not be even a single Robinson there now. "Football" is the name given to a game played in the U.S.A., notwithstanding that the foot is very occasionally used to play the ball with!



Similarly, East and West may be used as compendious words to describe certain geographical areas like Asia and Europe, certain racial characteristics like brown and white, certain political institutions like autocracy and democracy, certain social customs like freedom and subjection of women, certain mental attitudes like scientific and scholastic, and certain moral values, like good and bad. But when a correlation between these sets of physical, biological, political, economic, social, mental and moral factors is asserted when it is said that Oriental has, or is fit for, only Oriental Civilization, and the Occidental has, or is fit for, only Occidental Civilization; and when it is asked if Western Civilization or education is good for the Easterner or *vice versa*; and when such concepts are used to justify the restriction or denial of human rights and opportunities, much mischief and injustice result.

It is not possible here to enumerate all the grave injustices that have resulted from the confusion between coincidences and correlations. It is possible to refer only to an instance or two. In India, the "untouchables" are denied certain social rights on the ground that they are unclean; a correlation is presumed between the mere birth of certain persons and uncleanliness, and it follows from this presumption that every such person is unclean and not to be associated with. As a matter of fact, uncleanliness is not correlated with "untouchables"; unclean people occur both in the "untouchables" and caste people. Uncleanliness must be avoided wherever found, and not the "untouchables," even if clean. Similarly, the Negro in the U.S.A. and in Africa is denied social and political rights simply because he is a Negro. A correlation is presumed between the Negro race and slavery, and it follows from it that the Negro cannot be a citizen like the White man. If political rights are correlated with either an educational or property qualification, some Whites and some Negroes will be entitled to the vote. India is denied self-government of the democratic type on the ground that India is an Oriental country, and a correlation is presumed between Oriental peoples and autocratic rule, and between Occidentals and democracy. There is no such correlation, and hence no justification for the denial of democracy to India. ♀

Similarly, Orientals are excluded from the British Dominions and the U.S.A., on the ground largely of differences in the standards of living. A correlation is presumed between a race and a standard of living: the Whites have a higher standard than the Orientals, and the economic competition between the two will tend to lower the standards of living of the Whites. It is not true, however, that a race has a standard of living. Amongst most racial groups there are a number of standards of living, from that of the millionaire to that of the pauper and beggar. A number of individuals who are homogeneous for purposes of race are not homogeneous for purposes of the standard of living. If, for economic reasons, the poor people from abroad should be excluded from the U.S.A., it does not follow that the pauper immigrants from Europe should be admitted but not the rich people from Asia. *Economic ills need economic remedies and not racial ones.*

Similarly, grave injustices are done by the presumption that certain races are primitive, forgetting that no race is primitive, that every individual goes through a primitive stage and continues to be primitive in most ways, and the best among men can be civilized or skilled only in a few culture traits.

## *Conclusion*

AN objective study of the concept of Eastern and Western Civilizations reveals that it is an invalid concept which, like so many other superstitions, has caused much human injustice, cruelty and unhappiness. Civilization, meaning thereby all products of human activity down the ages, is not divisible into Eastern and Western. This civilization consists of a large and ever-growing number of culture-traits and culture-complexes, each of which was created by one person, and from him spread to others. Each culture-trait has its own culture area which fluctuates in time. Every individual is heir to all the culture complexes, if diffusion be free.

Each culture trait or complex divides humanity into two: those who have it and those who do not have it, at any particular time. If civilization is to be subdivided at all, it can be done only on the basis of culture traits or complexes, like Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, democracy, autocracy, dictatorship, manual industry and machine industry, science, superstition, slavery, war, and the thousand and one other culture traits. But not on the basis of East or West, or white or negro or brown, or tall or short.

Civilization is not property, though property is a culture trait, notwithstanding Lord Ronaldshay's (now Lord Zetland) statement to the contrary when he asked: "Whether in the scientific knowledge which is in special degree the property of the peoples of the West, we do not possess a golden gift which we can offer to the peoples of the East" (Ronaldshay, *India*, p. 280). In the first place, scientific knowledge is not property which can be owned. Whose property, for instance, are Darwinism, the laws of physics and chemistry and astronomy? In what sense are they the property of

the peoples of the West? There is ownership in property, but not in knowledge. If A shares his property with B, his share becomes less; if A shares his knowledge with B, his knowledge does not decrease; there will be two people with that knowledge instead of one.

In so far as knowledge of science or any other can be property at all, it cannot be the common property of the West, but only of certain individuals who own it. If certain knowledge is patented and becomes property, it belongs to the patentee alone and not to his friends, relatives, fellow-citizens, much less all the peoples of the West. If Thomas Alva Edison patented a number of inventions, the property belonged to him, and not to the peoples of the West to the exclusion of the peoples of the East; it was his, and no other, whether of the East or the West, had any right to it.

Civilization is a common heritage; each individual is heir to all knowledge. Each individual can take as much as he has opportunities for. The individual, and not a group, is the unit for the creation and acquisition of culture traits. What an individual can acquire, however, depends on his culture potential. But as culture potential cannot be measured and predetermined, the only right course is to secure *universal accessibility to universal culture*, and leave it to each individual to rise to the height of his culture potential.

*Civilization is one and is indivisible into Eastern and Western; its elements are a function ever of time, decreasingly of space but never of race.*

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